50th Anniversary Year

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

JULY 1972

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 50 JULY 1972 No. 4

THE ANGLO-IRISH PROBLEM

By John M. Lynch

IN the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when it was fashionable to speak of international problems in terms of "Questions" to be solved, the "Irish Question" proved particularly intractable for successive British governments. For Gladstone in 1886 it was "the long vexed and troubled relations between Great Britain and Ireland which exhibit to us the one and only conspicuous failure of the political genius of our race." He devoted much of his later political life to the question but his attempts to solve it were unsuccessful.

Lloyd George, a generation later, believed that he had found the answer. But his belief was tempered with caution. "I am not going to say that we have found the specific at last. This has been said too often. But we must try; at any rate I can see nothing better." Lloyd George's first attempt at a solution—the Government of Ireland Act, 1920—divided Ireland into two locally autonomous regions within the United Kingdom. "Northern Ireland" came into existence; but "Southern Ireland" was stillborn. So he negotiated with Irish nationalists (whose acceptance led to a civil war in their ranks) the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921. The Treaty provided that Ireland should have a status within the Commonwealth like that of Canada and other dominions but allowed Northern Ireland to opt out within a month and retain its existing status within the United Kingdom. Since Northern Ireland did opt out, the effect of his solution was the partition of Ireland.

After 50 years it is evident that Lloyd George's solution was not the right one. Partition shelved, but did not solve, the "Irish Question." Northern Ireland, one of the two entities which it brought into being, was never stable and it eventually became unworkable within its existing framework. In March of this

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year the British government prorogued its regional Parliament for a year and resumed responsibility for the region by appointing a Secretary of State with legislative and executive functions for which he is responsible to the Westminster Parliament.

The failure of Northern Ireland cannot be treated in isolation. Since it was one of the twin foundations of Lloyd George's answer to the "Irish Question," its breakdown reopens that question as a whole; and Britain and Ireland today must face again many of those issues which made it such a complex and difficult one for generations of British statesmen. But a wrong answer, which is seen to be wrong, may help to clarify the question.

It is necessary first to look back—to identify the problem and see why past solutions have gone wrong, but not to dwell on history for its own sake or to use it, in Edmund Burke's words, as "a magazine, furnishing offensive and defensive weapons." Then it is necessary to look clearly at the present situation to see what has changed over 50 years. And finally to look forward—to see the outline and general direction of a solution, but not to insist on precise and rigid proposals which might make it more difficult to achieve. This stage of transition, when the institutions of Northern Ireland have been suspended but not yet replaced and both Britain and Ireland are about to join the EEC, is a particularly suitable time for such an overall view.

To speak of the "Irish Question," as I have done so far, is to see the issue from the British viewpoint, as a major problem in British politics for generations. For Ireland, on the other hand, the problem could probably be called the "English Question"—though the issue was too basic, too fundamental to the very notion of a separate Irish identity, ever to be described in such a way. In the main, the issue is the relationship between Britain and Ireland; and to understand the present problem of Northern Ireland it is necessary to examine that relationship.

Britain and Ireland are two neighboring islands which have been deeply involved with one another for much of their history. The relationship began before either country had come to full conscious nationhood. For centuries it was one of half-successful conquest and its aftermath—as the larger island tried to establish its hegemony in the smaller. As Sir John Davies, an Englishman who was Attorney-General of Ireland under King James I, wrote in 1612, "the conquest of Ireland was made peece by peece, by slow steppes and degrees, and by seuerall attempts, in seuerall ages. There were sundry reuolutions, as well of the English for-

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tunes, as of Irish; some-whiles one preuailing, some-whiles the other. . . ." He explained that "euer since Our Nation had any footing in this Land, the State of England did earnestly desire, and did accordingly endeuour from time to time, to perfect the Conquest of this kingdom, but that in euery age there were found such impediments and defects in both Realmes, as caused almost an impossibility, that thinges should haue bin otherwise then they were." But Davies thought that the conquest had been completed in his own day. Three hundred years later, however, it was still not "perfected" and the "impediments" of which he spoke were still evident.

In the early period the conquest was a colonial one in the sense that its effect was to establish in Ireland an English colony, a "Pale," which varied in extent with the degree of assimilation by the native population of each successive influx of colonists and the attention which successive Kings of England could afford to devote to it. In Davies' own day colonization took a more determined form. Loyal English and Scottish settlers were settled on land confiscated after a series of unsuccessful Irish rebellions. Davies himself was deeply involved in the most successful and lasting of these settlements—the plantation of Ulster. By his time, too, a religious aspect had complicated matters and this was accentuated by the Cromwellian and Jacobite wars of the seventeenth century. The new settlers were largely Protestant, and the native population which they partly supplanted were generally unwilling to accept the reformed faith of those who had displaced them.

By the eighteenth century, however, what began as an English colony based in Dublin and the Pale was willing to identify itself as Irish; and Dean Swift and others of its writers asserted the Irish interest vigorously in some of their writings. Toward the end of that century it asserted the independence of its existing parliament in Dublin against the Westminster Parliament which had earlier assumed powers to legislate for Ireland. Unlike the American colonies, however, this "colony" had no thought of repudiating the Crown and it continued to accept the King as King of Ireland.

But there was a certain ambivalence in its sense of identity. Its parliament in its last years tried to follow the call which Henry Grattan, one of its leading members, made in a speech in 1780, "be a Parliament, become a nation." But it was still something

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less than a nation—an Ascendancy perhaps, but not a people. Its parliament had no place for the depressed mass of the native population, who were still largely Roman Catholic, and no place for those among the scarcely less depressed descendants of the seventeenth-century settlers in Ulster, who were Protestant dissenters from the Established Church and who had tenaciously held their position through the wars of the previous century.

Where the Ascendancy had looked to the American example, the two excluded groups—between them the great majority of the population—looked to the much more radical French Revolution. Under its influence, and with its help, they combined in temporary alliance in 1798 in a rebellion which tried to break the English connection and assert, for the first time in Irish history, a separate Irish Republic. The rebellion of 1798 in Ulster and elsewhere in Ireland was unsuccessful. But it led Pitt, the British Prime Minister of the day, to end the inconvenience and the dangers of a separate Irish parliament and bring both countries under a single government and parliament.

The Union took effect in 1801 and through the nineteenth century both countries formed the "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland." But almost from the outset there were demands on the Irish side for "Repeal." By the 1880s, under the leadership of Parnell, the well-organized and vociferous Irish Parliamentary Party, overwhelmingly victorious at each election, was pressing the case for "Home Rule" for Ireland in the House of Commons at Westminster. Pitt, in bringing about the Union, had found in Virgil a text to explain his policy:

> *Paribus se legibus ambae*
> *Invictae gentes aeterna in foedera mittant*
> (Let both peoples, unconquered, join in an eternal union under common laws.)

But he was too optimistic—the majority of the Irish people whose wishes had not been consulted in 1800 were now asserting their opposition to the Union.

By the latter part of the nineteenth century, the "Irish Question" was a complex one. A union of the two islands in a single kingdom had been tried for most of a century. But Irish separatist feeling had increased, not diminished. Government of Ireland direct from Westminster was clearly unacceptable to a majority of the Irish population, and it seemed to require a constant cycle of coercion and concession. The British Liberal Party,

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under Gladstone, saw that this could not continue. Gladstone, as Prime Minister in 1886, introduced a Bill to grant Home Rule, having come to accept that the interests of both countries required a separate, if subordinate, legislature for Ireland. But any change in the Union—even the limited separation which Gladstone's Home Rule would involve—evoked vehement opposition from a temporary coalition of two other forces. The British Conservative Party saw any weakening of the Union as a threat to the basis of the Empire. When out of office it also saw political advantage in the issue, so it encouraged, and allied itself with, minority opposition to Home Rule within Ireland.

In Ireland the issue divided the population largely on religious lines. Protestants of various denominations tended to favor the Union while Catholics were generally opposed to it. Two elements in the Irish population—the Ascendancy and the descendants of the Ulster "dissenters"—whose ancestors had been antagonistic to one another in 1798 were now against Home Rule and for the Union. But the population was not altogether divided on religious lines: some Roman Catholics were "Unionists;" and many of the prominent "Home Rulers," including Parnell, the leader of the Irish Party, and its founder, Isaac Butt, were Protestants.

Unionists claimed that Home Rule would prove to be "Rome Rule" since the majority of the population was Roman Catholic; and an economic interest in free trade, as well as imperialist sentiment, strengthened their opposition. The Industrial Revolution had come to Ireland since the Union but its effects had been largely confined to the North East which now feared that Home Rule for Ireland might eventually lead to tariffs between Britain and Ireland. The Home Rule issue aroused strong feelings for a generation, but no party to the controversy wished to partition Ireland. The issue was whether Ireland as a whole should have limited autonomy or whether it should remain an integral part of the United Kingdom.

At one stage, despite the forces ranged against it, a Home Rule settlement of the Anglo-Irish relationship did seem possible—though historians may speculate whether it would have fully satisfied Irish nationalist aspirations in the long term. Parnell at least was willing to settle for such an answer. He told the House of Commons on June 8, 1886, just before the crucial vote on the first Home Rule Bill: "I accept this Bill as a final settlement of

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our national question and I believe the Irish people will accept it." But the opportunity passed. Home Rule bills were defeated in 1886 and 1893. Although a Home Rule bill was enacted in 1914, just after the outbreak of the First World War, it was agreed, in deference to Unionist and Orange threats of rebellion, that it would not take effect until the war was over—and then only if it were amended.

At the end of the First World War, therefore, the "Irish Question" was still a conundrum for British politicians. But events no longer waited on a solution. Nationalist Ireland had despaired of Home Rule. It was now encouraged to seek change by force because it saw that the threat of force by the Unionist side had power to prevent change. So it took steps to solve the "English Question" for itself—by seeking complete separation. Two years after the Easter Week Rising of 1916 in Dublin, the separatist Sinn Féin party overwhelmed the old Irish Parliamentary Party of the Home Rule tradition at the 1918 general election. Sinn Féin captured 73 out of 105 parliamentary seats in all of Ireland while the Irish Parliamentary Party retained six. But the Sinn Féin members elected were pledged not to take their seats at Westminster. Instead, in January 1919, they established in Dublin an independent Irish parliament. This parliament—Dáil Éireann—set itself to make good its claim to be the parliament of an independent Ireland. A guerrilla war ensued against the British administration in Ireland over the next two years.

The British government of the day found itself facing a critical situation, and in the Prime Minister, Lloyd George, it had a Solomon who was prepared, in the event, to carry out a judgment which would mean dividing Ireland at least temporarily. The settlement which Lloyd George negotiated was, he believed, a pragmatic one. As he explained to the Irish delegation to the treaty negotiations in London on October 14, 1921: "It is no use ignoring facts however unpleasant they may be. The politician who thinks he can deal out abstract justice without reference to forces around him cannot govern."

He looked at the relative strength of the forces around him. The Conservatives and the Irish Unionists were no longer allied against Home Rule. The Conservative Party was now a partner in the government with Lloyd George's own party, the Liberals; their imperial sentiment had also weakened; and in the postwar

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period at the Versailles Peace Conference there was a more general acceptance of the principle of national self-determination. For these reasons the Conservatives had ceased to oppose some kind of Irish devolution and, handled with care, they might have been brought along in a settlement if Britain's strategic interests, as then understood, were maintained. But the other element of the old alliance against Home Rule—the Unionist minority in Ireland, which had been encouraged to believe that its armed opposition to self-government for Ireland could succeed —maintained its position. Conservative opinion would accept that such a minority could not forever obstruct a settlement. But it would not wholly abandon its former ally.

So Lloyd George treated with each of the two elements which he discerned in the Irish population. Since the Irish Unionists were concentrated in, though not confined to, the North East, he decided to meet their position by dividing Ireland and creating a separate region covering six counties, in which, taken as a whole (though not in each county), they would have an assured local majority. The Government of Ireland Act, 1920, divided Ireland into two parts—"Northern Ireland" and "Southern Ireland." Each part was to have local autonomy within the United Kingdom. A Council of Ireland would act as a link between them and provision was made so that it could ultimately lead to a single Irish parliament. The Unionists had not sought this settlement, but they accepted it. So "Northern Ireland" came into being. But "Southern Ireland" did not. Irish nationalism had long since gone beyond a limited devolution which also involved internal division. So guerrilla fighting against the British administration in Ireland continued.

By the end of 1921, when Northern Ireland was already functioning as a partly autonomous region within the United Kingdom, Lloyd George and his cabinet negotiated the Anglo-Irish Treaty with a declaration of Irish nationalist representatives from Dáil Éireann. The delegation pressed strongly against partition and for recognition of full Irish independence. But the treaty, signed on December 6, 1921, while granting Ireland the status of a dominion within the Commonwealth, allowed Northern Ireland, as already established, to opt out and remain as an area of limited local autonomy within the United Kingdom. There was henceforth a Unionist majority in Northern Ireland. The Unionists in that part of Ireland which became independent

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were left to adjust to life in the new "Irish Free State" (which later became a republic outside the Commonwealth). The treaty provided for a boundary commission to determine the boundaries between Northern Ireland and the rest of Ireland. Before the commission reported, its conclusions became known and were deemed unacceptable. The commission was wound up and so Northern Ireland has since remained a region covering six counties—Antrim, Armagh, Derry, Down, Fermanagh and Tyrone.

II

Pragmatism such as that of Lloyd George has its attractions—if it works. Since Lloyd George's settlement has obviously failed to work, one must ask how it went wrong and why it was the wrong approach to solving a difficult problem. A principal reason for its failure was the nature of the new entity of Northern Ireland which it created. I believe we can see three aspects of Northern Ireland which made it unsuitable from the outset.

Firstly, the area was not homogeneous. The border drawn by the 1920 Act had no basis in geography or history; it did not include the nine counties of the old province of Ulster. The six counties chosen constituted the maximum area in which the Unionist community would be assured of maintaining a majority. The aim, in the words of its first Prime Minister, Sir James Craig, was "to save as much of Ulster as we could hold." But to draw the border in this way was to include in the new area a substantial minority who were opposed to the settlement which made them permanently a minority under an unsympathetic government and who, though a minority in the six-county population as a whole, were a local majority in more than half of its area.

Secondly, in the creation of Northern Ireland, religious differences were publicly accepted as a basis for political division. This gave such differences a fundamental political importance from the outset because they became the symbol of loyalty or disloyalty.

Thirdly, the new local Parliament at Stormont was poorly designed to meet the difficult situation of a divided community. It was modeled on the British Parliament at Westminster where the government of the day has a virtual monopoly of power. At Westminster such a system works well because power changes hands at intervals as one party or the other gains a majority at

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the polls. But Northern Ireland had been so constituted as to ensure that there was a permanent Unionist majority in the area. The belief that the minority were a threat to the whole settlement and the politicization of religious differences gave that majority cohesiveness, so that the Unionist Party was always the majority party at Stormont and therefore always the "government of the day." The natural balance of the Westminster system did not exist—and no other restraint replaced it.

There were regular elections. But Unionist government, unlike most parliamentary governments, never faced an *effective* challenge at the polls over its 51-year history. Its leaders, however, were under constant pressure from their own right wing, which had real power to topple a leader if he seemed to be weak in dealing with minority "subversion." Such a system—which became in practice permanent one-party government, never free of hard-line pressures, and not subject to effective restraint on behalf of the minority community—could increase but not ease the division and bitterness between the communities. The British government at Westminster for its part, having created the subsidiary parliament in 1920, left Northern Ireland to a great extent to its own devices. This was to abdicate in practice the residual responsibility which it retained in principle. I do not believe it is unfair to describe such a settlement as a recipe for slow disaster. It created in Northern Ireland an inherently unstable region, politicized religious differences within it, gave it a parliamentary system which institutionalized community animosities, and left it to run its own local affairs for half a century.

If such an area were to work at all the minority had to be brought to acquiesce in what had happened. But instead of being brought fully into public affairs in order to win their consent, they were discriminated against as disloyal and systematically excluded from influence and office. Even if Roman Catholics accepted Northern Ireland as a *fait accompli* they were barred from effective membership in the governing Unionist Party. They should, it appeared, know their place as part of a passive minority, but not try to leave its ranks to seek a share in power within the party which controlled the state. A Roman Catholic, in effect, could be a "unionist" but not a "Unionist."

Despite its instability, Northern Ireland withstood sporadic and futile violence in almost every decade from those who refused to accept the Lloyd George settlement. But it did not with-

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stand equally well demands for civil rights which followed in the 1960s. Its immediate response to the civil rights movement was repressive and sometimes violent. When the Northern Ireland Prime Minister of the day, Terence O'Neill, tried to respond in a moderate fashion, he was forced to resign by right-wing pressures within his own party. It seemed as if demands for full equality of treatment by the minority challenged the assumption underlying the state—that it was to be a Unionist state with permanent Unionist control.

When the need for basic reforms became evident to British and world opinion in 1968 and 1969, reform was promised and slowly begun. But the real need was not simply to end the obvious abuses but to heal the deeper community divisions. Generous, speedy and effective reform might have done this; not slow and reluctant change after 50 years. The expectations of the minority were aroused but not met; and there was violence between groups on either side of the community divide. The British Army was introduced in 1969 in an active peacekeeping role, mainly to protect the minority. But because there was no thorough reform of structures at the same time, it tended, as time went on, to defend existing political structures because they represented "legality" in the area. The effort to repress minority violence by detention or internment without trial from August 1971 increased the violence and the alienation of the minority as a whole. It was because they accepted that a fresh beginning must be made that the British government prorogued the Stormont Parliament for a year as from March 1972.

III

The 1920–21 settlement also had an important effect on the nature of that part of Ireland which later became independent. Precisely because a separate area was created to accommodate most of the Irish Protestant community, the rest of Ireland came to independence with a largely Roman Catholic population—so that it is sometimes described in the press today as the "Catholic" Irish Republic. It was ironic that it should be so, since the Irish Republican tradition from which it derived had been explicitly nonsectarian in its origins and its founder and many of its most prominent leaders for over a century had been Protestant. But that it was so was an inevitable consequence of Lloyd George's whole approach.

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Historians may argue as to how far the twin foundations of his settlement—the 1920 Act and the 1921 Treaty—were part of a single deliberate policy and how far the second stage—the Anglo-Irish Treaty—was an improvisation. What matters today is their effect—a division of Ireland on largely confessional lines. The independent Irish State, while most of its population is Roman Catholic, is also heir to the nonsectarian principles of Irish republicanism. But, to some people today, it may be that Irish nationalism, as expressed in laws and in the present Irish Constitution, seems narrower and less generous than these principles promised.

These, then, were the unhappy results for Ireland of the 1920–21 settlement. But 50 years' experience has also shown some issues in a new light. First, it is now clear that, once they are freed of constraint, relations between Britain and Ireland are friendly. Historical passions quickly cool or dissipate when not inflamed by political institutions; and Britain and Ireland are not hostile to one another or embittered by history as might have been feared before Irish independence. The two countries have similar political institutions; they operate a passport-free common travel area and an Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area; 56 percent of the total trade of the Irish Republic is with Britain; the Republic is Britain's third largest customer; and as from January 1, 1973, the relationship will be closer as both countries join the enlarged European Communities. Only the "untied ends of England's Treaty settlement," as a recent English writer calls Northern Ireland, come between the two islands as a major divisive political issue.

Secondly, it is clear by now that this issue will not simply "go away" or "solve itself." Time will not settle the problem unless it is properly dealt with. Benign neglect by either side will not help to ease tensions in Northern Ireland or lessen the dangers of a serious explosion; nor will simple military repression or extremist "gunmen."

Thirdly, it is now evident that the minority is too large a proportion of the population in Northern Ireland to be governed without its consent. Even if repression of any violence coming from the minority could work for a time, the problem would recur again within a few years when the children of violence grow a little older. So we must face the problem now and try to settle it on a lasting basis.

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What precisely is the problem? And how should we try to solve it? Before answering these questions we must clarify some misapprehensions so that we will at least see what it is not.

A first mistake is to assume that the issue is primarily a religious one. The divisions in Northern Ireland are not *about* religion; they cannot be accounted for as an anachronistic remnant of the religious wars of seventeenth-century Europe. Indeed the fundamental mistake underlying the partition of Ireland was that it tended to treat the majority and minority religious communities in Ireland as if each were monolithic and then politicized religion by trying to divide the island between them. What has mattered most in Ireland's political history and what matters still today in Northern Ireland is not religion as such but the sense of the majority or minority community identity. There is no doubt that this is often determined by religious affiliation. But it can come about in other ways; and where it does, it is simplistic to think that the mere appointment of a Catholic as such to government could have lessened the alienation of the "Catholic" minority; or that Protestantism or agnosticism as such is a bar to leadership within that minority.

A second misapprehension is to treat the issue purely in colonial terms and to see the Unionist minority in Ireland as a community of "colons" to be provided for in a separate enclave linked with the motherland while the majority enjoy independence. It is questionable, to say the least, whether such a solution of a problem of decolonization is ever politically wise. But whatever the origins of the "Irish Question," such a view of it is no longer valid. No group or part of the population in Ireland—whether or not identifiable as to ancestry or antecedents—can be regarded as the "authentic" Irish; and, conversely, no group, whatever its present loyalties and attitudes, can be regarded as "colons." In any case, to treat in colonial or quasi-colonial terms the complex relationship between these two islands of Western Europe, which lie so close to one another physically, whose history is so intertwined and which still have so many lasting and growing interests in common, is to fail completely to understand it.

It has sometimes been suggested, however, that there be a partition of the present six-county area so as to cede the areas where the anti-Unionist population is strongest to the Irish Republic and to integrate the remainder fully into the United Kingdom.

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Such a settlement would still be unstable since there is no area of Northern Ireland which is homogeneously Unionist. But, beyond this, an attempt now to assert that any part of Ireland is irretrievably British would, as a former British Home Secretary said in the British House of Commons as recently as March 1972, be "an historical blunder of the first magnitude;" it would thoroughly alienate the majority in Ireland and would bring Ireland directly into conflict with Britain.

I wonder if those Unionist politicians who seek the full integration of Northern Ireland into the United Kingdom, following the shock of the loss of their Parliament and government, realize the folly of their demand. In asserting that being British is more important to them than being Irish, they risk recreating a colonial frame of reference and identifying themselves as "colons" in Ireland. Nor can Northern Ireland be regarded as in any sense a "disputed territory." Its future is not one to be settled by arbitration by an international court, by re-partition, by population shifts or otherwise between two contending parties.

When the issue is seen in these terms it is evident that it is no solution to deal with Northern Ireland in isolation on the grounds that its 50 years of existence have given it permanence. It is true that as Sir Lewis Namier said, "it serves no purpose to expostulate with history." But to face this problem as it must be faced is not to expostulate with history but to try to change present realities which dam up historical passions in a way which menaces both Britain and Ireland.

The real issue to be settled is not that of Northern Ireland. That was never the question—it was an answer, or part of an answer, to a larger question. Now that it has been proved inadequate that larger question remains. That larger and still outstanding question is how to achieve a settlement between the two islands which will ensure good relations between them—granted that Union did not work; that the division of Ireland has not worked; and that the incorporation of Northern Ireland, or any part of it, fully within the United Kingdom cannot work.

IV

I consider that the only solution is an Ireland united by agreement, in independence; an Ireland in a friendly relationship with Britain; an Ireland which will be a member with Britain of the enlarged European Communities. I hold this view because I

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believe that there is no other way to dispose of the contentious and difficult legacy which history has left to our two islands—certainly no way which will not compound the problem for our children. I shall try to be more specific. The points I set out below are an attempt to outline some of the views which I believe any realistic observer who studies the problem in any depth would come to.

Firstly, I consider that the decision by the British government to exercise its full responsibility for Northern Ireland directly for one year from March 1972 was a positive step because it meant a recognition that it was not possible to work through the existing structures. But that step was presented only as a necessary preliminary to a solution and not as itself a solution.

Secondly, I consider that any attempt to follow it up by integrating Northern Ireland fully into the United Kingdom would be disastrous. A substantial minority in the North would permanently resist it with the support of the great majority of the people of Ireland. Such an attempt would drive a wedge between the majority populations of the two islands; and, as I have explained, Northern Ireland cannot be dealt with without reference to the Anglo-Irish relationship as a whole.

Thirdly, Britain should recognize that the more intransigent among the Unionist minority in Ireland are not entitled to a permanent veto on harmony in Anglo-Irish relations; and recognizing this, should begin to work toward a real settlement. Such a settlement should not impose unity by force. But where the earlier settlement tended to encourage continuing division, this new settlement should offer positive and direct encouragement to unity, accepting that the fears of a community of less than one million should not stand permanently in the way of reconciliation between all the peoples of both islands. Many of the Unionist community realize that Irish unity is inevitable and are increasingly willing to consider the idea. They should be offered positive and direct encouragement in that direction.

Fourthly, while I consider that the division of Ireland was misguided from the outset, I recognize that obtaining unity is a difficult process. There has to be a growth of trust and reconciliation on all sides. But I believe that Irish unity should be the aim, and a commitment should be made by the British government to its achievement.

Fifthly, it should be clear that a united Ireland will not be an

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Ireland in which the present state in the "South" takes over the "North" and assimilates it into its existing structures. There should be negotiation, but it should be about a *new* Ireland.

Sixthly, the new Ireland to which I have referred should not involve any levelling down, on either side, of existing social or economic standards. There *are* discrepancies at present but they are not insurmountable and they are lessening. The real dividing line in Ireland so far as economic prosperity is concerned has always been an East-West and not a North-South one. At present the link with Britain provides substantial direct and indirect subsidies to Northern Ireland. In any settlement arrangements these subsidies would no doubt eventually have to be phased out; but this should be done over a period. Growing integration of the economies of all EEC member countries should help. Regional development policies of the EEC will also be helpful to each part of what is largely a single region—as will the general increase in prosperity of all within the EEC. Beyond this, however, the aspect of a united Ireland which would be most conducive to long-term economic prosperity would be its ability to concentrate its energies on building a better life for its people —instead of dissipating them, as at present, in division and recrimination.

V

What should be the constitution of this new Ireland? Obviously it must reflect the values and meet the legitimate interests of all sections of its population.

A constitution can take a number of forms. The British Constitution, for example, is not a single written document but a whole structure of conventions, laws, political institutions and established practices. What has often been referred to as the "Constitution of Northern Ireland" was simply an Act of the Westminster Parliament—the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, as amended by subsequent enactments. The Irish Constitution on the other hand, like that of the United States, is a written one. It was adopted by referendum in 1937 and its provisions require any amendments to be adopted first by Parliament and then submitted to the people in referendum.

The 1937 Constitution as it stands is not suitable for a new Ireland. My own view is that it would be better to regard the new Ireland as an entirely new political entity which should work

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out and enact for itself its own constitution. I do not say this because of reluctance to consider the changes necessary for a new Ireland but on the contrary because I believe that a fresh start could be a better approach. This would not, however, exclude preparatory work being undertaken now.

Parnell said in 1886 that, "the best system of Government for a country [is] . . . one which requires that that Government should be the resultant of all the forces within that country." I think something similar is true of the final working out of a constitution and system of government for a new Ireland. These are matters best worked out by the representatives of all those who are to live under the new structures. A philosopher or a constitutional lawyer may advise or draft a constitution; but he should not, I think, attempt to write the final version, at least not in a situation such as ours in Ireland, where the building up of trust and the overcoming of fears are so important.

The constitution of the new Ireland would have to be a written one with firm and explicit guarantees for the rights and liberties of all who live under it. I would tend to favor the view that these guarantees should relate to the individual citizen rather than to institutions as such. The constitution makers should perhaps take a "minimal" approach, *i.e.* not start from broad philosophical assumptions but, instead, try to piece together an agreement on what is necessary for government to function while ensuring rights and liberties to the individual.

VI

Though I have frequently referred in this article to the "Irish Question" it is no longer fashionable, as it once was, to speak of international problems in terms of "Questions." Perhaps to do so implies that "answers" exist, and there is a pessimistic tendency today to accept that some questions are unanswerable. But I do not believe that either Britain or Ireland can accept this kind of thinking. In the Anglo-Irish relationship Northern Ireland is a problem to which there is a solution; it is not an unanswerable question.

The solution which I have outlined is that Ireland as a whole should assert a new and more comprehensive identity.

What is it exactly that gives a people a sense of national identity? What is it that determines how the first person plural—the "we"—shall be used when a nation speaks of its history? In Ire-

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land, the majority—probably quite unhistorically—refer their sense of a common origin to a particular wave of early Celtic settlers in the island in pre-Christian times, while the Protestant-Unionist community in the North generally refer theirs to the settlements and religious-political wars of the seventeenth century.

No section of the Irish population today can afford to assert its identity in such terms as these, if to do so means excluding another section or regarding it as alien. Ireland's greatest need today is that all who live in the island should live and work in harmony. I quote once more from Parnell: "No Sir; we cannot give up a single Irishman. We want the energy, the patriotism, the talents, and the work of every Irishman."

An English observer in Ireland more than 300 years ago remarked that: "In kingdoms conquered, nothing but time, and that also must be the flux of hundreds of years, has power to unite the conqueror's issue and the ancient inhabitants in perfect amity." In Ireland time *has* passed. But we see now that Lloyd George's solution did not ease, but rather blocked, the effect of its flux. It was a solution which seemed to him to respond best to the exigencies of British politics at the time—which had earlier encouraged intransigence on the part of a minority in Ireland. But, based as it was on such considerations, it was unlikely to meet the best long-term interests of both islands. It is obvious now that it has not done so. In face of its evident failure, the British government today must respond to the real and pressing imperative—which is to encourage and assist a settlement among Irishmen about Ireland, and not to obstruct it nor to be merely neutral about it.

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WEIGHING THE BALANCE OF POWER

By Stanley Hoffmann

"THE end of the bipolar postwar world" has been acknowledged by the latest presidential State of the World message. Although it is elliptic in describing the new design for a lasting and stable "structure of peace," there is little doubt that the blueprint for the future is inspired by the past. It is the model of the balance of power which moderated, if not the aspirations at least the accomplishments, of rulers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It restrained violence (without curtailing wars). It provided enough flexibility to ensure a century of global peace after the Congress of Vienna, despite drastic changes in the relative strengths and fortunes of the main actors.

If, in the quest for international stability, this model is in favor again, it is not only because of the preferences of that student of nineteenth-century diplomacy, Henry Kissinger. It is also because the Yalta system is coming to an end. For many years, the world has ceased to resemble the confrontation of Athens and Sparta. Nuclear weapons have muted the rivalry. The universal drive for independence has made each rival's hegemony over, or interventions outside, his camp costly and delicate (on the communist side, it has led to the Sino-Soviet break). The very heterogeneity of a world filled with stubborn crises which do not let themselves be absorbed by the East-West conflict has made the cold war irrelevant for some areas and has dampened it in others, given the superpowers' reluctance to allow themselves to be dragged into partly alien causes and to let confrontations by proxies turn into direct clashes.

In such circumstances, the balance-of-power model is tempting. As long as the world remains a contest of actors without any supranational force, the ambitions of troublemakers have to be contained by the power of the other states; but equilibrium would be assured in a more shifting, subtle and supple way than in the recent past of fixed blocs. In a world of several main actors, the need for a superpower to be not merely the architect but chief mason of global containment would fade away. Restraining a troublemaker would be either the joint affair of several major states, or even of merely some of them, on whom the United

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States could rely, just as Britain could often rely on the continental powers stalemating one another. The small nations would find security, not in submission to a leader, or in a neutralist shelter, but in the balance of power itself, which would allow them to pursue more actively their interests within its less constraining limits.

Thus, mobility would return to the scene. A new age of diplomacy (and perhaps of its traditional concomitant, international law) would begin. Muted bipolarity has subjected the United States to maximum exertions and minimum results, or at least maximum constraints. The new system would provide two remedies for frustration: the political corrective of self-restraint, and the psychological compensation of openly pursuing one's national interest without having either to subordinate it to the solidarity, or to wrap it in the priorities, of one's camp. The United States would again be able to choose when, where, and whether to intervene at all. Therefore it could concentrate on the long-range, instead of rushing from the pressing to the urgent.

The President's reports and statements point to a pentagonal system in which the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Japan and Western Europe would be the main actors. This vision raises three sets of questions. Is the United States, as a society and as a state, willing and able to pursue such a policy? Does the world of the last third of the twentieth century lend itself to a system based on the model of European cabinet diplomacy? If the answer to these questions should be no, what ought to be the alternative? I have dealt elsewhere with the first question.[1] This article addresses itself to the second question and only inferentially to the third. Since it is a critical exercise, two preliminary caveats are in order. First, this essay does not state that the new policy is a simple resurrection of the European balance of power. It examines the features of the present world that do not lend themselves to any direct transposition. It also asks whether recent U.S. tactics contribute to the advent of that moderate structure called for by its leaders. Secondly, it does not deny that the ends of international moderation and American self-restraint are highly desirable. It wonders whether they are likely to be delivered through the means of the balance. Indeed, are these ends themselves entirely compatible?

[1] See *Foreign Policy*, No. 7, Summer 1972.

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II

To use Raymond Aron's terms, the balance of power is a model of "strategic-diplomatic behavior." The essence of international relations is seen as a contest of states on a chessboard on which the players try to maximize their power at each other's expense, and on which the possibility of war makes military potential and might the chief criteria of power. This view still fits much of the "game of nations," for it follows from the logic of a decentralized milieu, whatever the specific nature of the units or the social and economic systems which they embody.

For such a game to be played according to the rules of the balance, various conditions had, in the past, to be met. First, there had to be a number of major actors superior to two—it usually was around five or six—of comparable if not equal power. Today's distribution of power among the top actors is quite different. Only two states are actual world powers, involved in most of the globe, indispensable for all important settlements. China is still mainly a regional power, more concerned with breaking out of encirclement than with active involvement outside. While Chinese leaders assert that China will never want to become a superpower, there is no way of predicting that this will indeed be the case. Even if both dogma and growing power should push Peking toward a global role, given its internal problems the transition will be long, and China is bound to remain in the meantime a potential superpower, *i.e.* a major player presently limited in scope but exerting considerable attraction globally.

As for the other two "poles," they do not exist at all. Both Japan and Western Europe are military dependents of the United States. Neither, despite huge economic power, behaves on the strategic-diplomatic chessboard as if it intended to play a world role under the American nuclear umbrella. Japan, so far, does not have even a clear regional policy. Western Europe, so far, is a promise, not a real political entity. The current *relance* of her integration was made possible by a kind of tacit agreement to reverse the Gaullist order of priorities and to put the economic, monetary and institutional tasks of enlarged community-building ahead of the painful and divisive ones of foreign policy and defense coördination. In the traditional arena of world politics, pentagonal polycentrism does not yet exist. It would have to be created. Can it be?

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A second condition for the functioning of the balance-of-power system in the past was the presence of a central balancing mechanism: the ability of several of the main actors to coalesce in order to deter or to blunt the expansion of one or more powers. This corresponds to two fundamental realities. One was the inability of any one power to annihilate any other, the other was the usefulness of force. Aggressively, force was a productive instrument of expansion; preventively or repressively, the call to arms against a troublemaker served as the moment of truth. The invention of nuclear weapons and their present distribution have thoroughly transformed the situation. The resort to nuclear weapons can obviously not be a balancing technique. Indeed, the central mechanism's purpose is the *avoidance* of nuclear conflict, the adjournment *sine die* of the moment of nuclear truth.

The central mechanism of deterrence is likely to remain for a long time bipolar. Only the United States and the Soviet Union have the capacity to annihilate each other—a capacity distinct from that which France, Britain and China possess, of severely wounding a superpower but suffering either total or unbearable destruction in return. Only the superpowers can deter each other, not merely from nuclear but also from large-scale conventional war, and from the nuclear blackmail of third parties. Their advance over other nuclear powers remains enormous, quantitatively and qualitatively. It is doubtful that Peking could find the indispensable shortcuts to catch up with Moscow and Washington. Nor is a nuclear Japan likely to outstrip the Americans and the Russians; political and psychological inhibitions in the Japanese polity are likely to delay, for a while at least, a decision to join the nuclear race, and to limit the scope of an eventual nuclear effort. Western Europe continues to have an internal problem not unlike that of squaring a vicious circle. Mr. Heath may prudently prod Mr. Pompidou toward nuclear coöperation. But Britain's special nuclear relationship to Washington, plus Gaullist doctrine, are obstacles even to that modest proposal. A genuine "West European" deterrent would require a central political and military process of decision, of which there are no traces: nor is there a willingness by Bonn to consecrate the Franco-British nuclear duopoly or a willingness by London and Paris to include Bonn. This problem, unresolved within NATO, risks being insoluble here too.

A pentagon of nuclear powers is not desirable, and could be

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dangerous. It is not necessary: the deterrence of nuclear war is not a matter of coalitions. What deters Moscow, or Peking, from nuclear war is the certainty of destruction. To add the potential nuclear strength of a Japanese or of a West European strategic force to that of the United States may theoretically complicate an aggressor's calculations, but it does not change the picture. One might, of course, object with the familiar argument according to which nuclear parity between the superpowers vitiates the U.S. guarantee: would the United States risk its own destruction for the protection of Paris or Tokyo? Granted that coalitions are not important, is not the deterrence of nuclear war, nuclear blackmail and large-scale conventional attack likely only if the most tempting targets develop their own deterrents? To this, there are three replies.

First, there is never much point in desiring the improbable. For a long time, if not forever, the inferiority of Japan's and Western Europe's nuclear forces would be such that deterrence could not be assured by them alone. At the nuclear level, the United States could not expect to play the role of non-engaged holder of the balance which theorists have described as Britain's in the past centuries. Only the two superpowers would have the capacity—if not the will—to declare that certain positions are vital to their interests, and protected by their missiles. Other *forces de frappe,* even if invulnerable, would not have a credible protective power outside of their territories.

Secondly, the Chinese would feel threatened by a nuclear Japan, capable of dwarfing China's costly efforts, and the Soviets would react vigorously to any formula that put a West German finger near or on the trigger of a West European integrated *force de frappe.* For the United States actually to support the nuclear development of Western Europe and Japan, in the hope of being ultimately relieved of its role as nuclear guarantor, and in the conviction that the present central balance makes any Soviet or Chinese retaliation impossible would sacrifice, if not nuclear peace, at least the chances of moderation and détente to a distant and dubious pentagonal nuclear "balance."

Thirdly, a world of five major nuclear powers would be of questionable stability and probably foster further proliferation. Maybe five strategic forces of comparable levels could be "stable": each would-be aggressor would be deterred, not by a coalition, or by a third party's guarantee of the victim, but by that

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potential victim's own force. However, we are talking about five very uneven forces. The balance of uncertainty which up to now has leaned toward deterrence and restraint could begin oscillating furiously. Even if it should never settle on the side of nuclear war, it would promote an arms race *à cinq*. It is impossible to devise a "moderate" international system under these circumstances. Moreover, the very argument which stresses the dubious nature of nuclear guarantees to others would incite more states to follow the examples of Western Europe and Japan. In such a world some would have a second-strike capacity against each other, but a first-strike capacity against others.

In this area, then, the desire for moderation and the dream of self-restraint are hardly compatible. If the United States, in order to prevent proliferation to nations which are currently its allies, acts so as to keep its nuclear guarantee credible, the tensions of over-involvement will persist, and the world will not be pentagonal. If the pursuit of a more narrowly defined national interest, if doubts about the long-run credibility of nuclear guarantees, and if the desire for "burden sharing" should lead the United States to encourage nuclear proliferation, the result would be neither very safe nor conducive to the world of the balance of power with its central multipolar mechanism. For even if global peace should remain assured by the central mechanism of bipolar deterrence, the globe would probably fragment into a series of uncertain regional nuclear balances.

What of a return to a conventional balancing mechanism comparable to that of the past? It has been asserted that the very unusability of nuclear weapons restores the conditions of traditional war. But the picture is likely to be the same. Against a nuclear power, conventional forces are simply not a sufficiently credible deterrent. Deterrence of nuclear attack, or of nuclear escalation by a "conventional" aggressor, depends on either the possession of nuclear forces, or on protection by a credible nuclear guarantor. Even if conventional war provides moments of partial truth, ultimate truth is either nuclear war or its effective, *i.e.* nuclear, deterrence. For Japan and Western Europe to concentrate on conventional forces alone would mean consecrating a division among the "great powers." They are unlikely to want to do so. But if they should, there would still be a qualitative difference in status and influence between the three nuclear powers and the other two.

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Moreover, from the viewpoint of a conventional balance, a pentagonal world would not resemble the great-powers system of the past. All its members sought a world role. It is difficult to imagine either a West European entity or a conventionally rearmed Japan seeking one. Each one could become an important part of a regional balance of power—no more. This, of course, is not an argument against a conventional effort in Western Europe, which faces the Russian armies. Any such effort would have a considerable deterrent value. But this is a different problem from that of a central, worldwide balancing mechanism.

Under the nuclear stalemate, the logic of fragmentation operates here too. Would, even at this level, the United States be able to "play Britain," *i.e.* to contribute to a regional balance merely through its nuclear guarantee? In the West European case, nothing short of a disintegration of the Soviet Union—or the most drastic and unlikely mutual and balanced force reductions—is likely to make purely West European conventional forces comparable to Soviet and East European armies in the near future. Even if one believes that somewhat lower conventional forces in Western Europe *plus* the U.S. nuclear guarantee equal a credible deterrent, the plausibility of the guarantee will continue to depend on at least some U.S. presence, in the form of troops or tactical nuclear forces.

In the case of Japan, there is a difference, obviously. The main issue is not the deterrence of an invasion; a strong Japan could theoretically replace the United States as a balancer of Chinese or Soviet conventional designs in East Asia. But third parties—especially our former Asian outposts—may not want to be protected from one or another communist plague by what they might consider the Japanese cholera. As long as there are strong defense ties between Japan and the United States, a Japanese conventional rearmament would lead to complications for us. If we should loosen those ties in order to avoid these strains and to let an East Asian balance operate without us, we would encourage nuclear proliferation, and a loss of influence. On the conventional front, in Western Europe, the desirable is not likely; in East Asia, the likely is not desirable.

On this front, in the coming international system, three phenomena will manifest themselves. First, only the two superpowers are likely to remain, for a long time, capable of sending forces and supplies to distant parts of the globe. The world con-

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ceived as a single theater of military calculations and operations is likely to remain bipolar.

Secondly, as long as the fear of a nuclear disaster obliges the superpowers to avoid military provocation and direct armed clashes, and as long as China, Western Europe and Japan remain endowed only with modest conventional means, and largely neutralized militarily by their very connection to the central nuclear balance of deterrence, other states, equipped or protected by a superpower and in pursuit of objectives vital to them, will be able to provoke their own "moment of truth" and to build themselves up as regional centers of military power, as Israel has done in the Middle East, or North Vietnam in Southeast Asia. A coalition of states with great power but limited stakes is not enough to stop a local player with limited power but huge stakes. For the superpowers and for such local players, conventional force used outside their borders still has considerable productivity (although, paradoxically, the superpowers can use such force only in small doses or in limited spheres). For the other "poles" of the pentagon, however, the greatest utility of conventional force is likely to be negative: its contribution to deterrence.

Thirdly, the fragmentation which results both from the impact of nuclear weapons on world politics and from the regional nature of two, if not three, of the points of the pentagon, suggests that a future conventional balance of power will have to be regionalized some more. A strong Japan and a strong Western Europe are unlikely to ensure a sufficient balance in the Middle East or in South Asia, or even in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific.

Nuclear weapons have not abolished war, they have displaced it. The central mechanism of the past was aimed at the problem of large military interventions by a main actor. Now, whether they succeed depends less on a global mechanism than on a local one. No amount of coalition-building would have saved Czechoslovakia. No adversary coalition could have prevented the United States from moving into the Vietnam quagmire. Moreover, due to the fear of escalation, much of international politics on the diplomatic-strategic chessboard becomes a game of influence—less violent but more intense. There is an art of knowing how to deploy force rather than to use it, how to exploit internal circumstances in order to dislodge a rival. The traditional balancing mechanism may perhaps still function where the stakes

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are influence, not conquest; for military strength in an area can deter or restrict the subtle access which influence requires. A strong Western Europe associated with the United States would be guaranteed against "finlandization," for instance. However, there are complications even here. A coalition aimed at stopping a great power may actually goad it into "leaping" over the coalition, and leaning on local parties determined to preserve their own freedom of maneuver (a U.S.-Chinese coalition in Asia is not sure to stop Soviet influence). Also, if much depends on the internal circumstances in the area, neither military build-ups nor coalitions may compensate for local weakness. Anyhow, moderation at a global or even at regional levels is compatible with occasional setbacks.

The traditional mechanism is too gross for the modern variety of the old game. Also, its logic is a logic of arms races, nuclear or conventional. A game of influence partly played out with weapons supplies, in a world in which many statesmen continue to see in force the only effective way of reaching vital goals, risks leading to multiple wars. In past centuries, global moderation was compatible with such explosions; in a nuclear world, are they certain to be as limited as, and more localized than, before? Does the need for moderation not point both toward the preservation of the superpowers' nuclear stalemate and toward more arms-control agreements to prevent unilateral breakthroughs and competitive escalations into the absurd; toward both a multiplication of regional balances of power and regional arms-control systems?

III

A third requirement for an effective balance of power used to be the existence of a common language and code of behavior among the major actors. This did not mean identical régimes, or the complete insulation of foreign policy from domestic politics, or a code of coöperation. But the existence of a diplomatic *Internationale* reduced misperceptions, if not miscalculations. In the nineteenth century, it provided for congresses and conferences that proved the existence of a European Concert, however dissonant.

Today, summits too are fragmentary. To be sure, the imperative of avoiding destruction, and the need to meet internal demands inject into the major powers such a dose of "pragmatism"

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that the purely ideological ingredient of their diplomacy, or of their rhetoric, or both, has spectacularly declined. But we are still very far from a common language. Even a tacit code prescribing how to handle conflicts, how to avoid or resolve crises, how to climb down from high horses and how to save one another's face remains problematic for several reasons.

First, there is one important residue of ideology: the Sino-Soviet conflict, based largely on conflicts of interest but deepened and embittered by mutual charges of heresy. The United States can enjoy friendlier relations with either communist state than Moscow can have with Peking, and our détente with one may help to improve our relations with the other. But this does not suffice to bring about a moderate balance of power. To manipulate that animosity so as to benefit from it while avoiding getting entangled in it may require diplomatic skills far in excess of ours. Moreover, however much their mutual hatred softens their tone toward us, each one is likely to try to manipulate us against the other, and neither can reduce his hostility toward us too much—especially in so far as support of third parties against us is concerned—out of fear of opening the field to his rival.

Next, however much we may congratulate ourselves on having kept great-power conflicts under control and on negotiating with Moscow and Peking without ideological blinders, neither capital subscribes to a code of general self-restraint. An effective balance of power requires either agreements on spheres of influence and dividing lines, or hands-off arrangements neutralizing or internationalizing certain areas. Today, some spheres of influence are being respected: the Soviets' in Eastern Europe, ours in Latin America. Black Africa appears to be, in effect, neutralized. But Moscow and Peking both apply to the world a conceptual framework that dictates the exploitation of capitalist weaknesses and contradictions. Régimes in which the state not only controls but molds the society are better at granting priority to foreign affairs than régimes in which the impulses of the society actually control the state's freedom of action. The heterogeneity of many nations split along ethnic, class or ideological lines, which would make it impossible even for an angelic diplomacy dedicated to the principle of nonintervention to carry out its intentions, offers irresistible opportunities for diplomacies tied to a strategic (which does not mean necessarily warlike) vision

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of politics and to a dynamic reading of history. Khrushchev's proclamation of the "non-inevitability of war" was a landmark, but the less likely the use of overt force, the more subtly can influence be sought.

Those who, for years, feared a monolithic Soviet design for world subjugation were wrong, but so today are those who see in the Soviet Union merely a traditional power, or one interested mainly in the conservation of its sphere of influence. Prudence, yes, the simple preservation of the status quo, no. The very delicacy of the status quo in the one area where Moscow most assuredly tries to perpetuate it—Eastern Europe—the Soviet Union's inability, for domestic and external reasons, to separate security from domination there, the fact that the West cannot easily accept an equation which enslaves half of Europe, all this is likely to oblige the Soviet Union to keep trying to weaken the West in Europe, or at least to prevent it from strengthening itself. In the Middle East, in South Asia, on the world's oceans, the Soviets, without encouraging violence where it would backfire, and while supporting it where it works, behave as if any retreat, voluntary or not, of the United States and its allies, or any weak spot constitutes an invitation. This is not the code of behavior we would like Moscow to observe. But multipolarity is not Moscow's game, or interest.

Such tactics, if skillfully used, do not destroy moderation. But they test self-restraint. Of course, Moscow should be constrained to adjust its behavior to *our* code (and so could Peking if necessary), should we encourage other powers to fill the vacuum and to strengthen the weak spots. But we are caught between our own desire for détente and the fear that it would be compromised if we built up those of our allies whom our adversaries most suspect. Our rivals' game is to improve their relations with us in so far as we tend toward disengagement without substitution —in which case, our self-restraint could benefit them.

Two requirements for a new balance of power—relaxed relations with ex-enemies, and greater power for ex-dependents—are in conflict. Such will be America's dilemma as long as our interest in "flexible alignments" is matched by our rivals' search for clients; as long as their revolutionary ideology (not to be ignored just because their vision is, literally, millennial, and their tactics flexible), as well as their great-power fears or drives, result in a demand for security tantamount to a claim for either perma-

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nent domination where it already exists, or regional hegemony to exclude any rival. Whether or not Western Europe and Japan become major actors, Eastern Europe and East or Southeast Asia will remain potential sources of instability.

Multiple asymmetries are at work, therefore, in so far as a common code is concerned. There is the asymmetry between the ideologies of the Communists, and our conceptions, which envisage order as a self-perpetuating status quo, as a web of procedures and norms rather than as the ever-changing outcome of social struggles. There is an asymmetry between the active policies of the superpowers and the still nebulous ones of Western Europe and Japan—not so much poles of power as stakes in the contest between the United States, the Soviet Union and China. There is an asymmetry between the untenable global involvement of the United States, and a Soviet (and, potentially, Chinese) strategy that has to do little more than move into the crumbling positions on our front lines, or jump across into the rotting ones in the rear. Order and moderation used to be organic attributes of the international system, corresponding to domestic conditions within the main states, as well as to the horizontal ties between their diplomatic corps and codes. Tomorrow order and moderation will be more complex and mechanical, corresponding to the necessities of survival and to the price of opportunity.

A fourth condition for an effective balance-of-power system had to do with the international hierarchy. While the world was a much wider field in days of slow communications, the international system was simple: there were few actors, and the writ of the main ones covered the whole field. In Europe, the small powers had no other recourse but to entrust their independence to the balancing mechanism. Outside Europe, the great powers carved up the world. Today, the planet has shrunk, the superpowers are omnipresent, but there are more than 130 states. The small—thanks to the nuclear stalemate, or by standing on a greater power's shoulders—have acquired greater maneuverability and often have intractable concerns. Any orderly international system needs a hierarchy. But the relations of the top to the bottom, and the size of the top, vary. In the future world order, these relations will have to be more democratic, and the oligarchy will have to be bigger.

Consequently, and given the asymmetries described above, for the United States to worry almost exclusively about the central

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balance among the major actors, as if improved relations among them were a panacea, is an error. There are three ways of making such a mistake. One is benign neglect; we have practiced it in the Middle East for a couple of years after Israel's victory in the Six-Day War, and again in the Indian subcontinent, during the months that followed Yahya Khan's decision to suppress East Bengal. This provides one's rivals with splendid opportunities for implantation.

So could the second kind of error: reacting to a local challenge in one's traditional sphere of interest in an axiomatically "tough" way—for instance, cutting off aid to and exerting pressures on Latin American régimes intent on expanding control over their nation's resources.

Thirdly, it is a mistake to treat issues in which third parties are embroiled as if these countries were merely pawns in a global balancing game, instead of dealing with the issues' intrinsic merits and the nations' own interests. For it is most difficult to bring a theoretical balance no longer sanctioned by the moment of truth to bear on the local situation. To be sure, some important disputes among third parties, while autonomous in their origins, have become so much a part of the great powers' contest that the balancing game makes sense, either in the direction of escalation or in that of a settlement once the risks become too high. Such have been the Middle Eastern dynamics since 1970—when first the Soviets, then the United States, displayed increasing commitments to their respective clients, but also maneuvered so as to defuse the powder keg a bit. Yet this has not been the norm.

In the India-Pakistan war of December 1971, the United States, China and Pakistan did not "balance" India and Russia. Neither America nor China were ready to commit forces, and a verbal "tilting" toward Pakistan, aimed at safeguarding our rapprochement with Peking and at warning Moscow, merely underlined Moscow's successful exploitation of India's desire to dismantle Pakistan and strengthened unnecessarily the bonds between Moscow and Delhi. The traditional balance-of-power mechanism, while enforcing self-restraint upon ambitions, depended on the opposite of self-restraint—the readiness of the great powers to use force. If the risks are too high or the stakes too low, the balance cannot operate.

Vietnam yields a similar lesson. We have not dared escalate the war to the point of actually cutting off all Soviet and Chinese

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supplies to Hanoi. As a result, our attempt to coax Moscow into "restraining" Hanoi, *i.e.* to make of Vietnam a great-power issue, was doomed. Indeed, Vietnam, turned by us first into a test of misconstrued Chinese dogmas, now into a test of Soviet assumed intentions, shows that too much emphasis on the central balance and too little on local circumstances can be, if not globally, at least regionally destabilizing and destructive.

The proliferation of nations, like the impact of nuclear weapons, suggests a fragmentation of the traditional scene. The balance-of-power system assumes that peace is ultimately indivisible—although perhaps not every minute, as pure bipolarity does; more tolerant of minor shifts, it still sees any expansion by a great power as a threat to others. Our analysis suggests a greater divisibility of peace, and the more evanescent character of influence, as long as the central nuclear equilibrium lasts. What will have to be balanced, so to speak, are that equilibrium and the regional balances. Each one of these will have its own features, its own connection with (or perhaps, as in Black Africa today—but for how long?—disconnection from) the central balance. Thus, in the traditional arena, the *model* of the balance of power provides no real prescription, however wise the *idea* of balance remains. Five powers are not the answer. What matters is, first and still, the Big Two, in pursuit of universal influence, and in possession of global military means; secondly, if not all of the others, at least many more than China, Western Europe and Japan.

IV

Not only have the conditions of the old game drastically changed, but there are other games as well. The model of interstate competition under the threat of force accounts only for some of what goes on in world politics. Two distinctions which provided its bases are being eroded. One is the distinction between domestic politics and foreign policy. The latter is often the direct expression of domestic forces or the by-product of bureaucratic constellations (some of which involve transnational alliances of services or agencies) or the victim of equally transnational waves or contagions—constructive or destructive—carried by the new media. These waves both prove and promote the erosion of the distinction between public activities of states and private activities of citizens across borders.

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In the nineteenth-century balance, the latter provided an underpinning for interstate moderation, but they were not the constant or primary object of states' concerns (whenever they became their concern, the system deteriorated). Today, state policies are often impaired or inspired by transnational forces that range from corporations to scientists. Partly because of the importance of economic and scientific factors in a world driven by the quest for material progress, partly because of the relative decline of the traditional arena due to nuclear weapons, transnational relations raise increasingly important issues for states, and provide many new chessboards on which states pursue their interests, compete for advantages, yet are not the only actors.[2]

The model of the balance of power is doubly irrelevant to these new games. First, the logic of behavior is not the same. Although there is a competition of players for influence (as in all politics), and there is no power above them (as in all international politics), the stakes are not those of traditional diplomacy, and there are other restraints than those which on the other chessboard the "state of war" itself creates or destroys. Here, the threat of violence (however muted or diffuse) is of no utility or rationality. In the strategic-diplomatic arena, the central assumption of the contest is that ultimately my gain is your loss. My interest consists of either preventing or eliminating your gain or, should the costs prove too high, of "splitting the difference," or extracting a concession in return for my acceptance of your gain. It is not always a zero-sum game: at times, both sides can increase their power. But the perspective is still that of the final test of strength, which requires a constant calculation of force. Two powers cannot be number one simultaneously. Unless one is a seventeenth-century mercantilist lost in the twentieth, one can see that this is not an appropriate description of rational behavior on most of the economic and technological chessboards. The rules of interdependence, which condition the competition there, are not those of strategic interaction, which structure it here. The logic of the world economy, of world science and technology is, for better (growth and welfare) or worse (population explosion, pollution and depletion) a logic of integration. The logic of traditional international state politics is that of separateness. One may, as the communist states still partly do,

[2] See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (eds.), "Transnational Relations and World Politics," *International Organization*, vol. XXV, no. 3, Summer 1971.

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refuse to play games of interdependence; but if one plays them, their logic becomes compelling.

Here, quite often, your loss risks becoming mine: there is a worldwide transmission of depression, unemployment or inflation. Even when there is a test of wills—between, say, oil-producing countries and big oil companies— there is a joint incentive, often not merely to compromise but to "upgrade the common interest." A competition in fields where solidarity prevails because of the very nature of the factors in operation consists simply of the manipulation of interdependence. Even on the traditional chessboard, as we have seen, the old rules of strategic-diplomatic warfare are modified by nuclear interdependence, and tests of strength without the ultimate sanction of war become tests of will, at least among the major powers. Why apply the balancing model to new chessboards, when it falters on the old?

Secondly, not only does the balance of power not provide an answer, it addresses itself to the wrong problem. A world in which the autonomy of states is curtailed by transnational trends, drives and forces which operate unevenly, unpredictably and carry political flags and tags, a world whose states' policies reflect internal wants and bargains, is permanently threatened by "statist" reactions against global integration and outside intrusion—precisely because, however sieve-like, the state remains the final unit of decision, and the more like a sieve it becomes, the more it may try to plug the holes. Hence a curse of immoderation and instability, but in an original way.

It is not the use of force which is the daily peril, it is, literally, chaos. It is not war that brings the moment of truth, it is economic or monetary or environmental disaster. It is not the failure of the balance to work and curtail excessive ambitions, or the rigidity of the balance when it splits the world into rival, frozen coalitions, it is anomie. It is not the neglect or deterioration of familiar rules. It is the failure to clarify and to understand the new rules which govern the relations between different chessboards, the transfer of power from one to the other—these have only recently become major arenas of world politics: scholars are in the dark and statesmen experiment in ignorance or by analogy. Also to be feared is the inadequacy or breakdown of those rules, not of balance but of coöperation, that were devised in the past (for instance, the law of the seas), and the absence of rules of coöperation in a variety of disruptive cases in which

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no state can be successful in isolation—from the environment to short-term capital movements.

To apply irrelevant concepts is dangerous for general and for historical reasons. To proclaim "the primacy of the national interest" gives a free hand to domestic forces damaged or frustrated by the way these chessboards function, and encourages an epidemic of protectionist or aggressive measures. To use the logic of separateness in fields of integration invites disintegration here and discord on the traditional chessboard. Of the five "economic blocs" among which the balancing game is supposed to go on, two—those of our strategic-diplomatic rivals—are not fully integrated into the world economy. To treat Western Europe and Japan as rivals to be contained, just as we count on them to play a growing role in balancing our adversaries on that traditional chessboard, assumes that they will draw on it no consequence from our behavior on the economic chessboards, even while we use on the latter the advantages we have on, and the strong-arm tactics appropriate to, the former. This can only be self-defeating, for while each political function of a state—defense, welfare, economic growth, etc.—has some autonomy and logic, and each corresponding international chessboard has its rules, these functions all connect again at the one level that integrates them all, *i.e.* a state's foreign policy.

Historically, what requires a new policy is not the passing of the bipolar era but the end of a unipolar one. The rules of trade and finance prescribed at Bretton Woods and by GATT were those the United States wanted; they established a dollar-exchange standard and tended toward a liberal system of trade, which other nations accepted in return for security or aid. The United States tolerated exceptions to these rules in return for immediate military advantages (American bases in Japan) or for expected political benefits (a would-be "Atlanticist" Europe, growing out of the Common Market). It is this system which collapsed with the monetary crisis of 1971 and the acrimonious trade quarrels between the United States and its allies. The problem is to avoid a fragmentation of the world economy, which would breed chaos as surely as, in the strategic-diplomatic arena, fragmentation is likely to contribute to moderation.

A single world system must still be the goal. Of course, in the new monetary order, there should be a modicum of decentralization. A West European monetary union, with its own rules gov-

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erning the relations of currencies within the EEC, would be a part of such an order; a stronger and more coherent EEC would be better able than its members in the past to bargain with the United States for world rules of commerce, investment and money less geared to American specifications. But this is quite different from a break-up into independent economic blocs with fluctuating relations based on nothing but bargaining strength. The aggressive pursuit by the United States of national interests narrowly defined will inevitably be seen as a naked attempt at retrieving the dominating position we lost.

The United States, which is the lynchpin of the noncommunist world's transnational system, risks playing Samson in the temple. The flexibility which the world economy needs is not that of shifting alignments and reversible alliances. Even in cases where the United States has legitimate grievances, the solutions cannot be found in the functional equivalent of the strategic-diplomatic game of chicken: reprisals and protectionist threats. Given the stakes, the building of a moderate international system and the goal of a "world community" (utopian on the other chessboard) will have to be made increasingly close. Moderation is a negative goal: organizing the coexistence of hugely different players. It has, in the past, been compatible with a variety of woes—wars, assaults on the quality of life, arms races, internal massacres, a vast amount of domestic and internal inequality.

But it is difficult to conceive of a future international system remaining moderate if there is so much inequality between its members and turmoil in some of them as to incite permanent fishing in troubled waters, or recurrent violent exports of discontent. While, especially in the traditional arena, sovereignty would continue to manifest itself through unilateral moves or concerted diplomacy (although rather more for restraint than for self-assertion), there is a growing need for pooled sovereignty, shared powers and effective international institutions in all the new realms. Of course, a precondition is the maintenance of the central political-military balance. But American policy has tended in the past, and tends more than ever, to concentrate far too much of its energy on the precondition. There are two kinds of essential tasks: those which, if neglected or bungled, could lead to the ultimate disaster; those which the very success in postponing the "moment of truth," and the realities of a materially interdependent planet push onto the daily agenda. In a

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world full of active self-fulfilling memories—states which behave as if, despite nuclear weapons and the increasing costs of conquest, military might were still the yardstick of achievements, and by behaving in this way keep the past present—there ought to be equally active self-fulfilling prophecies: states moving on the conviction, so frequently asserted in words only, that on the seas of interdependence we are all in the same boat, and should worry more about common benefits than about national gains.

Community-building raises formidable questions of its own. Should it be primarily the duty of the developed nations, as some advocate paternalistically? Can an international system as diverse as this one function effectively without the active participation of all its members, even if one grants both the wisdom of "decoupling" the great powers' contest from the internal tribulations of the developing countries, and the risks of paralysis, corruption, or waste present in more "democratic" world institutions? Can community-building proceed in such a way as not to seem a neocolonial device through which the rich and strong perpetuate their hold on the poor? Is it compatible with economic spheres of influence? If such questions are recognized as imperative, then an economically and financially more cohesive Western Europe and a dynamic Japan would appear, not as "poles" to be contained or pushed back when they become too strong, but as contributors.

Yesterday's dialectic was that of a central balance between a handful of powers and imperialism, which pushed back the limits of the diplomatic world. Tomorrow's dialectic will have to be that of a complex balance, both global and regional, allowing for a fragmentation of the strategic-diplomatic contest under the nuclear stalemate, and an emergent community in which competition will, of course, persist, but where mankind ought, perhaps, slowly to learn to substitute games against (or with) nature for the games between what Erik Erikson has called "pseudospecies."

V

Faced with a world of unprecedented complexity, it is normal that U.S. policy-makers should seek a familiar thread. But they display a basic ambivalence. They aspire to a world in which the United States could share with others the burdens of being a great power. But they understand that self-restraint would be safe only

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if the game were played according to rules advantageous to us, and they realize that our favorite models and concepts may not at all be those of our would-be partners. And so they fall back on another conceptual habit, derived from the more recent past: that of explaining that we must still be the leaders and teachers of others, even if the goal is now defined as the balance, and the lesson called collective moderation. Between the desire for national self-restraint, and the ambition of shaping a system in which our influence endures, there is a tug of war.

If we define, as the President does in his moments of exuberance or in his fighting moods provoked by Vietnam, our main goal as the preservation of as much influence as possible, even limited disengagement will be hard to pursue. For it increases the chance that one or the other of our main rivals will move into the void, especially in those parts of the world where our clients are weak and have depended on our military presence or on huge injections of aid. Our extrication from Vietnam has been slowed down by this fear of a loss of influence, magnified by the belief that a victory for Hanoi would encourage anti-American forces everywhere: as if we were still in the mythical world of bipolar battle to the death. Should voids be filled by one of the new centers whose emergence we call for and should these decide to play their own game, we could find ourselves as deprived of influence as if we had been evicted by our rivals (against whom it would be more easy for us to react).

Our very concern for better relations with our chief rivals argues against disengagement in Europe and East Asia: for they may well prefer a U.S. presence in their respective neighborhoods (and the strains it creates in Washington and with our allies), to the might or magnetism of their immediate neighbors. At home, within or outside the Executive, many fear that any further disengagement would open the floodgates to "neo-isolationists" or protectionists. Influence remains an incentive for worldwide commitment, a goad to presidential rhetoric about indivisible peace and domino-shaped credibility. In Western Europe, it argues for having the Europeans contribute to the costs of American troops, rather than for a West European defense organization. This "burden-sharing" formula pleases the Treasury, reassures the military and seems a better way of deflecting Senator Mansfield.

If, on the contrary, we define our goal as devolution—the

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building of new centers of power in Western Europe and Japan —we are faced with a triple problem. One is their own long habit of dependence, their concentration on their internal problems or economic growth, which have insulated them from world responsibilities. De Gaulle's failure to create his "European Europe" resulted even more from the resistance of his neighbors to his global concerns than from their dislike of his style. Since last July, we have often appeared to kick our allies into rebellion deliberately. But that method of injecting pride conflicts with our ambition of having these new centers tied to us, playing our kind of game. Up to now, Western Europe and Japan have been far more eager to develop their power where it annoys or hurts us—in the trade and monetary fields—than in the military realm.

Secondly, our policy of détente encourages the West Europeans (some of whom preceded us) and the Japanese (who didn't dare) to seek their own entente with their communist neighbors; the goal of reconciliation interferes with that of a more dynamic diplomatic-strategic entity. The result, so far, is a postponement of the defense issue.

A third obstacle is the hostility of many of our smaller allies to a reduction of American power. South Korea, the Philippines or Taiwan clearly prefer our economic and military presence to Japan's—a distant protector is better than a close one. Even within the Europe of the Ten, some of the smaller powers may like America's military presence better than a European defense community dominated by the Bonn-London-Paris triangle. All three factors lead, incidentally, to one conclusion: if devolution is our goal, and especially if we want it safe, with partners rather than disaffected ex-allies, its forms and timetable should be negotiated between us and them, not between us and our chief rivals, as, in Western Europe, the linkage between the issue of American troops and mutual and balanced force reductions dangerously leads to, and as, in Asia, the moment and manner of Mr. Nixon's China trip inevitably suggest.

In our ambivalence, we have attempted to get the best of all possible worlds. On the traditional chessboard of world politics, this attempt has been given a name: the Nixon Doctrine. To preserve our influence, we maintain our commitments. But we expect our allies to do more for their own defense, and to count primarily on themselves if their fight is against subversion. A

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limited recipe for devolution and self-restraint, it raises two questions. One, will our allies continue to accept our definition of their job, *i.e.* will they play, in the new game, the role we assign to them? Our reinterpretation of our commitments provides them with a choice. They may read our doctrine not as a redistribution of strength but as a retreat from the contest, feel quite unqualified to take up the assignment, and define their national interest in a more neutralist direction.

Two, granted that they'll need tools for the job, will it be our tools—as in Vietnamization—or theirs? Will we, for instance, encourage them to develop their own defense industries? We have been most reluctant to do so. Our balance-of-payments problem has been one of the reasons for not encouraging too much local competition for our arms producers. So has our belief that we could have better control if we were the providers. This may be quite wrong. For dependence on a nation whose policy is not always clear, and whose supply of the tools may fluctuate according to domestic whims or sudden external shifts, creates the kind of insecurity that may breed accommodation with our chief rivals instead of "balance."

On the chessboards of interdependence, we have devalued the dollar, and the President's State of the World message speaks of the need for a new international monetary system that will "remove the disproportionate burden of responsibility for the system from this country's shoulders." However, our current policies seem aimed at preserving or increasing our advantages, as if to compensate for limited disinvolvement elsewhere. We have not taken steps to restore even partial convertibility. The world is still submitted to a dollar standard, and it is not clear that we are willing to subject the dollar to the constraints imposed on ordinary currencies. We seek a commercial surplus that would allow us to develop our exports of capital as well as goods. Allusions to the link between our role as providers of security, our demands for trade concessions, and the dollar's dominant position (which serves our investments abroad) reveal the depth of our ambivalence about the emergence of other power blocs. Should we succeed, because of Japan's and West Germany's continuing need for American protection, or because of the penetration of the British economy by the United States, we would actually make it more difficult to extend the Nixon Doctrine to Western Europe and Japan. Japan, utterly dependent on ex-

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ports to advanced countries, would face a crisis; Western Europe, whose integration barely begins to expand from trade and agriculture to currencies, would in effect become just a free trade area, and cease to be an entity.

Should they resist our attempt to get the best of all possible worlds, we might actually get the worst. American tactics could consolidate the EEC. A separate West European trade and monetary bloc could challenge the United States and destroy the chances of a single orderly world system for currencies and trade. But at the same time, the emergence of any West European diplomatic-strategic entity may be prevented by continuing divisions among EEC countries, the hostility of their public opinion to military and world responsibility, the desire of most leaders for a détente, and perhaps, if confidence in the United States declines, for some accommodation with Russia in anticipation of American force withdrawals. The United States would only have the choice between a military presence made even more unpopular at home by the EEC's economic separatism, and a disengagement that would spell a major loss of influence.

Japan has greater freedom of maneuver than Europe. She is under no threat of subjugation, however diffuse, and is part of a four-power game. American shock tactics and humiliation could breed two equally bad alternatives. One would be a rapprochement with China but in an anti-American context (by contrast with Brandt's *Ostpolitik*). Japan would move toward neutralism and pay the price China would demand for reconciliation. However, this price would be high in security terms, and the switch would not provide an answer to Japan's commercial needs. The other possibility is a gradual rapprochement with Russia, and an increasing militarization—conventional or nuclear—due to the fear of Chinese hostility and to a declining faith in the credibility of America's guarantee. Such a policy might help "contain" China, but in a highly unstable way, to Russia's benefit, and, again, with a considerable loss of influence for the United States.

The worst is never sure. But to avoid it, we must face two problems: of tactics and of goals. Tactics are particularly important in periods of transition from one system and policy to the next. There are two kinds of pitfalls. Sometimes one lets the past linger on too long, as in Vietnam. Vietnamization, aimed at facilitating military retreat, has also made the necessary political

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concessions more difficult. The stated fear of a disastrous impact of such concessions on America's other Asian allies sounds a bit hollow, given the shock to them of the way in which we undertook our rapprochement with Peking. The other pitfall consists of acting as if a desired future were already here in order to produce it. We have, especially in Asia, moved as if the era of horizontal great-power diplomacy had arrived; and our weaker allies are disconcerted. We have, both in Europe and in Asia, behaved as if our principal allies were already part friends, part rivals; and they are resentful.

Never have consultation, clarity, candor and coördination (as distinct from mere ex post facto information) been more important. Henry Kissinger, ten years ago, complained that the Kennedy administration, in its overtures to Russia, failed to consult and to reassure the West Germans sufficiently. The same could now be said about the China visits and the Japanese. To be sure, the present policy aims at having the three major competing powers establish together (or rather, at having each communist power establish with the United States) the framework within which all others would have to operate. We are trying to teach our allies to swim in the proper lanes—this may be a reaction against their past tendency to leave most of the swimming to us. But they may sink, or refuse to swim at all, or insist on choosing their own lanes.

Is this merely a contradiction between high-handed "great-power tactics" (partially explained by our concentrated policy process) and the goal of a less exposed role in world affairs? Does it not rather reflect our hope to preserve our past eminence, although at bargain prices? Does it not show that our brave talk about "breakthroughs" conceals far more continuity than change? What we seem to want bears a strong resemblance to Bismarck's system. We desire, at the same time, improved relations with the Soviet Union and with China, the continuation (in perhaps modified form) of our alliances with Western Europe and Japan, an improvement of our economic position as compared with that of our main allies-competitors. Bismarck was able to have tolerable relations with France, and defensive alliances with Austria, Russia and Italy. But the purpose of his alliances was limited to preventing France from building a coalition for revanche against Germany. They did not impose on Berlin the burden of protecting its allies against French aggression.

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They existed in a world of relative equality among the main powers, and considerable disconnection between *Grosspolitik* and the economic chessboards. They occurred in a century of secret diplomacy, when alliances were known to be passing affairs, and their terms could be kept in the dark without creating panics. Moreover, even Germany soon had to choose between the Russian and the Austrian connections—a choice that marked the end of the grand Bismarckian attempt at being both master and part of the balance.

Our current equivalent amounts not to a multipolar system, but to a tripolar one, with a comparably decisive but actually far heavier role for the United States. It is the United States which, in effect, protects the weakest of the three (China) from a Soviet strike; it is the United States which tries to hold the balance between Russia and China; it is the United States which attempts to contain each of these with the help of two subordinate alliances; it is the United States that guarantees its chief allies' security; it is the United States which tries to retain preponderance in the arena of interdependence. Such a vast design may be wishful thinking. Having proclaimed the primacy of the "free world" interest for 25 years, the United States can hardly make its new emphasis on the national interest the sole criterion of policy, and its way of using the power it enjoys on some chessboards in order to preserve or gain influence on others appear compatible with lasting alliances.

Our policy actually entails far less self-restraint than it promises and much less multipolarity than it pretends. World moderation will have to be pursued through other means. Neither in the strategic-diplomatic realm nor in all the others does a "pentagonal" world make sense: there are no likely or desirable five centers of comparable power in the former; and while there may well be in the latter, the issues and needs there have little to do with a balancing of poles. As for self-restraint, given the nature of our chief rivals, the responsibilities of nuclear might and the constraining need of a nuclear umbrella over Western Europe and Japan, there will be serious limits to its scope in the traditional arena. But our tactics of influence and instruments of policy are not doomed to remain as blunt and massive as in the past. Our goal should certainly be to build up autonomous strength in the main areas of the great-power contest.

But this does not mean worrying only about the "Big Five,"

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nor does it necessarily mean a militarization of Western Europe and Japan. Western Europe's future offers possibilities of a conventional defense organization, which it is in our interest to encourage even by reorganizing NATO's structure. Soviet opposition could hardly be effective if these moves were linked to gradual American withdrawals in a context of increasing East-West exchanges. The failure of such an organization to emerge and to grow could breed a transatlantic conflict about American troops in Europe. But even if these should leave, and if West European military coöperation remained imperfect, economic prosperity and political self-confidence would be the keys to West European strength.

In East Asia, we have nothing to gain by encouraging Japanese rearmament, conventional or nuclear, which could revive fears of Japanese domination. But the only chance of preventing it may be to provide Japan with real productivity for the power she has—economic power. Elsewhere as well, strength need not be defined too strictly in military terms, however important military might remains as an insurance against trouble. But when no autonomous strength can be found, we should disconnect ourselves entirely—as we should have done from Vietnam or Yahya Khan's Pakistan: then, our rivals' increase in influence has a greater chance of being fleeting. In all the other arenas of world politics, self-restraint may well be a necessity, and would assuredly be a virtue. Here, we must accept, rather than resent, the shift of power that has benefited our allies, and find ways of building a community against anarchy. But here as in the traditional sphere, self-restraint, contrary to the hopes of some, will consist of a variety of involvements, not a promise of disentanglement.

Above all, let us not confuse a set of worthy goals—the establishment of a moderate international system, new relations with our adversaries, the adjustment of our alliances to the new conditions of diplomacy and economics—with a technique—a balance of five powers—that turns out to correspond neither to the world's complex needs nor to our own ambivalent desires. A "structure of peace" cannot be brought about by restoring a bygone world. Rediscovering the "habits of moderation and compromise" requires a huge effort of imagination and innovation.

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A WORLD RESTORED?

By Alastair Buchan

IN the issue of *Time* of January 3, 1972, President Nixon is quoted as follows: "We must remember the only time in the history of the world that we have had any extended period of peace is when there has been balance of power. It is when one nation becomes infinitely more powerful in relation to its potential competitor that the danger of war arises. So I believe in a world in which the United States is powerful. I think it will be a safer world and a better world if we have a strong, healthy United States, Europe, Soviet Union, China, Japan, each balancing the other, not playing one against the other, an even balance."

It is a curious statement if taken at its face value. In the first place, it is historically untrue—a pentagonal balance of power produced two periods each of about 40 years of peace between the battles of Waterloo and the Marne and hardly existed afterward; in "the history of the world" the periods of deepest peace have been those of partial or universal empire. In addition, it negates a long-standing American declaratory position against a multiple power balance, symbolized by President Wilson's famous description of it at the Guildhall in 1918 as "a thing in which the balance was determined by the sword which was thrown in on one side or the other . . . the unstable equilibrium of competitive interests . . . maintained by jealous watchfulness and an antagonism of interests."

It abrogates at least a decade or more in which it was the conventional wisdom in Washington that the United States should be "infinitely more powerful in relation to its potential competitor." And finally, it assumes that, as in the eighteenth century, the five powers concerned have broadly the same range of resources at their disposal. This simply is not true today. The Soviet Union and the United States possess a degree of strategic, military and economic resources which the other three partners do not. Western Europe, the United States and Japan are advanced technological powers of a kind which the Soviet Union and China would like to be but are not. Western Europe has still only the characteristics of a supermarket and it will take it many years to acquire those of a single actor in world politics. Japan is not

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a military power in the ordinary sense and if she were to become one it might destroy the very system of balance of which the President speaks.

Before discussing whether the President is talking in archaic terms or not, one has to make one's own assessment of what are likely to be the most significant forms of power in the 1970s. The United States has lost its old strategic dominance over the Soviet Union. But is strategic power, that is to say nuclear weapons and long-range means of delivery, going to be the crucial means of exerting influence, the dominant expression of national power, in the years ahead? I am inclined to think that "the balance of prudence" has become the norm here, and last year's Soviet American agreements on the handling of a nuclear crisis or accident would seem to confirm this.

Moreover, one can, I think, detect a diminishing confidence on the part of the smaller nuclear powers that their own armories give them either real influence in the world or real security, which is not to say that they will dispense with them, especially as China perceives the Soviet Union as an active menace to her territorial integrity. But one factor which is common to all the nuclear powers, great and not so great, is concern with the cost of accepting the dictates of technological innovation and a growing readiness to distinguish between the possible and the desirable. These considerations are also present in the councils of advanced non-nuclear powers even though they may wish to keep their options open. The nonproliferation treaty is still a fragile instrument; but I detect less concern with the old Nth-power problem than, say, five years ago.

To say this is not to challenge the conventional wisdom that nuclear weapons would still probably provide the most potent source of influence in a situation of deteriorating or uncertain security for the major powers and in the crisis points of the world. All I would argue is that they now provide a relatively static form of influence, which seems not only less likely to be challenged or diffused than, say, a decade ago, but also one that will play a less central part in a somewhat more fluid calculation of interests and affiliations than was the case in the postwar decades.

Whether we are still in a bipolar situation or a multiple relationship of major powers, conventional forces also remain important. Force in being, the potential use of force, can be as impor-

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tant a form of political influence as force in battle. One of the factors which one cannot discount is that for over 25 years Soviet military power has been potential rather than employed, except for brief and decisive interventions in Budapest and Prague, whereas American military power, to say nothing of British and French, has been frequently deployed in action with all the shortcomings that the conduct of real conflict shows up.

But how politically significant this distinction is I am not sure because the readiness of the big powers to intervene with military force seems to me to be declining. I do not see any American administration being ready to repeat the Lebanon intervention of 1958 or that in the Dominican Republic in 1965 unless it had the direct mandate of a large number of other states as well. And despite the growing Soviet Navy, does not the active voice of China make Russian intervention in the third world—a landing in support of some African régime, for instance—less probable? Within Eastern Europe itself the difference in the Soviet handling of the Czech crisis, the Polish uprising and the sustained Rumanian defiance of the Kremlin's leadership is instructive even if it is not decisive. It is military aid rather than deployed force which has become the accepted form of intervention in the third world.

It is now becoming a Western interest—and in this I include the Japanese—to minimize the military aspect of power in a sense that was not true in the 1960s. And I find it difficult to see that it is in China's interest to maximize it. One can argue that this is not the Soviet view. But may they not be making a serious misjudgment about the temper of our times? May not the cumbrous decision-making machinery in Moscow have deduced from Cuba and Vietnam that we were entering a period when military power was the decisive aspect, only to find that by the time the ships and the missiles are built, the rules of the game are changing?

II

If strategic weapons appear to have become a rather less dynamic form of power and the exercise of conventional military force is to be hedged about with important limitations, does this make the exercise of political influence, both within the industrial world and in the developing world, relatively more significant? Obviously in the world as we know it, political influence cannot

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be wholly divorced from strategic and military potential. But the possession of force and influence have never been synonymous, even though the latter may be difficult to quantify and define. Considering a great power which is also a great civilization, one important aspect of influence is clearly the internal dynamism of its society. Does it provide the magnet for those that are trying to modernize or humanize their own societies? Britain had this effect from the day in the early nineteenth century when Pitt asserted that "Britain has saved herself by her exertions and will, as I trust, save Europe by her example," until 50 years later when Taine vividly exposed the cruel and seamy side of her Industrial Revolution. Germany in the latter part of the last century with its industrial vigor, Bismark's social legislation and the strength of its great universities (which provided the model for their American counterparts) played a similar role. For a while in the interwar years before the Stalin purges, it looked as if the Soviet Union might play it; but, as Isaiah Berlin pointed out many years ago, it was the success of the liberal pragmatism of the New Deal which weaned my own generation away from Marxism. Without question the United States was the magnetic power from the immediate postwar years until problems like race riots, student trouble, crime, the overloading of the legal system and the evident problems of the cities destroyed—temporarily, one hopes—the unique quality of the United States as the world's great experimental society. Perhaps China, if she would let more people look at her achievements more openly and more closely, could use this form of influence effectively, especially with the leaders of the developing world who face problems not dissimilar from those with which Peking found itself faced a generation ago.

A second element of political influence is national will—on which so many Teutonic and Anglo-Teutonic theses have been written—not necessarily the will to fight, but national will as an aspect of determination to change or maintain the nation's external environment. What proportion of its resources is a country prepared to devote to the achievement of its external goals, not necessarily in terms of armed forces but of involvement in the destinies of other states? What risks is a government prepared to take? To what extent is it prepared to assume the political consequences of external economic involvement? To what extent are its primary concerns domestic and its élites inward rather

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than outward-looking? How much authority does a government command among the young and the energetic?

Third, how good is its diplomacy? How sensitive to external susceptibilities is its decision-making apparatus? How consistent is its pursuit of its objectives? And lest anyone should think that I have in mind the well-documented vagaries of American policy over the past ten years, important though these have been in the loss of American influence in the world, it is worth remembering that in 1966 Prime Minister Harold Wilson told a Labour Party meeting that Britain's frontier was on the Himalayas and 15 months later took the final decision to withdraw all British military power from East of Suez. Moreover, diplomacy now has an altogether wider meaning, for it implies an ability to control the activities of one's own nationals, whose independent operations, as for instance in the multinational company, may conflict with broader national objectives.

No one can draw up an accurate balance sheet of the relative political power or influence of the major actors on the world stage today. In terms of political and social magnetism, what writers like Lord Acton have called the "moral factor" in diplomacy, the situation has become, and may well remain, that of a zero-sum game in the sense that no one power, society or capital city is now regarded as the central magnet; for what the United States has lost in terms of influence neither the Soviet Union nor China has gained as yet, nor Europe either, despite the many close ties of its component countries with different parts of the developing world. Nevertheless, it is a bleak fact that in terms of the will to extend control of its external environment and consistency in its pursuit of this goal, the Soviet Union is in some places gaining ground which the United States and Europe have lost: in the Middle East, in the subcontinent, in parts of Southeast Asia. Three new treaties of mutual assistance with Egypt, India and now Iraq—the first such treaties negotiated by the Soviet Union with noncommunist powers since the war—represent the ratification of a major extension of Soviet political commitment.

There remains the fourth level of power, economic power, whose external influence is related, though only partially, to the other three. Here there is a real danger that we may be entering a period of "power politics," something quite different from the acceptance of a balance of power, a preoccupation with the wel-

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fare of my side rather than the general health and stability of the international landscape. If democratic governments in particular are unable to find the answer to the unfamiliar phenomenon of growing inflation coupled with growing unemployment, then some of the dangerous features of the 1930s are likely to recur. If the United States, Western Europe and Japan cannot find limits of accommodation in both the trade and monetary fields quite soon, then the prospects of a stable balance of power, not only between themselves but with the communist powers as well, are poor indeed.

If one combines the four planes of power, then I suppose we have achieved a sort of pentagonal relationship, uneven though their interaction may be.

But in terms of the interface of the four levels of power, it seems to me more realistic to think in terms of two different foci of international politics, Europe and East Asia, with only the two superpowers actively engaged in each, even if certain kinds of development in one area may have an indirect bearing on developments in the other. In both areas the key concept to the maintenance of a stable balance is what Marshall Shulman has recently described as "access," or the right of interpenetration, the resistance of any claim to an exclusive sphere of influence.[1] I note with encouragement a recent statement by Secretary Rogers that in effect repeals the Monroe Doctrine and accepts the principle of mutual accessibility in Latin America.

III

In Europe, we are groping our way toward a new relationship on two and eventually three fronts: among ourselves, toward the Soviet Union, and eventually toward the United States. The first process has started very late in the day because the 1960s were dominated by an argument about the balance of power in Western Europe itself, whether it would be a French-run system or a genuine coalition of equals. What is involved is not merely the enlargement of the Community, which itself is a difficult process, but the evolution of political institutions which can enable the European governments to speak with similar if not identical voices in their dealings with the rest of the world.

At the level of strategic power there is no serious question of Europe playing the role of equilibrist. Not only is there no re-

[1] "What does Security Mean Today?" *Foreign Affairs*, July 1971.

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quirement to counterbalance American strategic predominance as President de Gaulle mistakenly assumed, but it is acknowledged, in Paris nowadays as well as elsewhere, that the security of Western Europe still depends crucially upon the continuing commitment of American strategic power—on the maintenance of the Atlantic Alliance—and that the development of autonomy on the strategic plane is not on Europe's agenda in the foreseeable future.

But the problem of maintaining adequate deployed military manpower in Europe to make a European crisis manageable is going to present us with a difficult set of choices. Should we by some means or other bribe the Americans to stay in Europe at the level of five divisions, 26 air squadrons and a two-carrier fleet? I am not sure that it would be possible even if we decided to, given the domestic constraints on American military manpower and expenditure. Moreover, a mercenary relationship is rarely an enduring one. Should the active European members of NATO consolidate their relatively successful coöperation in their Euro-Group or should they invite France to join with them in creating a new European defense community or system as a counterpart of the Economic Community, even though nuclear weapons are excluded for the time being? Somewhere in the next few years—not more—the road forks toward the evolution of a less powerful European grouping within an integrated NATO framework and a more powerful, more autonomous European system under the umbrella only of the collective alliance. It is difficult to believe that the 1970s can pass without a radical reorganization of the structure and probably the strategy of NATO.

These questions are important, for conventional military force continues to be an aspect of balance in Europe, even though the center of the stage may be held in the next year or so by the preparation and staging of a European Conference on Security and Coöperation. It is at the third level, of political influence, that the tripolar or triangular relationship is beginning to assert itself. Valuable as such events as President Nixon's visit to Rumania may have been in establishing the principle of access, indispensable as was the unity of the Allied negotiating position on Berlin, the fact remains that it is the countries of Western Europe themselves which are playing the leading role in creating a new relationship between the two halves of Europe. Herr Brandt's *Ostpolitik* may suffer some temporary political setbacks in Bonn,

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but he remains one of the central figures in developing the conception of a Western Europe with interests of its own "interwoven," to use his own phrase, "with the rights and duties of the two superpowers." And the support of conservative figures like Heath and Pompidou for what we may call the Brandt conception is significant. What we are witnessing in Europe is a continuation of bipolarity at the level of strategic power; and the slow beginnings of a triangular situation at the level of political, economic and perhaps military power. But there is no question of the balance becoming fully triangular as the Soviet-Chinese-American has been for some years.

IV

If the development of a sort of tripolar balance of power in Europe, a small continent scarred with centuries of conflict, with very high levels of mobilized force on either side, is going to be a gradual and tentative affair, the evolution of a major power balance in Asia is already occurring more rapidly. In my own view this is primarily a quadrilateral relationship. If you consult the text books they will tell you that a quadrilateral balance is inherently unstable because it must either polarize into two against two or three against one. But it can also become two against one against one. Moreover, if you have only four actors you cannot invent a fifth simply for the sake of symmetry or intellectual orthodoxy.

I think that Europe, however rapidly it coheres, will play much the same interested spectator's role in relation to Asia that Japan will play in relation to Europe, with the difference that, in certain circumstances, individual European powers can continue to play a useful but quite limited role in the process of nation-building in Southeast Asia. By the same token I think it unlikely that India will play a decisive part in the Asian balance. Now that she is a Soviet ally her freedom of maneuver may well be restricted. But in any case her ability to project power of any kind at any distance from her borders is limited. She will be much more concerned with the new power balance in the subcontinent, and even if she were to develop operational nuclear weapons, these could be for purposes of local deterrence only. Indonesia, the other potential partner in the Asian balance, has her hands full with domestic reconstruction for years to come.

It may well be asked whether the United States is going to

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remain a central actor in East Asia. I believe that it will; that David Hume's remark about the Athenians who, "finding their error in thrusting themselves into every quarrel, abandoned all attention to foreign affairs," is not applicable to the American position in the Pacific, or elsewhere. Though indeed President Nixon has narrowed and refined the definition of American interests, more particularly in Asia than in any other part of the world, a European observer cannot fail to be struck by the long history of American concern with Asia. After all, her own metropolitan territory stretches halfway across the Pacific, and an irredentist Japan or an implacably hostile China could threaten not only her interests but her own security. What clearly is disappearing is an American sense of responsibility for order in the whole of noncommunist Asia—the policy that prevailed from about 1952 to 1968—in favor of concentration on certain key countries. But it must, for instance, remain a high American interest to prevent Japan from quitting the Western military and economic system, even though her presence in it presents difficulties; clearly there is still a continuing sense of obligation to the Philippines and to Australasia. The difference between the past and the future is that there is little public and even less congressional willingness to consider the actual use of American force to maintain an Asian balance, though its latent use may still be an important factor. For the most part, American influence must be exercised more at the level of political influence and economic power.

The Soviet Union, as implied earlier, is a much more confident power than in the past but in East Asia its motives seem to be dictated as much by fear as by ambition. It is doing what it can to prevent the expansion of Chinese political influence in southern Asia and around the shores of the Indian Ocean. In an era of increasing Sino-American dialogue it cannot be certain that it could use nuclear weapons against China with impunity; this is one virtue of a multiple balance. True, it now has larger forces deployed along the Chinese border and in Mongolia than in Central Europe, but probably the very last contingency it could face is the prolonged exercise of the second level of power, conventional military force, against China at the end of very long lines of communication. This could weaken its position in Eastern and Central Europe disastrously. By the same token, it needs Western assistance in the development of Siberia though

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it has not as yet shown itself ready to pay a political price for it. In sum, though it has reason to fear Japanese or Chinese dominance in East Asia, the Soviet Union will be forced to tread rather more delicately there than in other parts of the world. A false step might either convince Japan that she had no alternative to an indefinite security relationship with the United States or that she must rapidly become a full-scale nuclear power—an autonomous actor at every level of power (a role which very few Japanese that I know wish to play). It might also make Peking see a new congruence of interests with both the United States and Japan, a new form of Triple Entente.

But China enters the international system with considerable skepticism about the credentials of the three other partners. Even though a mixture of fear, sense of historic wrong, ideological contempt and anxiety about superpower collusion has made her identify Moscow as the prime adversary for the time being, this implies no necessary confidence in Washington or Tokyo. Even if the Taiwan and Vietnam issues are gradually settled, as long as there are American military installations in Thailand, near her vulnerable southern border, the United States still has the qualities of an adversary state. China's distrust of Japan is based not only on jealousy of the economic dynamism of a country which was once a cultural province of China, but also on memories of recent aggression. China is not an expansionist state in the territorial sense. Yet she is proud, unused to participation in modern multilateral diplomacy, and on certain issues revisionist. She has, however, a clear sense of her own strategic vulnerability and will also play her hand with caution. If she has an external form of power to exert it is through the example she can set to the countries of the developing world and it must therefore be in her interest to widen the compass of the Asian balance.

Japan is a very uncertain actor at every level except that of economic power, and even here she may well have as much concern in the next 20 years with the social consolidation of her economy as with its growth. That she will acquire political interests as her dominance of the markets in Asia extends and as her preoccupation with the problem of access to sources of raw materials continues, there can be no doubt whatever. But I see no reason to assume that she must feel an instinctive urge to translate her economic strength into military and strategic power,

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unless she is deliberately encouraged to, or is frightened into it by some débâcle in the relations of the other three partners.

Here, then, we have a much more fluid balance-of-power situation than in Europe, operated by four partners of uneven strength, interests and perspectives. If we look some years ahead it is possible to conceive a number of variations in the combinations of the players: (1) A revival of the Sino-Soviet alliance to contain Japanese economic influence in Asia and oust Western influence for good—possible after Mao's death but improbable if one considers the deep and bitter national and ideological rivalries between the two countries. (2) A Soviet-American understanding emerging out of the SALT dialogue, to conduct parallel policies in different parts of Asia in order to neutralize the effect of Chinese nuclear weapons and to channel Japanese activity down paths that suit their interests; this would be certain to incur first Chinese then later Japanese hostility. (3) An American-Japanese-Soviet understanding to contain Chinese influence; possibly an attractive option for Japan, for it would ensure a continuing American strategic guarantee while giving her access to Soviet raw materials and possibly the Soviet consumer market. However, such a pattern would not only embitter China for generations but, being a rich man's club, would arouse the hostility of the rest of developing Asia. (4) A Sino-Japanese economic entente in a situation where the United States played a muted role in Asian politics; this prospect has certain cultural and economic attractions for Japan: the reuniting of the twin cultures, closer access to certain raw materials, the prospect of jointly exploiting the China Sea for oil. But it would be very difficult for China to embrace in ideological terms, despite the prospect of keeping Japanese military power at a low level as well as giving China access to her technology. If given concrete form it might well jeopardize the future of the Japanese-American political relationship and, of course, for the Russians it would represent the resurrection of the Yellow Peril in its starkest form. (5) A bilateral Russo-Japanese entente; this has some degree of probability if the Asian balance becomes governed largely by economic considerations. On the one hand, Japan could accelerate the exploitation of Siberia; on the other, the consumer market of European Russia may be ripe for the kind of products which the Japanese produce so well and so cheaply. But it would probably be a consequence

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rather than a cause of the change in relationships in Asia. If the United States and Western Europe were to turn increasingly hostile to Japanese commercial penetration it is a possibility that would have to be taken seriously, though, if Japan tried to play the role of balancing agent and gave a political context to such an understanding, it would forebode such a decisive shift in the balance of power in favor of the Soviet Union as probably to lead to a modification of European and American tariff and economic policies.

A number of other combinations can be envisaged, but while combination-making may be a useful intellectual exercise Asian politics will not consist of a continuous series of choices. The facts about modern international politics as we know them indicate that swift alignments and realignments are not possible as they were in earlier multiple balances; choices once made cannot be readily unmade.

What one can foresee, however, is a more elastic system of great-power interaction in Asia, in which the relationships of the major actors are not necessarily identical at the four different levels of power; in which, for instance, the Soviet Union and the United States maintain their current concern for the stability and safety of the overall strategic balance; in which China and the United States have a certain level of political relationship, one of reasonable diplomatic intercourse and adjustment without attempting to hedge in the Soviet Union by the appearance of a more intimate or more collusive bond; in which Japan is neither frightened nor encouraged into an active military let alone strategic role in Asia.

But, though I have argued earlier that the politics of the 1970s are not as likely to be dominated by the fear of nuclear diffusion as we feared, the one development which would impose a dangerous rigidity on the politics of East Asia would be the development of Japanese nuclear weapons. The United States would become dubious about the risks involved in its Asian commitments, China would freeze again into her shell, the Soviet Union would feel menaced by three nuclear powers and would behave either with truculence or with uncertainty, Japan herself would lose much of the influence and respect she is slowly regaining in the small Asian states.

The desirable balance in Asia, therefore, seems to me one in which the status quo is maintained at the strategic and military

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levels, namely a continuing Japanese-American security relationship, while the relationship between the four major actors at the political and economic levels has greater fluidity.

But such an outcome has two very important concomitants. First, there must be a reasonable degree of communication between all four major actors. The line between Peking and Washington is gradually getting cleared, that between Tokyo and Peking must now be built. For a stable relationship to exist, it is also a Western interest that communications and as high a level of confidence as possible be restored between Peking and Moscow. The other condition may take even longer to establish: it is nothing less than the acceptance by all four capitals of a a common principle, that of mutual access in third areas—on the one hand, acceptance of the fact that in the rest of Asia and indeed the developing world in general, the various powers have acquired certain areas of primary interest, dictated by strategic, economic or historical affiliations, but that this endows none of them with the right to a hegemonial sphere of influence. The United States may legitimately argue that it has a primary interest in, say, the Philippines and Australia, the Soviet Union in India, China in the Asian states to her immediate south, Japan in Indonesia, the European countries in Malaysia and Singapore. But the difference between primary and exclusive interests must be accepted; all must be open to the political, ideological, or economic penetration of the others; he who claims an exclusive relationship with another country destroys the balance.

What the President is feeling his way toward, it seems to me, is not a resurrection of a classic pentagonal balance in the crude sense of countervailing power (though his Prince Metternich in the West Wing may use the language of an earlier age), so much as a philosophy of multiple coexistence. If this were the 1960s with its preoccupation with military power, as a consequence of Berlin, Cuba and Vietnam I would look with great suspicion on the whole concept and feel that the maintenance of the American-Japanese-European triangle was of far greater importance than any discussion of a pentagonal balance. But in an era when military power may play a less dominating role, there is one objective of the old multiple system which is worth emphasizing, namely the preservation of the autonomy of its members.

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The world is still divided into different political and cultural civilizations, and the main rationale and function of a multiple balance in the past have been to preserve the freedom of its members, while in the process minimizing the risks and scale of war, for the reason that the destruction or crippling of one of them destroys the system. The importance of this question of autonomy can hardly be overstressed in looking at Asia, where what are, in fact, four different civilizations meet in the area of the China Sea; but it also has relevance to the European balance as well: Europeans are not Americans, and their civilizations are distinct though the two are closely linked. The autonomous state or civilization has a great deal of vitality and we are more likely to live in relative tranquility if we respect this differentiation while opposing the temptations of universality for our own values or the claims of other polities.

V

But what about the position of the smaller powers in a world dominated by such a pentagonal relationship? Not only do some of them, notably those at the interface of the focuses of primary interest, like Korea or Jugoslavia or the newly truncated Pakistan fear that they will be the victim of some great-power agreement over their heads, that they will be the Polands or Taiwans of the future, but some of them are or will be tempted also to exploit the multiple balance.

Both aspects seem to me to give a new importance to the United Nations and its agencies. It has proved of limited value as an instrument of collective security, largely because it borrowed from the League of Nations, which in turn had unconsciously adapted from the Congress of Vienna the assumption that a concert of the great powers was feasible in an age when the meaning of power, the strength and objectives of those who wielded it, and the whole structure of the international system were about to change drastically. And even the ad hoc improvisation of U.N. peacekeeping is largely in abeyance because the concept has not yet been adjusted to the existence of a world of more than two great powers. Very possibly the next decade or so may see a regeneration of the United Nations, with China a member of the Security Council and with the two Germanys in the Assembly. I, for one, wholeheartedly favor a permanent seat on the Security Council for Japan opened up by the reduction of the West Euro-

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pean seats from two to one as the Community acquires political validity.

But even if the Security Council were to acquire a new effectiveness, I share Castlereagh's doubts about the legitimacy or durability of the idea of a concert of great powers as a means of keeping order in the world. I see the contemporary value of the United Nations in rather different terms. First, as a permanent seat of contact between the new partners in the two great multiple balances of the world. Second, as an arena where the smaller powers can hoist danger signals if they feel themselves the victims of the kind of great-power pressure which I have suggested is no longer legitimate in a multiple balance. Third, as a means by which they can drag as many resources as possible out of the developed world to accelerate their own development and mitigate the appalling problems which they face. In addition, of course, the smaller powers are, as in an ecological balance, acquiring new forms of coherence, new means of underpinning their own national identities by local combinations—ASEAN, LAFTA, OAU and, more valuable, some of the local groupings within the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa.

VI

In the last two generations we have forgotten, and by *we* I mean Moscow and Peking as much as Washington or Brussels or Tokyo, the means or the conditions for maintaining a multiple balance. One is the importance of diplomacy, which is both more onerous and more significant than in the simple world of the cold war; it involves a sensitive concern for the interests not only of adversaries but of friends, a skilled knowledge of the sensibilities of other governments and other cultures; a skill which is as important in embassies abroad as in the national capital and which in my view cannot be sustained by ad hoc teams of political advisers, however brilliant, but only by a permanent corps of experienced professionals. Occasional summit meetings, bilateral or multilateral, are no substitute for Bacon's maxim that "princes do keep due sentinel."

A second condition is consistency in policy, so that over a very long period of time governments have a clear sense of each others' central interests, which is by no means the same thing as saying that foreign policy must be excluded from domestic and electoral controversy.

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Finally, there is the necessity for restraint or moderation in our demands upon the international system, economic as well as political; we know that a trade war among the democracies would undermine the prospect of balance at all other levels.

Lest it should be thought that these remarks are directed particularly at the United States, let me say that they present an equal challenge to all the major power centers. The Soviet Union seems at this moment to have some of the ambitions of an old-fashioned imperial European power and by its emphasis on exclusive spheres of influence to undermine the principle of accessibility or interpenetration which I believe is central to the notion of balance. It, therefore, may have the most to learn about the new rules of the great game. Japan has yet to learn the lesson of economic magnanimity as an essential constitutent of her autonomy. Western Europe has still to create the very decision-making machinery which is necessary to identify its essential interests.

We live by our own choice, and to a significant extent an American choice, in a plural world in which the important sources of power have become neither abolished, institutionalized nor diffused, but have tended to aggregate in uneven ways around a small number of great states. The intellectual challenge for the next generation is both to use and to modify our tradition, which is flawed but also enriched by sporadic failure, to find a temporary accommodation for other civilizations and ideologies in an intractable social order which limits our ambitions but must not suspend our efforts. Yet it would be a sorry world that risked alienating not only the small powers but our own younger generation as well, if they came to believe that a balance of power was the highest political achievement of which the new great powers were capable.

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THE COMPUTER THAT PRINTED OUT W*O*L*F*

By Carl Kaysen

"THE Limits to Growth" is a brief, forceful, easily read polemic which has already generated many times its own weight in enthusiastic encomia and equally strong condemnations.[1] It advances a familiar, indeed fashionable, thesis. The goals and institutions of our present world society stimulate population growth and production increase at a rate that cannot be sustained. Further, and perhaps less familiarly, we are now about a generation from the point of no return, after which the world must suffer a catastrophic drop in numbers and wealth, no matter what is then done to restrain further growth. The argument is presented with a sufficient panoply of graphs, flow diagrams, references to the World Model and the new discipline of System Dynamics, and invocations of the computer to produce an aura of scientific authority for the conclusions. They have the additional weight of the endorsement of a prestigious private international group of respected businessmen, officials and academics, The Club of Rome, in a commentary appended to the study and signed by its executive committee. It is my contention that the authors' analysis is gravely deficient and many of their strongest and most striking conclusions unwarranted. None the less, it draws attention to a number of difficult and important problems which must be faced, including the question of whether its whole approach is helpful or harmful in dealing with these real problems.

The backbone of the argument of "Limits" is simple, and requires little elaborate intellectual machinery to develop. Many significant variables that characterize our global society, in particular population and industrial production, have been growing exponentially over the last century, that is, at a constant percentage rate, and thus showing a greater and greater absolute increment each year. The processes that determine this persistent growth at constant (roughly) percentage rates lie deep in the structure of our social order, and unless we deliberately make drastic changes in it, they may be expected to persist and continue

[1] "The Limits to Growth," by D. H. Meadows, D. L. Meadows, J. Randers and W. W. Behrens III. New York: Universe Books (A Potomac Associates Book), 1972.

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to generate exponential growth in the future. Many important physical aspects of the world, however, are finite, and their finiteness implies that exponential growth cannot go on indefinitely, without, so to speak, bumping into the limits. In particular, supplies of cultivable land, reserves of mineral resources and the capacity of the earth to "absorb" pollution are finite, and one or another of these (or some combination of them) sets a ceiling level for population and industrial output.

What is more important, when one of the exponentially growing variables reaches the ceiling, it does not simply remain at the limit value, but rather moves sharply down to a much lower level in a process of catastrophic decline. Thus when industrial production, for example, reaches a ceiling level set by limits on mineral resources, it does not simply remain there but plunges from a wealth- to a poverty-level in a short space of time. It is this proposition, together with some of the characteristic time dimensions of the process that both constitute the core of novelty in the book and justify its urgent call for rapid and drastic action.

This characteristic sharp shift from growth to decline in turn reflects two features of the formal model which underly the computations and arguments presented in the book.[2] The first is that the several variables and limits are all interrelated in a system in which growth in each of the main variables is reinforced by growth in the others. The second is that changes in some elements of the system have their effects on others only after a long lag. Thus, for example, a fall in the birth rate affects the demand for food fully only after a lag determined by the average length of life.

The question of how the system behaves when it reaches or approaches a limit is the central question of interest, and it is worth repeating that the kind of behavior which the authors find characteristic of their system is what gives their argument both its interest and its compelling quality. The fact that some limits exist, that the earth is in principle finite, is hard to deny, but does not in itself lead to any very interesting conclusions. Examples of growth systems are known that display quite different behavior as they approach their natural limits than the sharp reversals portrayed in "Limits." For instance, a system in which

[2] The details of the model are not given in the present volume, but are developed in a series of technical papers listed in its appendix, and in the book, "World Dynamics," by Jay Forrester (Cambridge, Mass.: Wright-Allen Press, 1971). Forrester is the intellectual father of System Dynamics.

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the rate of growth of the major variables was proportional to their distance from their limits would show a smooth, gradual, stable adaptation to its growth ceiling.

Further, the response times of the system the authors present to changes in some of the key variables are such that we must anticipate the possibility of castastrophe by half a generation or more, in order to have time to act and avert it. By the time we see the whites of their eyes, our guns will no longer fire. Thus the book's chief conclusion, endorsed by its sponsors in The Club of Rome, is that we must planfully, radically reorganize the fundamental institutions of our social world soon or face an unmanageable crisis not so late. To do so, we must now recognize the need, and begin to devise the means.

The analysis supporting these conclusions is unconvincing. It contains at least three kinds of flaws, each of which alone would justify a skeptical view of the result. Further, the first two are deficiencies of principle, which operate at the same level of simplification, approximation and qualitative generality that the authors attribute to their analysis. The most important question concerns the nature of the limits that enforce the growth ceiling in the model. Basically, there are two: arable land and the supply of exhaustible minerals. The first operates primarily on population, the second on industrial production. In order to demonstrate the ineluctability of the limits, and unimportance of the precise magnitudes assigned to them, the authors show that doubling the productivity of agricultural land, or doubling the reserves of natural resources, leads to no qualitative change in the behavior of the system, and only a relatively brief postponement of the moment of catastrophe. Pollution operates as a limit too, but somewhat more indirectly, through its effect on length of life and thus on population. Making pollution control more effective is seen as possible only with sharply increasing costs; thus an economic limit is built into the model in respect to pollution control that functions in the same way as the physical limits on agricultural land and mineral resources. The various alternative assumptions the authors work into the model always rely on one or more of these limits to bring about the characteristic crisis of the system. Even the variant of the model described as "utilizing a technological policy in every sector of the world model to circumvent in some way the various limits to growth" (p. 141) in fact incorporates all three limits—though they oper-

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ate in a more distant future than in other variants, and the onset of catastrophic decline in population occurs only at the end of the twenty-first century.[8]

The notion that such limits must exist gains plausibility from the use of physical terms to indicate the relevant quantities—acres of arable land, tons of chrome ore reserves—implicitly invoking the physical finiteness of the earth as the ultimate bound. But this is fundamentally misleading. Resources are properly measured in economic, not physical, terms. New land can be created by new investment, as when arid lands are irrigated, swamps drained, forests cleared. Similarly, new mineral resources can be created by investment in exploration and discovery. These processes of adding to the supplies of "fixed" resources have been going on steadily throughout human history. Indeed, the authors themselves in effect recognize this when they describe the pollution limit not in physical terms, but in terms of the increasing costs of achieving higher and higher degrees of pollution control.

However, once the problem is recognized as one of cost limits, not physical limits, it appears in a different light. The force of rising costs as mines go deeper or exploit thinner veins, or as drier and more distant lands need more water brought from farther sources and the like, meets the force of advancing technology, which brings down the costs of using existing resources and literally creates new resources by bringing within the bounds of cost feasibility materials or methods which formerly lay outside it. Thus, for example, the Hall process for reducing aluminum oxide by bringing the costs of the metal down to a level that made it an industrially usable material rather than a jeweller's curiosity, literally added hundreds of millions of tons to our reserves of metal ores. New ways of locating oil pools and new ways of exploiting them have combined to keep oil reserves —measured in terms of annual consumption—about constant over the past generation, though the actual rate of consumption has been growing exponentially. In general, the relative prices of mineral raw materials and agricultural products have not been rising, and the share of minerals (even allowing for imports) and agricultural output in total production have been falling fairly steadily over a long period in the United States. This is

[8] The plot of this model (fig. 42, p. 140) shows an inexplicable and incredible rise in food consumption per capita, although its timing does not suggest that the population has overeaten to the point of extinction.

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also true in other developed countries for which we have good evidence. While comparably good quantitative evidence for the whole world is not available, and such evidence as there is has not been assembled and analyzed, the best guess is that for the world as a whole, the share of extractive industries in output has been falling over the long period.[4]

In sum, the advance of technology, like the growth of population and industry, has also been proceeding exponentially. In the United States—again the society for which the best data are available over a long period of time—the average annual rate of technological growth over the last half-century for the private economy as a whole has been in the neighborhood of two percent. Broadly speaking, this means that a representative bundle of inputs—labor, capital, raw materials, land—of constant value (in constant prices) will each year yield two percent more output than the year before. As "Limits" points out in urging the force of exponential growth, a two percent annual growth rate corresponds to a 35-year doubling time. Thus, technical progress over the life of a generation has made it possible for our children to get twice as much output from the same bundle of inputs as their parents. There is even some evidence that the rate of technological advance in the United States has speeded up in recent years, but it is not conclusive. Other industrial countries also show exponential growth in technology; some, such as Germany and Japan in recent years, at higher rates than the United States but the data pertaining to them cover only a short recent period.

Once an exponentially improving technology is admitted into the model, along with exponentially growing population and production, the nature of its outcomes changes sharply. The inevitability of crisis when a limit is reached disappears, since the "limits" themselves are no longer fixed, but grow exponentially too. The qualitative character of the results then depends on the fine details of the model, and, in particular, on the differences between the growth rates of the most important variables. Catastrophes need no longer be the rule, and more stable outcomes, in

[4] At this point, the reader probably feels uneasily that there must be some flaw in the argument. Surely the earth is finite, and even the wonders of technology must have some limit. The earth is finite, to be sure, and without broaching the larger question of whether the universe is or is not, it can be shown that the finiteness of the earth does not in itself set limits to what technology might accomplish that are relevant to the time horizons of the kind of argument with which we are concerned. I owe to Professor Robert Socolow of Princeton University a calculation that shows that in terms of physical limits alone, *i.e.* available matter and energy, the earth could support a population at least 1,000 times the present one at the current U.S. per capita income level.

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particular continuing growth at low rates, now become possible.

The second major flaw in the authors' analysis lies in the total absence of adjustment mechanisms of any kind in the model. Certain behavioral relations among the major variables are laid down, the magnitudes of their parameters determined by average behavior over the past, and then the relations projected unchangingly into the future. That is not how real social mechanisms work. Especially in the workings of the economy, adjustment mechanisms play a crucial role. The most important of these is price: as a resource becomes scarce, the consequent rise in price leads to savings in use, to efforts to increase supply, and to technical innovation to offset the scarcity. All economists know that these adjustment mechanisms are far from perfect and smoothly functioning. Yet they are and have historically been sufficiently powerful to mediate very large shifts in use of resources location, of population and patterns of consumption. Prices play no significant role in the basic logical structure that supports the argument of "Limits," although it is precisely their function to make smooth transitions possible as scarcities and demands change. Their absence is not unrelated to the characteristically unstable responses the model system of "Limits" displays. Only the effort of constructing another and much more complex model could show in detail what kind of stabilizing influence the incorporation of price changes and responses to them would exert. It is, however, well known that dynamic models structurally similar to those employed in "Limits," that characteristically display various forms of unstable behavior in the absence of prices as variables, are stabilized by the incorporation of prices and normal responses to price changes.

The third defect of the analysis is of a quite different order, one of detail rather than of principle. It is simply the failure of the authors to use available knowledge fully, effectively, or in some cases, at all. No one detail is of great importance, but together, they weaken seriously the claim of the work to respect. The most important single example is the authors' treatment of the determinants of population growth. Nowhere in their discussion do they acknowledge the great fact of demographic history in the Western world: the adjustment of birth rates to death rates. Our understanding of this "demographic transition" is far from complete; even if the underdeveloped countries repeated the same pattern over the same (relative) time period, they and the world

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would not be free of appropriate concern over the magnitude of population growth. But what should we think of a model of a process in which population growth plays a crucial role that simply ignores this central, elementary and familiar fact? Or to take another example of much less significance to the central argument, the discussion of equality and economic growth (p. 42–44) closes with an italicized warning that "the process of economic growth, as it is occurring today, is inexorably widening the absolute gap between the rich and the poor nations of the world." The "absolute gap," *i.e.* the difference in dollars between average per capita income in the United States and, say, Peru, is growing and, given their present levels, will probably continue to do so for a very long time. But is that interesting or important? The *relative* gap between average income in many of the poorer countries and the industrial West is narrowing, and that is what is relevant to the question of equality. Economic history shows that, after the early stages of urbanization and the development of commerce, economic growth has tended to greater equality of incomes, both within nations and between them. A complete syllabus of errors would be tediously long; perhaps the length of the list is the natural result of the process of reinventing economics, demography and much else as System Dynamics.

So much for the analysis. Can the major conclusion stand alone on its intuitive (or counter-intuitive?) merits without the analytic underpinnings? Is there merit in the proposition that we must seek now to move as rapidly as possible to the state of "global equilibrium" defined by stability of both population and capital, and that failure to do so invites catastrophe? After all, this proposition is now frequently advanced on the basis of much simpler arguments than those we have examined. Briefly, and simply, the answer is "No." There are no credible reasons for believing that the world as a whole cannot maintain a fairly high rate of economic growth (though not necessarily the present one) over a long period of time into the future. Further, if it becomes necessary, for whatever reason, to slow down the growth rate, a relatively smooth transition from higher to lower rates will be perfectly possible, and not achievable only through the mechanism of catastrophe. Moreover, whatever is done to slow down the rate of population growth, population will continue to grow, especially in the poorer countries, for a long time. Only

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an *increased* rate of economic growth in those countries will make it at all possible for them to deal with their unavoidable population increases without catastrophe. The large poor countries contain in aggregate a substantial share of the world's people, and thus increased growth for them will have some reflection in world totals. Further, it is difficult or even impossible to conceive of continued substantial economic growth in the poor countries in general taking place in a context of economic stagnation in the industrialized world. Thus, seen both in terms of need and of feasibility, the prospect for the foreseeable future is continued long-term economic growth, perhaps at rates lower than those currently observed, and with quite a different distribution of rates as among countries.

In the legend, there were in the end, real wolves. In the world today, there are real and difficult problems attendant on economic growth as we now experience it. The social-economic system is *not* self-correcting or self-managing; sustained, self-conscious efforts are necessary to deal with the problems, and they often must be maintained against strong resistance. Two of the authors' three central concerns, population growth and pollution, do indeed present genuinely urgent and difficult problems. A third equally important and difficult one, mentioned in "Limits," but only in passing, is the assessment of the indirect consequences of technical change, the unanticipated "side effects" that can sometimes outweigh the benefits. Present social mechanisms are not adequate for coping with any of the three, and the kinds of changes required to do so more effectively meet strong opposition at every level, from that of the individual family to organized interest groups and governments. From one point of view, all three problems can be seen as examples of "external effects," where costs and benefits of particular actions are not borne by the primary actors and thus fall outside the reach of the price system as it usually functions and the control of the incentives and adjustment mechanisms it provides.

In each case, the problem is to find a set of supplementary adjustment mechanisms and incentive systems which can guide the relevant actors to socially more desirable choices, a proposition easy to state in the abstract and difficult to realize in the concrete. In many situations we lack knowledge of the likely consequences of specific actions; in many, those who benefit from present arrangements or think they do resist change, while those

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who might benefit from change may lack both knowledge and power. In many situations we lack reliable indicators of what is desirable in an overall sense, and the machinery for resolving conflicting judgments is inadequate. Determined effort to deal with these problems is important. Failure to pay proper attention to them might well result in serious troubles, though they are unlikely to be of a kind which can properly be termed catastrophic. And, though there is widespread discussion of many of these problems and considerable social effort at dealing with some of them, it can be plausibly asserted that it falls far short of what is required.

Finally, therefore, how much does "crying Wolf" help to direct social energies toward improving our responses to these problems? In principle, it is not only useful, but indispensable. The social mechanism is made up of human beings moved by passion far more than by reason. The mobilization of feeling that is the necessary prelude to all but the most routine social action requires some stimulus stronger than a sound argument. But to be effective, the cry must be well directed: the wolves must be imminent and they must indeed be wolves. On this score we can give only a moderate grade to "Limits," or more properly, to its sponsors in The Club of Rome. The problems they call us to attend are real and pressing. But none are of the degree of immediacy that can rightly command the urgency they feel. Indeed, at least two problems of worldwide consequence outside the scope of this work seem to be more urgent than any it deals with: the creation of an international order stable enough to remove the threat of nuclear war, and the diminution of the staggering inequalities in the international distribution of wealth. A good sentry does not cry up tomorrow's wolves and ignore today's tigers.

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NO FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

By Richard H. Ullman

IN his first speech to the General Assembly, the leader of Peking's delegation to the United Nations, Chiao Kuan-hua, stated on behalf of his government: "I once again solemnly declare that at no time and under no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons." And he continued: "If the United States and the Soviet Union really and truly want disarmament, they should commit themselves not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. This is not something difficult to do."

Chiao's remarks, and their prominence in the first official statement by a representative of the People's Republic of China before the United Nations, came as no surprise: the declaration that China would not be the first to use nuclear weapons has been a staple of Peking's foreign policy, constantly reiterated, ever since the first Chinese nuclear explosion in October 1964. From a Chinese point of view, such assurances made eminent good sense. In their first years, the few Chinese nuclear weapons and their manufacturing facilities offered a tempting target for a preëmptive enemy. Indeed, it was more than once rumored first that the United States and then that the Soviet Union was planning such an attack. Even today a first strike could very largely eliminate China's nuclear capabilities. In so far as a solemn declaration foreswearing first use tends to make it morally more difficult for others to use nuclear weapons against China, the P.R.C. continues to be well served by it. Moreover, it is also self-evident that, given the marked disparities between the Chinese nuclear force as it will be for the rest of the 1970s and the forces possessed by the United States and the Soviet Union, first use by China against either "nuclear superpower" (a term the Chinese use only derogatorily) would be suicidal.

Now that Peking is at last represented at the United Nations, it is likely that the theme of no first use of nuclear weapons will be heard with increased frequency and from increasing numbers of voices among the non-nuclear powers, fearful as they are that some day, in some perhaps unforeseeable circumstance, nuclear weapons might be used against them. The United States and the Soviet Union will undoubtedly be under more pressure to declare

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that they, also, will not use nuclear weapons first. The fact that such a declaratory position is so self-evidently in the interest of China, with a large ground army and vulnerable nuclear force, does not necessarily mean that it would not also be in the interest of the United States.

II

The U.S. position on first use of nuclear weapons has been virtually the mirror image of the Chinese. Ever since 1945 American leaders have tended to look upon nuclear weapons as a vital counterbalance to superior Soviet and (after 1949) Chinese ground forces. It became accepted wisdom that "free world" countries could not—or should not—regiment themselves to the same degree as their communist adversaries and place an equal number of their citizens under arms, but would rely on superior American technology to provide a nuclear deterrent to large-scale conventional aggression. This dogma was basic to the Dulles notion of "massive retaliation." Ever since the early 1960s, however, when the Soviet Union achieved strategic nuclear forces in sufficient numbers to rule out an American first strike, the planning and accompanying declaratory policy of the United States have emphasized a second-strike retaliatory role for its strategic forces, at least so far as the Soviet Union is concerned.

Very different, however, has been the declared purpose of American tactical, or "theater nuclear" weapons. Here the implied trade-off between communist "hordes" and American technology still applies, despite the fact that our potential enemies also possess tactical nuclear weapons. As Secretary of Defense Laird put it in his statement on the 1973 Defense budget: "our theater nuclear forces add to the deterrence of theater conventional wars in Europe and Asia; potential opponents cannot be sure that major conventional aggression would not be met with the use of nuclear weapons." Thus, we have been deliberately ambiguous about the circumstances in which we might initiate the use of nuclear weapons. The Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon administrations have all insisted upon maintaining sufficiently strong conventional forces so as not to be forced into early escalation to nuclear weapons, but they have also asserted that they would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons in the face of a major conventional attack if it seemed that it could not otherwise

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be stopped. In the context of NATO this posture has been characterized as "flexible response."

The Soviet government has also been vague—no doubt also deliberately—about defining the circumstances in which it might initiate the use of nuclear weapons. Military writings and Warsaw Pact exercises indicate that the Red Army leadership generally assumes that a NATO attack would employ tactical nuclear weapons, and that such weapons would similarly be used by the defenders. This assumption is so strong that the question of whether or not to meet a conventional attack with tactical nuclear weapons seems scarcely to have been addressed. Another assumption is that once an exchange has taken place it would be almost impossible to limit the employment of nuclear weapons to "tactical" targets: general nuclear war would almost surely follow. Yet despite the pervasiveness of these assumptions in Soviet military writing, the Soviet Union's declaratory policy has been strongly hostile to nuclear weapons from the outset of the nuclear era, a logical concomitant of its position of nuclear inferiority for so many years. The Soviet position throughout has been that the use (and not merely the first use) of nuclear weapons should be banned and existing stockpiles destroyed as the first step toward general and complete disarmament. The American position, by contrast, has been that nuclear weapons and their delivery systems should be eliminated from national inventories only as part of a general process of disarmament, and only in proportion to reductions in conventional arms levels. Thus while the destinations of Soviet and American declaratory policies are the same, the routes to be taken are very different.

The Soviet government was a moving force behind the 1961 U.N. General Assembly resolution, sponsored by Ethiopia and seven other African and Asian states, declaring the use of nuclear weapons to be a violation of the Charter, an action "contrary to the laws of humanity," and "a crime against mankind and civilization." Taking shelter, perhaps, behind this absolutist stand, Moscow—in contrast to Peking—has not formally foresworn the first use of nuclear weapons, nor have Soviet spokesmen drawn a distinction between "use" and "first use."[1] Only

[1] Note the comment by Premier N. S. Khrushchev to C. L. Sulzberger of *The New York Times* on September 5, 1961: "Let us assume both sides were to promise not to employ nuclear weapons, but retained their stockpiles. What would happen if the imperialists unleashed war? In such a war if any side should feel it was losing, would it not use nuclear weapons to avoid defeat? It would undoubtedly use its nuclear bombs."

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the Chinese government has explicitly and consistently emphasized "no first use," although its declarations have also called for the "complete prohibition and thorough destruction" of nuclear weapons. British and French policy has closely paralleled that of the United States. Both London and Paris seem to regard the possible use of nuclear weapons as a powerful deterrent against conventional attacks. The 1964–70 British Labour government placed special emphasis on the development within NATO of more precise and comprehensive guidelines regarding the use of tactical nuclear weapons. In doing so it was motivated at least in part by its own unwillingness to maintain significant levels of conventional forces on the Continent. Perhaps because French military policy has developed formally, at least, outside the context of NATO, French rhetoric has emphasized to a degree much greater than either American or British statements the desirability of banning nuclear weapons and destroying stockpiles, but French statements have almost always included the qualification that nuclear disarmament must be accompanied by conventional disarmament and that all disarmament measures must be guaranteed through rigorous inspection and international supervision.

III

"No use" carries with it the implication that the mere possession of nuclear weapons is wrong, and that existing stockpiles should be destroyed. "No first use," however, has very different practical implications and probable psychological consequences. It contains no built-in presumption toward the phasing out of nuclear stockpiles. In the absence of dependable international guarantees, a nuclear power undertaking not to initiate the use of nuclear weapons would retain its ability to retaliate fully in response to the use of nuclear weapons by others. It would, in short, give up nothing of its ability to deter nuclear attacks. Many factors have contributed to the nuclear truce which the world has observed since the bomb that destroyed Nagasaki in August 1945, but not least—and perhaps most—among them has been the knowledge that the United States and the Soviet Union (and lately, perhaps, other nuclear powers as well) are able to absorb a devastating nuclear attack and yet respond in a manner that will devastate the attacker. Under a "no-first-use" obligation, no matter what form it might take, this ability, and

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therefore the efficacy of a deterrent, would be undiminished.[2]

On the other hand, to the extent that a "no-first-use" undertaking appeared credible—and that extent undoubtedly would vary—a nuclear power's ability to deter conventional attacks by the threat of a nuclear response would be reduced. This is the contingency referred to by Secretary Laird in the statement quoted, and it has long been an important part of American (and NATO) military doctrine. Yet it is also true that no area of military doctrine is more vague than guidelines for the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Most writers on the subject take it for granted that in Europe, at least, the use of tactical nuclear weapons by one of the opposing alliance systems would lead to a nuclear response by the other. Where analysts disagree is on the probability that the conflict would remain limited. The preponderance of informed opinion, however, is that it would not, and that once a belligerent takes the momentous step of using tactical nuclear weapons, it would be more likely to escalate than to accept an unfavorable battlefield outcome, particularly under the conditions of stress that would invariably accompany the outbreak of nuclear hostilities. Thus there would be no certain advantage for NATO in meeting a conventional attack with a nuclear response, and the risks of mass destruction would be enormous. The notion of "no first use" aims at making absolute the boundary between conventional and nuclear weapons, even at some cost.

The cost, of course, is recognition that a party declaring that it will not initiate the use of nuclear weapons renders itself at least marginally more open to conventional attack. It therefore must tend to its non-nuclear defenses. In some circumstances this cost may seem overwhelmingly high: where there exist major tensions that might lead to conflict, and where there are significant disparities in non-nuclear military capabilities, the threat of a nuclear response by the weaker side may, indeed, be its sole assurance against coercive pressure from the stronger. In such a case, the potential costs of nuclear escalation, once war had started, would seem far less worrisome than the costs involved either in sustaining a conventional invasion or in creating con-

[2] "No first use" would not—strictly speaking—apply to strategic defensive systems such as ABMs. For practical purposes the irrevocable launch by an opponent of a missile suspected of containing a nuclear warhead would constitute "first use," thus justifying interception by a nuclear-armed ABM before the actual detonation of the incoming warhead.

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ventional forces sufficiently powerful to deter one. Indeed, in some situations, the creation (or the perpetuation) of conventional parity may be simply impossible. If the Arab-Israeli confrontation were to continue indefinitely, and if the Arab nations were eventually to achieve the ability to field formidable military forces, the Israelis might well conclude that only nuclear weapons—with all the risks entailed—would give them the ability to deter a potentially overwhelming attack.

The case of the United States, however, is very different. In no cases where it has commitments which might ultimately lead it to engage its military forces does there presently exist this hypothetical combination of severe political tension and a pronounced disparity in non-nuclear capability. The area which has traditionally been the source of greatest concern, Europe, is now the scene of considerably lessened East-West tensions. Despite the traditional worst-case predictions which accompany requests from the NATO bureaucracy at Brussels for more military resources, Western non-nuclear forces are capable of offering formidable resistance to their Warsaw Pact opponents; even if they are in some respects inferior, their inferiority is not now such as to invite an attack.

The trade-off, of course, for raising the nuclear threshold is the maintaining of non-nuclear capability adequate to deter a non-nuclear attack. Any enunciation of a "no-first-use" policy by the United States would necessarily have to come as an integral part of our military policy relating to Europe. Here some obvious questions immediately arise: Why do it? Tensions are low. War in Europe is not likely. Why change arrangements that seem to have worked so well? The questions are good ones. Yet if anything is certain about American conventional force levels in Europe over the next decade it is that they will drop; what is uncertain is by how much. And any significant drop will itself change the arrangements which have seemed to work so well. Such a change need not be for the worse. Provided the process by which American troop levels are reduced is gradual, provided the cuts themselves are not drastic (down, say, to no less than 100,000 men), and provided they are signaled to our European allies well in advance, they could serve as the spur to a healthy process whereby the West Europeans assume more responsibility for their own defense.

Paradoxically, a U.S. "no-first-use" policy would be likely to

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assist rather than hinder that process. Raising and maintaining armies has never been popular with the European members of NATO. They are subject to the same sorts of domestic pressures for the reallocation of scarce resources away from military and toward internal purposes as we are. Like us, they have made piecemeal reductions in the size of their forces. In the absence of a U.S. "no-first-use" policy they would be likely to reduce further their own force levels as we reduced ours, and not take over the military leadership of the Alliance. They would choose instead to rely on the deterrent power of the thousands of American tactical nuclear weapons (with their implicit escalatory link to U.S. strategic weapons) which would surely still remain in Europe even if our manpower level fell sharply. Thus the nuclear threshold would be lowered and the risks of potential nuclear war —although still remote—would be correspondingly increased.

Yet while the Europeans have at least in some measure justified their less than enthusiastic response to past American calls for larger forces and increased readiness on their part by pointing to U.S. nuclear weapons as the ultimate deterrent against a Warsaw Pact attack, many of them have been unable to suppress their doubts as to whether, in fact, any administration in Washington would be willing to trade American for European cities. And just as they have questioned the credibility of the U.S. strategic deterrent, so they have also expressed considerable uneasiness about the probable consequence of the use of tactical nuclear weapons to stop an advance by Warsaw Pact forces. The West Germans in particular have shown a not surprising skepticism toward claims, from their own military establishments and ours, that tactical nuclear weapons might be employed on European territory without themselves causing widespread and horrifying devastation and triggering even more destructive escalation.

A U.S. "no-first-use" policy in conjunction with a gradual and deliberate drawing down of U.S. force levels in Europe would necessarily break the linkage between lowering U.S. force levels and a lowering nuclear threshold. It would also be the clearest way of telling the West Europeans that a set of states which have come to comprise the largest economic entity in the world must henceforth take primary responsibility for its own defense—for assessing the threats that it faces and for allocating appropriate resources for defense. It would not be surprising if the resulting assessment did not result in increased European conventional

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forces; indeed, the Europeans might even further reduce their active forces. But in so doing they would make explicit the assumption which underlies this whole argument: that it is not the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons but the absence of overriding political tensions which is responsible for the very low likelihood of war in Europe. In such circumstances, it should be added, U.S. tactical nuclear weapons would not be removed, although undoubtedly their number should in any case be reduced from their reported present swollen 7,000. Rather, they would remain as a deterrent against nuclear first use by the Warsaw Pact. Whether they remained wholly under U.S. control, or whether some or all were placed under multilateral arrangements,[3] the U.S. nuclear umbrella—in so far as it shields our allies from nuclear attack—would be unimpaired.[4]

At present, NATO policy regarding the use of nuclear weapons is ambiguous. It seems clear in retrospect (as, indeed, it did to many observers at the time) that Secretary of Defense McNamara was determined to raise the nuclear threshold so high as to amount virtually to a "no-first-use" position; this was a principal implication of the "flexible response" strategy which the United States imposed on NATO in the early 1960s. Yet because "no first use" has never been adopted as U.S. policy, both U.S. and NATO military planning has always proceeded in a climate of uncertainty regarding the critical issues of whether, and how, nuclear weapons might in fact be used, and how further escalation might be prevented. There is no question but that formal adoption of "no first use" would make possible a more realistic process of military planning. Under present conditions planners and field commanders must fear that the option of initiating the use of nuclear weapons would be denied NATO forces in a crisis, yet they cannot fully plan for that contingency. By limiting options in advance, "no first use" might well enable commanders to respond more decisively, and thus, paradoxically, increase the effectiveness of NATO forces.

[3] As proposed by Walter F. Hahn in his article, "Nuclear Balance in Europe," in the April 1972 issue of *Foreign Affairs*.

[4] If the United States were to adopt "no first use" and if the British and French did not, it would be at least theoretically possible for either or both of the two smaller nuclear forces to initiate a chain of events which would involve our own. At least for the rest of this decade, however, when both London and Paris will be devoting such resources as they allocate to nuclear weapons predominantly to strategic forces, their tactical capabilities will remain sufficiently modest so that preëmptive use would be most unlikely.

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IV

As regards Asia, even more than Europe, U.S. military doctrine has been to regard nuclear weapons as a cheap and effective barricade against communist "hordes." Asia, and not Europe, has been the scene of the only U.S. threats to use nuclear weapons —to induce the Chinese Communists to accept a ceasefire in Korea in 1953 and to forestall their invasion of the Nationalist-held offshore islands in 1958. Yet while the doctrine remains the same, reality is changing. The domestic outcry which greeted rumors—almost certainly unfounded—that the Johnson administration was planning to use nuclear weapons, if necessary, to lift the siege of Khe Sanh in 1968, led to official statements that the use of such weapons in the Southeast Asian war was out of the question. At the same time, there is a heightened general awareness of the racist undertones of a military doctrine which had implied a greater readiness to use nuclear weapons against Asians than against Europeans. These sensitivities, combined with our new relationship with China and a widespread realization that we had wildly overestimated the likelihood of Chinese military expansionism, make it increasingly improbable that we would ever initiate the use of nuclear weapons in any foreseeable Asian contingency.

The United States would not need to initiate the use of nuclear weapons in order to meet its commitments to Japan, Taiwan or the Philippines. If these island territories were ever subject to non-nuclear attack, a non-nuclear response would be sufficient to prevent an invasion or to lift a blockade. Nuclear attack, of course, would be deterred by the threat of U.S. nuclear retaliation, just as it would anywhere else where we have commitments (and, more than likely, even where we do not). Only in the case of Korea is there any real likelihood of the kind of "classic" border-crossing attack with main-force units which might be deterred by the threat of a tactical-nuclear response. Here the situation resembles that in Europe: we maintain U.S. forces in Korea for the express purpose of helping an ally deter an invasion. As in Europe, the administration is under considerable budgetary pressure to draw down force levels. Yet the large and well-trained Korean army is a formidable force in its own right, undoubtedly capable of acquitting itself well in the event of a North Korean invasion. Indeed, U.S. forces have often appeared

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to be needed less to deter a North Korean attack than to cool hotter heads in the South who want to turn their own soldiers northward. As in the case of Europe, the price of a U.S. "no-first-use" policy might need to be a decision to keep U.S. forces —particularly air forces—in South Korea at greater than token (although lower than present) levels for the foreseeable future.

Alone of Asian governments, that of the Republic of Korea would be likely to lodge strenuous objections to a U.S. "no-first-use" position. In part, however, its objections would be for bargaining purposes, in order to assure the continued presence of U.S. non-nuclear forces, and in part they would also be for domestic political reasons—the Park régime in Seoul has long found it useful to magnify the threat from the North as a rationale for the suppression of opposition at home. Less heated objections, as much for the record and from simple opposition to any change, would be likely to come from Taipei and Bangkok, while the Japanese and perhaps also the Filippinos would be at least as likely to welcome any such move, so long as it was apparent that the U.S. deterrent against nuclear attack remained as effective as before. Provided the Japanese had concrete reassurance on this point, a U.S. "no-first-use" policy would not give them any additional reason to develop nuclear weapons of their own. Indeed, in so far as such a position was made to appear as part of a move to deëmphasize nuclear weapons, pressures to "go nuclear" in nations like Japan, which face no insuperable non-nuclear threats, might decrease.

Perhaps the most far-reaching political effects of a U.S. "no-first-use" position would be on our relationship with Peking. Virtually ever since it came to power on the mainland, the communist régime has viewed American (and, later, Soviet) nuclear weapons as a threat aimed particularly at themselves. It is not surprising, therefore, that they have insisted that a prerequisite for China's participation in any measures of arms control relating to nuclear weapons would be prior U.S. and Soviet adoption of the "no-first-use" position to which China has adhered since even before its first nuclear test. This is not to imply that once the United States (and the Soviet Union) had adopted "no first use" the Chinese might be willing to accept restrictions on their own nuclear force which would not also apply to other nuclear powers. Even if China does not plan to deploy nuclear weapons in nearly the quantities fielded by the two superpowers,

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simple reasons of "face" would prevent Peking's acceptance of lesser quotas. But once the other two had pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons—and therefore, once they had removed from the conduct of their diplomacy nuclear threats, to which the Chinese have been particularly sensitive—Peking might well agree to join the various forums, bilateral and multilateral, in which arms control is discussed. This would be a symbolic step of no small importance, psychologically emphasizing the role of China as a state in the world of states. It also might well have beneficial consequences, as part of the process of wiping the slate clean, for future U.S.-Chinese relations.

V

A U.S. commitment to "no first use" might come through agreement with one or more other governments, or it might be unilateral. In addition, it might be general or specific (*i.e.* confined to a specified geographic region) in its application. A logical first such bilateral agreement would be between the United States and China. Each would pledge not to initiate the use of nuclear weapons against the territory or the armed forces of the other. Such a bilateral agreement would perhaps be easier to negotiate than one that is multilateral. In addition, it might be easier to get agreement to it within the U.S. government than a consensus on a wider commitment. An agreement including the Soviet Union might be postponed until agreement had been reached on other matters affecting European security, such as mutual and balanced force reductions. On the other hand, a bilateral U.S.-China agreement would necessarily leave the parties free to initiate the use of nuclear weapons against third countries, which would clearly be undesirable. (It can be argued, however, that China has already assumed unilaterally a general "no-first-use" commitment which would not be reduced except by explicit reservations.)

If the United States were to adopt a "no-first-use" policy, there are undeniable advantages in doing so within the context of an international—preferably multilateral, rather than bilateral—agreement. An international agreement would be seen both in the United States and abroad as another measure of arms control, a follow-on to the test-ban, the nonproliferation treaty, SALT and the treaties banning nuclear weapons from Latin America, Antarctica, the seabeds and outer space. It would be useful as a

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means of preserving the momentum that is an important psychological concomitant of arms control, and therefore as a stepping-stone to eventual arms reductions.

Yet, desirable though "no first use" by international agreement might seem, there are also strong arguments for adopting such a policy by means of a unilateral declaration, as the Chinese have done. Within the United States, a unilateral declaration would meet less resistance from the foreign affairs and military bureaucracies and the Congress, because its wording would not need to be negotiated with other governments and therefore could incorporate any shadings or reservations—such as a statement of conditions which would make the declaration void—which might be regarded as necessary on political grounds.

Moreover, of all the various measures for arms control already in effect or foreseeable, "no first use" is the least dependent for its efficacy on international agreement. The purpose of a "no-first-use" commitment is to decrease the likelihood that parties to a conflict will resort to the use of nuclear weapons. Even if only one party (call it nation A) has made such a commitment, the behavior of its opponent (nation B) will also be affected. A's "no-first-use" declaration will give B at least some assurance that A will not strike with nuclear weapons. B will therefore have less of an incentive to use nuclear weapons to strike preëmptively at A's nuclear forces in order to minimize the damage that they might inflict. Indeed, B will have a positive incentive not to use nuclear weapons, for their use would free A from its "no-first-use" commitment, and invite nuclear retaliation. Thus a "no-first-use" commitment undertaken unilaterally by only one party to a conflict will still serve to widen the fire-break between conventional and nuclear weapons for the conflict as a whole. And unilateral "no-first-use" declarations will encourage other governments to do the same: the more that do so, the wider the fire-break becomes.

Whether "no first use" is undertaken unilaterally or by international agreement, the consequences for individual nations are exactly the same, for "no first use" does not depend for enforcement upon international mechanisms. Instead, it is self-enforcing: once a nation violates its pledge of "no first use," others are thereby released from their pledges, subjecting the violator to the prospect of nuclear retaliation—a prospect which would be a powerful deterrent against violation. This simplicity

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is one of the attractive aspects of "no first use" as an arms-control measure. It is also one of its weaknesses. A nation may go back on its declared word. A government—indeed, a single national leader—may decide that a nation stands to gain more from escalating to nuclear weapons, despite the retaliation that would then be invoked, than it does from allowing a conflict to proceed using only conventional weapons. Moreover, an abrogation would not need to be formally a violation; before actually escalating, a government could solemnly announce that its previous declaration of "no first use" is rescinded. Indeed, the prospect of abrogation—which would never be entirely absent so long as states retained nuclear stockpiles—would in itself serve as a form of deterrent against conventional attacks. Who can say what a government might do under crisis conditions should it feel that its existence, or vital national interests, were threatened?

Such fragility is undoubtedly a drawback, but "no first use" is in fact no more fragile than any other arms-control régime. Indeed, because it is so directly self-enforcing, with such potentially dire consequences from abrogation, it is as relatively durable as any arms-control régime can be in a world of sovereign states lacking any overarching mechanism of enforcement. In order to prevent violation, states which subscribe to the principle of "no first use" will nevertheless keep their own nuclear forces at whatever levels they calculate are necessary to deter nuclear attacks upon them by others. They might, however, find it possible to phase out some of their tactical nuclear weapons more suited to initial than to retaliatory use, and to withdraw others from forward positions to the greater custodial security of rear depots. And if the principle ever seemed to be well accepted by all of the main nuclear powers, national-security bureaucracies might be moved to make more far-reaching reductions in their nuclear forces, based upon more realistic notions of types and levels of weapons genuinely necessary for deterring nuclear attacks.

VI

An alternative to a flat "no-first-use" declaration, at least for the United States, might come through congressional legislation stipulating that the President, as Commander in Chief of the armed forces, may not initiate the use of nuclear weapons without receiving prior congressional authorization. Congress now

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has before it so-called War Powers legislation stipulating that in the absence of a formal declaration of war the President may not engage the armed forces in military operations for more than 30 days without specific congressional authorization. This draft legislation is premised upon the assumption that the "collective judgment" of Congress and the President should apply to the "initiation" and the "continuation" of hostilities. Senator Fulbright, Congressman Dellums, and others (including the Federation of American Scientists, one of the most active lobbying groups in the arms-control area) have pointed out that just as Congress should be concerned to limit the power of the President to *sustain* hostilities without its approval, so it should also limit his power to *escalate* them across the threshold from conventional to nuclear weapons. They are seeking to amend the War Powers legislation to that effect.[5]

In many respects the effects of this proposed legislation would be similar to those of an orthodox commitment to "no first use." Nuclear threats would be inappropriate. Force deployments might reflect the assumption that the United States would not initiate the use of nuclear weapons. Just as in the case of a "no-first-use" commitment, U.S. ability to respond to a nuclear attack, and therefore the efficacy of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, would be undiminished. The granting of congressional authorization, should it take place, would be equivalent to a formal announcement rescinding a prior "no-first-use" commitment, unilateral or multilateral. Such authorization (or the rescinding of a prior "no-first-use" commitment) would, in fact, constitute in itself an important diplomatic instrument. It would convey to an adversary the seriousness with which Washington viewed a threat, and its willingness to risk nuclear war in response. In this respect congressional authorization (or the public rescinding of "no first use") would be akin to the "demonstration use" which figures in some war-fighting scenarios, when one party to a conflict explodes a nuclear weapon in a manner which inflicts no damage but nevertheless conveys resolve.

Depending upon the form it took, the requirement of congressional authorization might also differ in important respects from a "no-first-use" commitment. For example, the President

[5] It has also been suggested that any such amendment should stipulate that when the President comes before Congress with a request for authority to use nuclear weapons, Congress must act on his request, positively or negatively, within a specified short period of time, say two or three days.

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might announce in advance, and the Congress informally indicate its agreement, that in certain contingencies—a build-up, for example, of Warsaw Pact forces near a Western frontier—he would seek advance authorization. Such an announcement might serve to reassure allies, such as the West Germans or the South Koreans, who otherwise might feel that their positions were excessively vulnerable.[6] In such a form the basic principle of "no first use"—although substantially diluted—might also be more readily accepted by the American foreign affairs bureaucracy, by the military services and by the Congress itself. Yet, by the same token, it would be regarded as insufficient by others; the Chinese, for example, would be unlikely to regard it as sufficiently forthcoming to serve as an opening for their participation in arms-control discussions.

Regardless of whether Congress passes War Powers legislation which includes a prohibition on the first use of nuclear weapons without its authorization, and regardless of whether the present or a future administration should decide to commit itself to "no first use," the issue of when the United States might be prepared to initiate the use of nuclear weapons deserves more serious public discussion than it has thus far had. Present U.S. military doctrine (if not practice) continues to regard nuclear weapons as trade-offs for adequate conventional forces—indeed, as simply higher levels on a continuum of violence. The public should have more information concerning the circumstances in which those trade-offs might be made, what might be achieved by escalating to nuclear weapons, and what risks of still greater nuclear escalation would thereby be engendered. An unequivocal "no-first-use" position undoubtedly also entails certain risks. But careful and thoughtful examination might judge them lesser risks, and risks more easily hedged against, than those inherent in blurring the line between conventional and nuclear weapons, and thus jeopardizing the long-lasting nuclear truce.

[6] It might be argued that such an announcement might lead an opponent to respond with a preëmptive nuclear strike on U.S. tactical or strategic nuclear forces. Yet such a risk would not be significantly greater than it would have been had "no first use" never been adopted in the first place, which merely points up the fact that the principal reason for adopting "no first use" is to reduce incentives toward nuclear preëmption.

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CANADA INDEPENDENT

By John Sloan Dickey

President Nixon's visit to Ottawa in April was preceded by two White House pronouncements that made far more news in Canada than they did in the United States. On both occasions for quite different reasons the President's words struck Canadians as nothing less than fantastic. At a White House news conference on September 16, 1971, the President unintentionally made news from coast to coast in Canada by announcing: "After the Japanese were here I found that, both from the information they gave and the information we had ourselves, that Japan is our biggest customer in the world." Coming as it did hard on the trauma induced in Canada by the August 15 surcharge, the President's confusion of Japan for Canada as the best customer of the United States seemed to Canadians as all but unbelievable literally and disturbingly fantastic.

The second utterance, made on December 6, 1971, also got a billing of "fantastic" but this time in a very different sense. It was made directly by the President to the Canadian Prime Minister, Pierre Elliot Trudeau, who, leaving nothing to chance, himself characterized the President's words as "fantastic," using the term, of course, in the happiest possible meaning. The following day the Prime Minister formally reported the presidential pronouncement to Parliament as follows:

> One of the purposes of my visit was to seek reassurance from the President, and it can only come from him, that it is neither the intention nor the desire of the United States that the economy of Canada become so dependent upon the United States in terms of a deficit trading pattern that Canadians will inevitably lose independence of economic decisions. . . . He assured me that it was in the clear interests of the United States to have a Canadian neighbour, not only independent both politically and economically but also one which was confident that the decisions and policies in each of these sectors would be taken by Canadians in their own interests, in defence of their own values, and in pursuit of their own goals. . . . We are a distinct country, we are a distinct people, and our remaining such is, I was assured, in the interests of the United States and is a fundamental tenet of the foreign policies of that country as expressed by the Nixon administration.

The Prime Minister's White House visit, made as it was on his initiative, clearly aimed at countering two somewhat paradoxical thrusts of concern and political criticism throughout

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Canada. On the one hand he faced the growing militancy of Canadian nationalism, with its insistence that the country's independence was being (or had been) sold out to the Americans, while on the other flank he was charged, however unrealistically, with having brought the surcharge and other forms of U.S. wrath down on Canada's head because he had permitted the U.S. special relationship to languish.

Before Trudeau's visit the President had been well briefed from the front: he knew what was wanted by the Prime Minister and the latter needed no prompting to see the potential importance to the U.S.-Canadian relationship as well as his immediate political advantage in featuring, even fantastically, this particular presidential dictum. Clearly it was this bell-ringing reception of the December reassurances that led to elaboration of the same theme by the President in his more ceremonial remarks to the Canadian Parliament in April. However taken-for-granted the President's words may be for Americans, they are in fact addressed to the most fundamental issue in the contemporary relations of the two countries and it is not unlikely that they will prove quite as long-lived as they are unprecedented. No previous presidential utterance has ever proclaimed the independence of Canada *in its relations with the United States* as being "in the clear interests of the United States."

Canadian independence in other respects has had a long history of entanglement with the American national interest. Indeed, American interest in promoting Canada's independence predated the United States as a nation. Washington, Franklin, Lafayette and other notables of the American Revolution at various times sought unsuccessfully, through both persuasion and force, to further the rebellion against the British Crown by getting the Canadians to join their cause.

The decisive failure of the American effort to "liberate" Canada from British rule by military force, of course, came in the War of 1812. One can only speculate on what later form the issue of Canadian independence would have taken if these early American incursions had succeeded, but it is probably safe to say that the issue of an independent Canada would not have disappeared; almost certainly it would have resurfaced as an earlier, more militant call for a *Québec Libre*.

The American national interest in the independence of Western Hemisphere nations as expressed in the Monroe Doctrine

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was more implicit than explicit in respect to Canada prior to the rise of the Axis Powers. President Franklin Roosevelt gave it explicit avowal in 1938 at Kingston, Ontario, declaring: "I give you assurance that the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other Empire." Following as this declaration did on Roosevelt's earlier statement in 1936 that the United States was prepared to defend its neighborhood against aggression, the Kingston assurance and the Ogdensburg Joint Defense Agreement of 1940 made it unmistakably clear that the United States was prepared to protect the independence of Canada from external aggression.

From World War II on through the cold war and the advent of intercontinental bombers and missiles, this Monroe Doctrine form of American national interest in Canadian independence was readily translated into a concern for the protection of Canada as a necessary condition of American military defense. At the time, this perception of the external threat was shared by both Canada and the United States and the joint continental defense arrangements which resulted were all but universally welcomed in both countries. During this period the rhetoric of "partnership" and the concept of "continentalism" spread into other areas of the relationship. This era reached its full flowering with the Merchant-Heeney Report of 1965 under the rubric of "Principles For Partnership."

Today, the words "partnership," "continentalism" and "integration" as well as the concept behind them are eschewed by most Canadians and bitterly rejected by some.

II

The validity of the cliché that Americans take Canada for granted is borne out by the unexamined ease with which in little more than 100 years we have switched from an assumption that Canada's "manifest destiny" was to be annexed by the United States to today's benign unawareness that Canada has anything to worry about from us. It is only one of our areas of ignorance about things Canadian, but it is a fact that until very recently it has not occurred to more than a handful of publicists, scholars and diplomatists that a well-intentioned United States with its spreading American presence in Canadian life might be regarded as, let alone actually be, a threat to a viable Canadian nationhood.

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Greater awareness of this particular insensitivity could be immensely instructive to American understanding—in bringing to the surface two ill-founded premises which underlie American assumptions about the U.S.-Canadian relationship, namely: our intentions being good, no harm can result; and the two countries being so similar, what is true for the United States is also true for Canada.

As far as U.S. intentions are concerned, there is very little concern in Canada that contemporary America has ulterior designs on Canadian independence. Even the most militant Canadian nationalists do not make this charge; their grievance rather is that the omnipresent American influence in all its manifestations of defense, trade, investment, publications, mass media, academic life and popular culture just keeps on spreading with no thought on the part of Americans and too little on the part of Canadians for what, in the view of the nationalists, must be devastating consequences to Canadian nationhood. It is not within the purview of this article to analyze the nature and impact of today's American presence in Canada, but it must be said unequivocally that for both better and worse it is an awesome reality. If Americans have a genuine interest in the future quality of Canadian nationhood they, as well as Canadians, must reckon with this reality.

Our taken-for-granted good intentions toward Canada have beyond question dulled our sensitivity to the increasingly critical perception on the part of many Canadians of the consequences of American influences in their national life. And perhaps more pernicious is the American tendency to assume that because there are many similarities and shared experiences between them, the two nations are essentially alike in all fundamental things. There is probably no firmer tenet of faith in the Canadian character than that this is not so. And there are few situations that are better proof of the validity of this Canadian belief than the fundamentally different posture on the issue of national independence in the two societies. For over 150 years, Americans have been able to take independent nationhood for granted. It therefore comes naturally to us, particularly when we are desensitized by our good intentions, to assume that Canada, being, as it seems to us, so like us and so similarly situated, also takes her nationhood for granted. The hard fact is that she never has, she does not now and for the foreseeable future will not be able to

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take independent nationhood for granted in any sense similar to that of the United States.

The division of views that exists in Canada today about the American presence is not over whether or not it is a major factor in Canadian life but rather over how serious it is as a threat and how it should be met. The main disagreement is whether some of the proposed remedies, particularly in the control of foreign investment, would not be more harmful to Canada and individual Canadians than an often irksome, ubiquitous American presence. This is particularly true on the heated issue of American investments in Canada. The recent proposal of the Trudeau government for screening foreign "takeovers" to serve Canadian purposes may or may not dampen the issue for a time, but it will not satisfy the militant nationalists and its implementation inevitably will add another contentious issue to the already overburdened agenda of Ottawa-Provincial relations. At the same time the proposal should appeal to the substantial sectors of Canadian opinon that, while not prepared to cede the nation to the Americans as their hypernationalistic critics claim, believe the American presence is probably as inevitable as it may be irksome, and that Canadian well-being will be better served by learning to absorb it and put it to Canadian ends rather than by expending energy and sacrifice on what they regard as an ultimately frustrating, if not actually anachronistic, effort to exorcise it from Canadian life.

The disagreement follows a complex pattern of cleavage. Geographically the concern is sharpest in Ontario and least noticeable in the economically have-not Atlantic provinces. British Columbia and the prairie provinces are by and large less militantly nationalistic than Ontario, and while even in these areas there is a heightened criticism of the American presence, particularly in academic circles, it is considerably dissipated by the traditional endemic suspicion of the East that pervades most of the region from Winnipeg west. Quebec, as in most matters, is a very special situation; here the preoccupation with French Canadian concerns vis-à-vis the rest of Canada, along with the province's protective cultural isolation, plus a special need for outside capital and related developmental needs, make any American threat to an independent Canada a low priority of concern and something that at least for the moment can largely be left to *les Anglais* to worry about.

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Politically, explicit apprehension that Canada is about to lose —if, indeed, it has not already lost—its independence to the American presence centers in the New Democratic Party, particularly in its so-called "Waffle" wing whose militant nationalism finds little reason to shy away, as most Canadians do, from being thought anti-American. The NDP's nationalism is paralleled by a strong socialistic political ideology which is regarded by some within the party as the only practicable way to get Canada back from the Americans. The two major parties, the Liberals and the Progressive Conservatives, have been far less militant about the American presence but leaders are increasingly uneasy about the matter and are seeking ways to deal with it or at least to keep it from plunging the country's domestic and international political affairs into a late twentieth-century "no truck or trade with the Yankees" imbroglio.

One could analyze these differences in perceptions of the threat of the American presence regionally, economically, vocationally, politically and ethnically, without altering the essential conclusion that there is in Canada today a substantial, spreading concern which is not likely to be well met by leaving it to time and unattended circumstances. Presumably it was such a judgment of the matter that led Prime Minister Trudeau to seek and President Nixon to give explicit assurances that the United States has a stake in the political, economic and cultural independence of Canada.

Assuming, as seems warranted, that the President spoke for the unexamined sentiment of the nation, a formidable work remains to spell out "the clear interests of the United States" in having a Canada which is confidently "independent both politically and economically" of the United States. Very little analytical attention has ever been given to these "clear interests" either by practitioners or students of the relationship; without this, even presidential assurances are likely to be rapidly wasting assets in the affairs of the two nations. The need is to support sentiment with a perceived, stated sense of U.S. self-interest in an independent Canada.

III

Viewed positively and functionally, the stake of contemporary America in an independent Canada is grounded not in Canada but in the United States. It is in the self-interest of this country

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as a great concentration of power to be subject to an independent, critical scrutiny, which is free of both the hostility of an adversary and the acquiescence of a sycophant, as well as sufficiently knowledgeable to be received seriously, even if not always accepted.

One of the tenets of American society is that its pluralism, its constitutional freedoms and its democratic process assure the nation of a measure of self-criticism sufficient to protect its policies from unexposed error. The historical record generally supports the proposition that the nation's errors have rarely for long flourished simply for want of exposure, but the time lag between "a voice crying in the wilderness" and the straightening of the path has sometimes in the past been rather long.

The nation's experience with the Vietnam War testifies convincingly that U.S. self-criticism is far from being a paper tiger, but equally importantly, the Vietnam War experience leaves little room for future argument about the high degree of interaction in a communication-intensive world between a nation's self-criticism and that coming from the outside. American critics of the war might have prevailed on their own; we cannot be sure about this, but we do know that criticism from the outside constantly played a confirming, fortifying role and was a sufficiently worrisome factor to bother American officialdom. Although Canadian public criticism of the war was slow to gather and has been mostly moderate, it has been sufficiently widespread and sustained to register here, and on the one occasion when Lester Pearson, then Canadian Prime Minister, ventured to expose his views to the American public on the desirability of a pause in the bombing, President Johnson was—to use a Texas-sized understatement—not amused.

Criticism of the United States from Canada in the course of a year will touch most subjects in the spectrum of public policy and private life; in form it ranges from starchy diplomatic notes, academic tomes, editorials, the maledictions of the NDP and the Committee for an Independent Canada, to the bantering *veritas in vino* of business conventions and hunting lodges. Whether it be official or private, criticism from Canada is not, of course, easier to accept simply because it comes from a neighbor and friend. What Canadian criticism on occasion lacks in self-knowledge and sense of proportion (Secretary of State Acheson felt that Ottawa preferred to raise mundane matters "to the

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plane of high principle"), it makes up for in other ways: it can be captious, even moralistic, but it is rarely vindictive; except for the hypernationalists, it is usually more regretful than aggressively bitter and it has a built-in inevitability about it that makes it almost an expected part of the relationship. Fueled as it is by propinquity and today's ubiquitous American presence, it is also often uncomfortably knowledgeable, almost, but never quite, "within the family" in its sense of "there but for the grace of God" goes Canada.

In fact, China policy is one of the clearest examples both of the value to the United States of an independent Canada and also of the degree to which Canadian fear of U.S. resentment of Canadian policy divergence can stifle Canadian independence. As early as 1950, under the leadership of Prime Minister St. Laurent and Lester Pearson, then Minister of External Affairs, Canada was disposed to follow the lead of Britain and India in extending recognition to Peking. She held off, however, and the decision itself was delayed for another 20 years, largely because, as St. Laurent's biographer, Dale Thomson, states, "the possible advantages were outweighed by the disadvantages within Canada and in relations with her neighbor." Mr. Pearson has never made a secret of his judgment that the matter had not seemed worth "a first-rate row with Washington." At the same time the Canadian government's divergence of view on the matter was no secret to Washington and over the years the possibility of eventual recognition was freely discussed in the Canadian press and public circles, as well as the academic community, all very much in contrast to the situation in the United States where serious discussion of the subject was immobilized in a bipartisan freeze that loosened a little in the early sixties but then hardened again as the American situation in Vietnam worsened.

We do not as yet have the full story behind either the Canadian recognition of Peking in 1970 or the ensuing ping-pong charade which preceded the U.S.-Chinese rapprochement in 1971, but unless there are later revelations that totally discredit what is now known and presumed, it seems certain that the independent Canadian initiative was one of the significantly "favorable circumstances" that helped both the American public and U.S. officialdom to break out of the dangerous, mutually reinforcing immobility that for 20 years characterized the U.S.-Chinese standoff. In this matter as in few others, the osmosis of

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the border worked a transfer of influence from north to south.

China policy also provides a classic example of the degree to which the U.S. national interest in an independent Canada can be compromised by a Canada which, rightly or wrongly, lacks confidence in its capacity to pursue a divergent course from the United States without undue risk, as the diplomats are fond of saying, of inducing a "counterproductive" U.S. reaction. The attitudes of the American Congress and press toward an independent Canada are particularly important. Wisely or not, Canada gives special weight to congressional sentiment as the best single indicator of both the direction and intensity of American national feelings. John W. Holmes, a former officer of the Department of External Affairs and an astute student of the U.S. relationship, has said of the early decision not to recognize Peking: "Direct pressure from Washington was not so much a factor as Canadian uneasiness about provoking the wrath of the U.S. Congress."

As might be expected, there is no public record that U.S. officialdom has ever permitted itself the luxury of serious concern about the ill effects on U.S. national interests of having Canada unduly mindful that divergent initiatives could produce American displeasure. However, Canadian diffidence may have adversely affected us in the China situation. We can only speculate as to whether Canadian recognition of China in the fifties followed by others, perhaps including the United States, might have contributed to a vastly different Vietnam scenario in the sixties.

Although American observers have given Canada considerable credit for leading the way on the recognition of China, Prime Minister Trudeau understandably refrains from claiming any intention to lead the United States out of the wilderness. In a December 1971 interview with James Reston of *The New York Times,* however, the Prime Minister spelled out his belief in the value of Canadian initiatives, saying that: ". . . because we're a smaller and more manageable society . . . I think we can afford to take some risks of opening up new avenues which we think are correct. For even if they are incorrect we will be slapped down by events or force of circumstances or by our friends without great adverse consequences on peace and stability in the world. But for a power like yourselves, if you are naïve and your confidence doesn't breed confidence, but rather brings a terrible

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response from other countries, then it is of much greater moment not only for you but for the whole world, than if we make a mistake."

Whether or not the servant girl's justification of her indiscretion—". . . but, ma'm, it's such a little baby"—has as much to be said for it in international affairs as Prime Minister Trudeau suggests, there can be little doubt that divergent Canadian initiatives can on occasion provide the United States with a sort of vicarious experience against which to make a more confident judgment of its alternatives.

Parenthetically, but not unimportantly, it should be noted that the U.S. stake in the vicarious experiences of Canadian policy divergences may be fully as great in domestic affairs as in foreign policy. The federal structures of the two countries have a particularly fruitful mix of contrast and similarity for purposes of comparison. A notable current instance is found in a 1971 study of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations entitled "In Search of Balance—Canada's Intergovernmental Experience." This report, as described by the Commission Chairman, Robert E. Merriam, "focuses its attention on a comparative analysis of Canadian experience relating to selected intergovernmental fiscal tensions prevalent in the United States. . . . The Commission's concern centers on an analysis and description of Federal-Provincial relations, financing of public education and social welfare, and Provincial-local relations."

As the United States moves toward radically new fiscal relationships between the federal government and the states and of both to local communities, the more venturesome and varied experience in Canada with these relationships, particularly with revenue-sharing arrangements, may be useful to Americans. A Canadian political scientist, Pauline Jewett, with first-hand experience as a member of Parliament, has described Canada as a U.S. "window" for observing social experiments and "as a kind of loyal opposition to traditional conservatism in the United States." Canadians take a special pride in their particular brand of government as a combination of some of the better features of both the British and the American systems. A growing interest on the part of Americans in the social policies of an independent Canada will serve a significant U.S. national interest and could contribute significantly to the long-range health of the relationship.

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IV

A second area of international concern sufficiently basic to be a national interest of the United States is that Canada should be accepted in the eyes of other nations as a genuinely independent nation. For a considerable period of the post-World War II era, especially during the deepest freeze of the cold war, there was a widely held view in the international community that Canada was peculiarly well suited to play what has been called a "mediatory role in world affairs." "Middle powermanship," with its accommodating, imprecise view of what "middle" meant, became in the eyes of many Canadians a way of being on the side of the angels while still remaining in geopolitical realities a North American nation. And as things then stood, most other nations, including the United States, welcomed the existence of such a Canada. However the Canadian middle-power role was perceived at home or by others, it assumed a Canada that, while fundamentally friendly to the point of alliance with the United States, could still be regarded by the other side as sufficiently independent not to be classed as a spear-bearer for "American imperialism."

This benign ambivalence was put to good use by a generation of remarkable diplomatists, led by Lester Pearson, in rendering distinctive service to the international community through such major undertakings as the resolution of the Suez crisis in 1956, the U.N. Emergency Force in the Middle East, the U.N. operations in the Congo, U.N. peacekeeping in Cyprus, and as a member of the largely frustrated tripartite Commission for Supervision and Control in Indochina. From 1945 through 1970, Canada actually participated in ten U.N. peacekeeping operations.

In 1968, with the coming to power of the Trudeau government, Canada undertook a comprehensive reappraisal of the national interests and principles which should guide her foreign policies in a changing world where, as the 1970 white paper, "Foreign Policy for Canadians," put it: "International institutions which had been the focus and instrument of much of Canada's policy were troubled . . ." and where "the world powers could no longer be grouped in clearly identifiable ideological camps. . . ." A combination of considerations, some internal, such as the mounting crisis in French Canada, and others ex-

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ternal, led the Trudeau government explicitly, if perhaps gratuitously, to reject the type-casting of Canada "as the 'helpful fixer' in international affairs."

Even assuming that Canada's "middle-power" heyday as interpreter, mediator and peacekeeper for the international community is a thing of the past, there certainly will be future needs for such a nation to serve what might be fairly designated the disinterested interests of peace. When such circumstances arise, a Canada that has practiced, as the 1970 white paper adjures, an unrelenting cultivation of her national interest in remaining "secure as an independent political entity" can hardly fail to be a source of strength in the international community and as such a substantial national interest of the United States.

While most policy problems in the relationship can be met within a relatively short time-frame, the U.S. stake in having Canada regarded by other countries as genuinely independent of the United States requires a substantial showing of sustained U.S. sensitivity. Such convictions must be grown in a variety of situations over a period of time, they cannot spring "fully armed" from the brows, or public statements, of either presidents or prime ministers at a moment of need.

Finally and most fundamentally, all other considerations of U.S. national interest, now and in the future evolution of the relationship, depend upon the relationship's psychological health. As things stand today, the sine qua non of such health is that Canadian independence should pass current with Canadians themselves. It was therefore no idle thing that the Prime Minister chose to feature the President's commitment to "a Canadian neighbor . . . which was confident" of its independence of choice and decision. Actually such Canadian confidence is still and for the foreseeable future is likely to be an uncertain thing that both requires and generates a new-nation kind of highly self-conscious nationalism. The concern which Americans can share with most Canadians is that what is still an essentially positive nationalism should not deteriorate into a frustrated, debilitating, neurotic preoccupation with the United States as the cause of all that's wrong and uncertain in Canada. The reality of this danger is increasingly recognized in Canada. In Toronto's *Globe and Mail* of July 10, 1971, the respected Canadian academician A. E. Safarian refers to many Canadians as being in a state akin to "self-induced paranoia," and on November 13, 1971, a well-

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known journalist, Raoul Engel of the *Financial Post* of Toronto, in reporting on a recently established Canadian-American conference center, mentioned certain critical Canadian reactions to it as "a response that suggested how deeply suspicious—almost paranoid—some of us have become over any kind of collaborative venture with the United States."

Somewhat paradoxically, Canadian nationalism has become more militant and in its more extreme form has tended toward the neurotic at the very time that Canada's foreign policy, with its pursuit of "diversification" and "counterweights" to U.S. domination has taken a more independent stance than perhaps ever before. Indeed, this paradox and the inability of the "doomsayers" to deal with it convincingly have been something of a handicap to the cause of the most militant nationalists. But at bottom both Canada's heated-up nationalism and her more independent foreign policy are mainly functions of a reaction to the same thing, namely, the contemporary American presence.

V

The interest of the United States in an independent Canada must reckon with the fact that there will always be divergences of interest and view between the two nations. Even though some issues may arouse strong feelings, where the United States thinks it has the better case it assuredly will seek to prevail. An independent Canada neither needs nor should expect to meet a soft, complaisant United States on the other side of such arguments. In truth, U.S. paternalism in the dealings of the two countries could quickly give Canadian independence the *coup de grâce*. The point was made by A. E. Ritchie, Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, before a committee of the Canadian Parliament on May 5, 1970, in testifying that in U.S.-Canadian negotiations the expectation of favors was unrealistic and that their acceptance by Canada would be "risking our independence in a way that I think we do not risk it when we negotiate a pretty hard-headed bargain on a particular point."

Realistically viewed, the issue here is not one of favors, paternalism, soft negotiations, suppression of dissatisfactions and a fantasy of bland politeness between the two societies; rather, it is the ability of the United States in its enlightened self-interest to live and work and disagree, without petulance or retaliatory posturing, with a Canada which on occasion, for reasons of her

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own, chooses to diverge from the United States in the conduct of her foreign affairs and which for a long time to come will be an uneasy neighbor. The important truth for both nations to perceive and practice is that this is one of those twilight areas of statecraft where great consequences may turn on differences of degree: for Canada, in the way she distinguishes between the legitimate assertion of American interests and the remote possibility of being blackguarded to her serious harm for a divergent initiative; for the United States, in its need to assert its views and interests without losing sight of its national interest in having a neighbor which is neither pusillanimous nor paranoid.

In fact, the possibilities for dangerous policy divergences by an independent Canada from any fundamental U.S. national interest are probably neither very great nor very lasting. Prime Minister Trudeau, although uneasy about bedding down with the elephant, even in a continental-sized bed, has recognized this as clearly as anyone, explaining in his recent interview with Mr. Reston:

> . . . there is bound to be always a preoccupation in Canada with whether we're doing something which makes sense in United States terms, just because of our long relationships, our history, because of geo-politics, because of friendship, because of relatives which we have on both sides of the border, because of business connections, but basically I think because of geo-politics. It's just nonsense to think that when we are a large land mass with a rather small population next to the most powerful nation in the world, that we're not going to be constantly influenced by and preoccupied with the feelings down there.

Giving full credence to this judgment, as the historical record warrants, Canadian divergences from American policy on China recognition and the vote on U.N. admission and in such matters as wheat transactions with China, trade with Castro's Cuba, NATO force reductions, assertions of jurisdiction in coastal and Arctic seas, prime ministerial observations in Moscow about life alongside the United States, the Amchitka nuclear tests, etc.—all these fall into a perspective that from our point of view is at worst undesirable rather than unbearable. At best they protect the larger, long-run national interest of the United States in a Canada which is accepted both at home and abroad as a genuinely independent nation and which as such may have much to offer to the United States and to the evolving relationship of the two countries.

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THE SUBCONTINENT: MÉNAGE À TROIS

By Phillips Talbot

WHATEVER its other consequences, last winter's brief war in South Asia broke the mold that since 1947 had cast India-Pakistan relations into a continuing confrontation punctuated by three military conflicts. Now, for better or worse, the subcontinent with its 700,000,000 people has been transformed into a *ménage à trois,* linking together three national members in new relationships.

Two of these nations—defeated, truncated Pakistan and the new state of Bangladesh—entered 1972 beset by severe internal problems. Neither is likely soon to play more than a reactive role in the affairs of the region. By contrast, India, the third element, emerged as a relative giant. Before 1971 India by many measures was three or four times larger than Pakistan, though her weaknesses reduced the differential in some respects. Today she has ten times the population and resource base of Pakistan and considerably more than ten times the resources of Bangladesh. Her decisive military victory over Pakistan last December added a full measure of self-confidence to her mood. Moreover, under Mrs. Gandhi's firm management India's economy has become steadier and the country's polity more closely knit in 1972. India has attained, in short, a new primacy in the subcontinent.

In these radically changed circumstances can Bangladesh, Pakistan and India put behind them the tensions and conflicts of the past generation in favor of peaceful cohabitation in their region? This question is urgent for a great many people outside as well as within the subcontinent proper. Such immediate neighbors as Ceylon, Nepal and Afghanistan, whose anxieties over the events of 1971 were evident, have major stakes in the answer. So do some, at least, of the nations of Southeast Asia and western Asia. The Soviet Union and China see that their own confrontation has a southern flank in the subcontinent. The United States has repeatedly found itself enmeshed in competing claims by the countries of the region and could not but warmly welcome any just and peaceful settlement. Also, apart from national interests in the area, crises such as occurred in 1971 touch the sensibilities of the international community in general.

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Important as are external concerns over prospects in the subcontinent, however, the issue naturally presses most heavily on the three countries themselves, for essentially it is they who will determine how good these prospects are. Both Bangladesh and Pakistan have options ranging from considerable flexibility to the rigidities sometimes associated with extreme weakness. Yet in present circumstances neither can hope to match the political or material weight of India. Thus it is India which has both the greatest opportunity and the greatest responsibility for determining whether a fresh start—and if so what sort—can be made in the international relations of South Asia.

II

Bangladesh is a triumph of survivability. Again and again during the past generation the area has been struck by disaster: the great famine of 1943, the Hindu-Muslim massacres in 1946, the partitioning of Bengal (and of India) in 1947, the India-Pakistan wars in 1948 and 1965, and the ferocious cyclone in 1970 which swept away perhaps 200,000 people. Yet the society as a whole survived each fresh catastrophe. It now seems also to have survived the turbulence of 1971, in many ways the worst of all.

It had been evident for years that differences were deepening between West and East Pakistan. The latter had grown increasingly restive under what it regarded as political, administrative and economic discrimination by the dominant but less populous west wing of Pakistan. Ironically, it was just as Pakistani and international developmental efforts, including a major interest on the part of the World Bank, turned to East Bengal that the political scene erupted. The storm that broke in March 1971, after the collapse of negotiations over President Yahya's constitutional proposals, became a Greek tragedy. Pakistan poured more and more troops into Bengal in vain efforts to subdue resistance there, and this in turn was gradually strengthened by Indian training and weapons. Meanwhile, huge streams of refugees flowed across the border into neighboring districts of India. Finally, India's lightning occupation of East Bengal in December forced the surrender of the entire Pakistani force there and set the stage for the establishment of Bangladesh.

By some estimates, one million people were killed in Bengal between March and December. Some four million families—up

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to 20 million people—appear to have fled their homes, nearly half of them to refuge in India. Between one and two million houses were destroyed. Ports were mined, ships sunk, railways and roads disrupted, hundreds of bridges blown up, telecommunications broken. Industrial production came to a halt. The jute, tea and rice trades were thoroughly disorganized. Food distribution collapsed. In short, resources of all sorts were shattered.

Yet, once again, the people who now called themselves Bangladeshi—"of the Bengal nation"—survived. Wild enthusiasm greeted the establishment of their new state and the return of their leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, from detention in West Pakistan where he had been held since his arrest in March. Pride and exuberance rippled through the towns and countryside: this was, after all, the first opportunity in modern times for Bengalis to rule their own homeland. This spirit did much to pull together the battered nation in its first critical weeks.

Bangladesh emerged as a state of 70 to 75 million people, roughly 85 percent of them Muslims, in an area the size of Wisconsin. By population it thus ranks as the eighth or ninth largest state in the world. It is also the second largest Muslim state, after Indonesia (and before India and Pakistan, which now rank third and fourth, respectively, in Muslim population). However, to accent its dissociation from what its leaders regard as the spurious Pakistani doctrine of religious nationalism, Bangladesh like India identifies itself as a secular state.

Its impoverished people have an average income per capita of less than $1 a week. There is promise of "green revolution" productivity in rice strains that were just becoming available in 1970–71. Also, the society is buoyed up by a rich and ancient culture and an educated class which, although relatively small, includes impressive talent. Sheikh Mujib and his colleagues have some justification for their belief that the country has reasonably good prospects for the future.

For the present, however, the sober realities of independence start with tremendous reconstruction needs. If there is a single first priority, it must be to reëstablish the transport and communications systems. This year the country must also import perhaps two million tons of foodgrains and rebuild lost homes for millions of returning refugees. In getting factories back into production it must replace managers—many of whom were West Pakistanis—as well as equipment and stocks that disappeared. The

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total reconstruction cost has been estimated by some as high as $3 billion, which would virtually equal one year's gross national product in Bangladesh. (The statistics are very approximate.) Plainly, the effort will require massive external assistance.

Many other urgent tasks also confront the leaders of Bangladesh. They need, for example, to build political cohesiveness on more enduring qualities than the charismatic leadership of Sheikh Mujib. What remains of the former provincial bureaucracy must be transformed into a properly functioning national administration. Stocks of weapons which remain in the hands of actual or potential dissidents must somehow be brought under government control. The country also needs to get a grip on minorities issues, notably those involving non-Bengali-speaking Muslims called Biharis. Nation-building in this early stage will be exceedingly arduous.

The sweep of domestic requirements quite naturally influences the foreign policy goals of Bangladesh. After assuming the prime ministership, Sheikh Mujib promptly declared that external assistance would be welcome from any source. He explicitly included the United States before the latter's recognition of his state and despite the belief that the American government had been antipathetic to the Bangladesh movement. He traveled to Moscow, both to thank the Russians for their early assistance and in search of more aid. He actively sought ties with as many nations as possible. The principal external link he forged, however, was with India.

It is obvious that for the indefinite future Bangladesh will be heavily dependent on India, and that India will have a major stake in the survival and stability of Bangladesh. Until 1947 the Bangladesh area was, of course, part of India, with a common administration, fiscal structure, rail service and the like. The reversal of the partition of that year does not appear to be in the cards. Yet intimate cultural ties continue to exist between the peoples of Bangladesh and of Indian Bengal and so do the compulsions for close alignment between the two countries. Not only was Indian support decisive in bringing Bangladesh to birth but Bangladesh finds Indian skills, Indian supplies, Indian markets, Indian finance, Indian transport and—if need be—Indian defense protection comfortingly close at hand. There is no practical possibility that assistance from other external sources can replace the need for large-scale Indian help. Nor, for her part, could

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India stand quietly by if for lack of help Bangladesh should begin to fall apart; the separatist tendencies which have been endemic in both East and West Bengal could readily spread trouble from one jurisdiction to the other. A relationship as close as this has its delicate aspects as well. Thus, while drawing heavily on Indian support, Bangladesh has been at pains to emphasize its unrestricted independence, for instance in encouraging the earliest practical departure of Indian troops after the victory over Pakistan.

After the breakaway, Bangladesh was initially in no hurry to sort out remaining issues with Pakistan. Yet for it to obtain full international standing, uncertainties about the distribution of undivided Pakistan's assets and liabilities as between the two present states must be resolved. Similarly with the host of international ties to which Pakistan has been a party—some might be taken up separately by Bangladesh whereas others would require modification to fit the new circumstances. Bilaterally, there is the political issue of the repatriation of some of the hundreds of thousands of Bengalis left in West Pakistan and the possible emigration of Biharis from Bangladesh to Pakistan, as well as the release of Pakistani prisoners of war in Indian custody. The tens of thousands of Pakistani military and civilian personnel who surrendered in December were counted as prisoners of the joint Indian-Bangladesh command. The announced plan of the Bangladesh government to try hundreds of these prisoners on war crimes charges quickly became charged with high emotion, and no easy solution is in sight.

III

What remained of Pakistan proper in early 1972 was a despondent people who had not yet counted their surviving assets. The national military defeat and the dissection of the country had created a serious trauma. The population had not been kept well informed of the difficulties of the military campaign in distant Bengal and it was dazed by the sudden and total collapse. President Yahya and to a large extent the military establishment were discredited. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto succeeded to the presidency at the most critical moment with high ambitions but apparently little political leverage apart from his initial party support and a wider sense that there was no one else.

The central problem for the new Pakistan has been to adjust

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to present realities. Objectively, its prospects are not necessarily bleak. It is no longer beset by the deep cultural cleavages of the former bifurcated state. At current consumption levels it is economically viable, and it has prospects for growth. Its ratio of resources to population seems rather more favorable than India's, not to mention that of Bangladesh. If it is given international economic assistance it should be able to acquire a considerable degree of self-sufficiency. Whether it can in fact do so must depend heavily on how President Bhutto's government deals with critical issues both on the domestic front and in the necessary war settlement. The national fabric at present is so fragile that serious adverse developments in either area could tear it apart.

The country must absorb the economic as well as the other consequences of the loss of East Pakistan. The trade and resource exchanges on which much of the Pakistani economy had been built are gone. While alternative prospects (*e.g.* cotton textile sales in Africa) can perhaps be developed, for the time being the economic base is highly vulnerable.

Even more vulnerable is the political base. This quickly became evident when Mr. Bhutto collided with regional leaders and other political elements over such issues as the maintenance of martial law (which he subsequently lifted, while keeping many of the same controls under a continuing state of emergency). His early months in office saw police strikes in at least three cities and disruptions and walkouts at some of his public meetings. In a partisan campaign reminiscent of Bengali demands a year earlier, voices in the Northwest Frontier Province, Baluchistan and Sind—Mr. Bhutto's own province—called for substantial provincial autonomy rather than a strong central government. Supporters of the President vowed to maintain the integrity of the country even if troops had to be called up. The highly charged atmosphere seemed to quiet somewhat when the President convened the National Assembly and got the assent of the parties to a provisional constitution which set the ground rules until 1973. Mr. Bhutto is well known for political agility, but whether he can keep the underlying conflicts in check remains to be seen.

President Bhutto has set in train other policies that could, if successfully implemented, bring deep changes in Pakistan's traditional social and economic patterns. He has, for example, declared for basic reforms in land-holding patterns and in controls

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of industrial enterprises. Like the numerous retirements and transfers which he ordered for military commanders and civil service officials, such moves could undercut the coalition of senior officialdom, landed gentry and major industrial families which has long managed the national instruments of power. The new Pakistan may be ripe for more populist political arrangements, but it is an unanswered question how much risk would be entailed in pressing for these reforms under the present circumstances.

With his home base less than secure, Mr. Bhutto could not afford serious delays in settling with India and Bangladesh the problems remaining from the war. To prepare for what must be difficult negotiations he began his presidency by testing prospective support in rapid travels to the Middle East, China and Soviet Russia and in diplomatic probes elsewhere. Apparently he found a good deal of understanding and sympathy, with indications of a certain degree of diplomatic backing at least from China and several Middle Eastern Muslim states. Yet the results of his diplomatic initiatives as announced suggested that a Pakistan now one-tenth the size of India would be pretty much on its own at the negotiating table.

Among the issues that could cause Pakistan grave difficulty three stand out. The first relates to about 2,500 square miles of territory in Pakistan's Punjab and Sind provinces that India has seized during the December war and continued to occupy after the ceasefire. Any attempt by India to keep parts of this territory as a condition of peace would be stoutly resisted by Pakistan, defeated or not, and President Bhutto would certainly make intensive appeals to the international community for support. Secondly, the return of Pakistani prisoners could become a sticky issue if Bangladesh were to persist in its intention to try hundreds of the prisoners as war criminals. Emotions in Pakistan on this issue could be explosive.

Even more complicated, however, is the new phase which has begun in the protracted Kashmir dispute. For a generation the quarrel over Kashmir has done more than any other issue to corrode India-Pakistan relations. Is there anything in the new conditions which offers hope of a settlement? An editorial in a New Delhi paper indicated that some thoughtful Indians regarded the handling of Kashmir since 1947 as the Achilles' heel of Indian policy. Can some sort of accommodation be made

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with the Indian position? If Pakistan realistically assessed its strengths and weaknesses, might it moderate its claims?

The key factor, as it has always been, is whether Pakistan and India can bring themselves to make compromises which they can live with. If each clings to its traditional claim to the whole of Kashmir there will be no hope. Nor will there be hope if each should take its classic stand on the issue of a plebiscite. Any real prospect of a settlement would be undermined, of course, by the sort of fresh military clashes that occurred in May across the current lines of control. Yet the search for a solution should not be dropped. One approach to possible progress would be for negotiations to start by recognizing the present partition. Among various possible next steps, arrangements might be explored whereby Kashmir residents could move freely within the whole state, even though different parts of it would continue under the separate jurisdictions of India and of Pakistan. Failure to agree on the future of Kashmir would only put Pakistan and India at loggerheads for a future period and in circumstances much more disadvantageous than before for the smaller state.

IV

In striking contrast to Bangladesh and Pakistan, their big neighbor India has been riding a crest of exhilaration in 1972. To foreign visitors Indians this year have seemed to show more pride in being Indian and less defensiveness about faults or shortcomings in their country than at any time within memory. They approach the national tasks facing them with a new degree of confidence.

During 25 years India's military operations have for the most part been inconsequential (Junagadh, 1947; Hyderabad, 1948; Goa, 1961), indecisive (Kashmir, 1947–48; Pakistan, 1965) or disastrous (China, 1962). But the 1971 campaign is generally acknowledged to have been conducted with speed, skill and éclat. Indians tend to see it, in the words of a military writer, as "the most decisive liberation campaign in history—giving a nation of 75 million people its independence in one lightning strike." They also see it as a wholly justified war. The victorious campaign not only stopped the pressures against the local East Bengali population that between March and December had thrown millions of refugees into India but it opened the door for their return to their own homes. Much of the world, however it had initially

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viewed India's justification for military action, was looking at India with new respect. It is no wonder that Indian national confidence zoomed!

But more than elation over the military triumph underlies the new mood. In economic and political fields as well, Indian confidence has been buoyed by stronger results after years of disappointments. Not all of India's towering economic programs are yet yielding to solutions, to be sure: population pressures, unemployment, urban deficiencies, management problems—especially in public sector corporations, black market operations, foreign-exchange stringencies and other familiar difficulties can still be catalogued at great length. What is more, the 30 percent growth in net national income (at 1960–61 prices) achieved during the past decade has improved the lot of the average Indian by hardly more than one percent per year.

None the less, there has been genuine progress and more is in the works. In just five years the "green revolution," for all the well-publicized problems it has generated, has brought India to the point of self-sufficiency in foodgrains. Industrial production has not only expanded substantially in scale but has also attained higher levels of sophistication. With a new generation of technocrats moving up in business and government, some of India's persistent management problems may be on the way to being managed. Balance in foreign exchange will doubtless be harder to achieve, but greater efforts have been stimulated by the suspension during the December war of development assistance loans by the United States and, for a time at least, by some other countries. Economically, the country seems to be on the move.

Recent progress in political management has been more dramatic. Mrs. Gandhi has proved herself as adept a national leader as her father, Jawaharlal Nehru, and as skilled a political manager as his close associate at the time of independence, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. Having fragmented and virtually neutralized her opponents in the central parliamentary elections of 1971, she consolidated her hold on the country's political apparatus in early 1972 by campaigning with great effect (and with the prestige of the Bangladesh victory) for "strong and stable state governments, in tune with national policies." Her victories do not suggest that India will no longer face regional strains. However, she has clearly acquired a degree of authority beyond the reach of previous Indian prime ministers. What remains to

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be seen is how she will use it, both domestically and in India's relations with other powers. In respect to the future tranquility of the subcontinent, much will depend on how India's current cohesiveness and confidence are used to contribute to a lasting settlement with Pakistan.

V

The prospects for a fresh start in the subcontinent are necessarily also affected by the postures of the major external powers.

The Soviet Union has substantially increased working relationships with India during the past year. It has aimed at this since the 1950s and especially since the Sino-Soviet split and the Sino-Indian war of 1962. Soviet economic involvement in India and the scale of its military aid to India both rose markedly after the India-Pakistan war of 1965. By 1969 the Soviets were hoping for a favorable Indian response to the Brezhnev proposal for an Asian security arrangement. However, it was only the confluence of two developments in mid-1971 that opened the way for a formal Soviet-Indian tie. One was the new turn in Chinese-American relationships, dramatized by Dr. Kissinger's flight to Peking via Pakistan; to Indians this suggested a prospective axis of three nations antipathetic to Indian interests. The other was the gathering Bengal crisis and the possibility of another India-Pakistan war, in which India could expect backing only from the Soviet Union among the major powers. Faced with these prospects, India signed a mutual assistance pact with the Soviet Union last August. The pact was generally welcomed by Indian opinion. Although some Indians expressed anxiety that their country might fall too much under the Soviet sway—and tended to blame the United States for "having pushed us into Russia's arms"—there was considerable confidence that India could manage the Soviet relationship to her own advantage.

The Soviets also moved quickly to establish a presence in Bangladesh. While their assistance was not great in quantity, at least in the early months, they spared no effort to establish their visibility as a benefactor. More quietly, they also received Mr. Bhutto in Moscow and agreed to resume assistance programs that had been under way in West Pakistan before the war. There can be no doubt that the Soviets see themselves as a major factor in the subcontinent and intend to remain so.

By contrast, China has seemed to view the subcontinent in

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terms of her own confrontation with the Soviet Union and her differences with India, rather than as an area of broad opportunity. Her close and cordial relations with Pakistan did not affect the outcome of the Bengal conflict. Her posture toward India during and since that conflict has kept antagonism at a high pitch, effectively rebuffing India's previous overtures toward negotiating outstanding border issues. Now that Pakistan's political weight in the subcontinent has dwindled, some Indians hope the Chinese may revise their posture.

The same hope is voiced about the Americans. With rare unanimity, Indian opinion has judged American official policy on the Bangladesh issue as wholly wrong. Reactions have ranged from outright hostility to deep puzzlement as to what could have driven the U.S. government to support a corrupt and politically bankrupt Pakistani régime, alienate India and wind up with the defeated and discredited side. No matter that the White House in 1971 was focusing primarily on the China initiative rather than on the subcontinent or that American policy was apparently influenced by official suspicions that India intended to encourage the break-up of West Pakistan after completing the task in Bangladesh. Some influential Indians who had long been known as pro-American have particularly resented being, as they see it, let down. They have noticed with satisfaction that general public opinion in the United States has appeared to favor the Indian position rather than that of the American government. Even so, bitterness against the United States has been running higher than in any period since the middle 1950s, when American military aid programs for Pakistan were first developed.

Actually, two separate sets of principles are involved in the policies of India and the United States in this instance. India assessed the Bangladesh issue in terms of Wilsonian self-determination. The U.S. government chose to stand on the concepts built into the U.N. Charter that protect the sovereignty and integrity of member nations against interference by external powers. While this may not be a very convincing position, especially since the flood of refugees into India effectively internationalized the issue on the ground, its significance was demonstrated by the response in the United Nations. Only the Soviet veto protected the Indian position against an adverse vote in the Security Council. In the General Assembly no third-world country except Bhutan (whose vote is controlled by India), and no other country

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outside the Soviet bloc backed the Indian resistance to stopping military operations in East Bengal. Because many other countries contain potentially dissident areas, governments are understandably loath—as the U.S. delegation understood—to endorse outside military intervention against a central authority. (Ironically, in the Kashmir debates in the United Nations the principle of national integrity has been defended by India and the concept of self-determination by the United States. Somehow the two countries look at different issues from different perspectives.)

The first fragile indications that both the United States and India would prefer to move toward more normal relationships came months later. Both have sound reasons to desire friendly relations. Having won her contest within the subcontinent and, in the process, strengthened her ties with the Soviet Union, India needs to bring her international relations back into some sort of balance. On the American side, it is clear that henceforward any dealings of significance within the subcontinent will bring the United States into contact with India.

This was made clear by the U.S. recognition of Bangladesh. Also, continuing contacts with the Pakistan government help make certain that the United States, like the Soviet Union, will maintain working relationships with all three countries. What directions they will take must depend on the kind of relationships that are worked out between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh themselves.

VI

Whatever the great-power concerns with the subcontinent, in the new circumstances of 1972 the focus must be on developments within the region rather than on influences from outside. While all three of the countries in the subcontinent need access to international economic assistance programs to achieve timely growth, and to the network of international connections within the world community, the key decisions affecting the 700,000,000 people of the region will be made in the three national capitals.

Two factors stand out in the relationships among the three countries. One is the imbalance between the contributions to be expected from Dacca, Islamabad and New Delhi. The stability of Bangladesh is the primary responsibility of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his government, just as the integrity of Pakistan is the central domestic issue facing the government of Mr.

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Bhutto. Yet neither of these countries can manage its affairs without taking into account the posture and policies of its huge neighbor India. India, on the other hand, carries not only the responsibility for three-quarters of the subcontinent's population but also the knowledge that her views and actions can substantially affect the well-being of the two smaller countries. Thus, while in a *ménage à trois* it takes three to make a settlement, the chief opportunity and responsibility clearly lie with the one that disposes the most resources.

The second factor is the inescapable linkage of the three independent nations. As Mr. Bhutto commented in a recent conversation, "There is something about the subcontinent, with its high mountains to the north and the ocean surrounding it on all other sides, that keeps us all together and forces us to find ways to live with each other." It is this sort of understanding, to the extent that it is shared by him and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Mrs. Gandhi, that gives the best hope, despite all difficulties, of a fresh start in the subcontinent.

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HOW CHINA AND JAPAN SEE EACH OTHER

By Chalmers Johnson

OVER the past century the politics of East Asia have been influenced more profoundly by the Sino-Japanese relationship than by any other single factor. Because both the two present-day societies have roots in classical Chinese civilization—only a "heritage" for each today—Chinese and Japanese politicians before World War II often argued that there was a special binding relationship between them. Japan's written language and much of its religious, artistic and moral civilization derive from Chinese culture, while Japan was the primary influence both positively and negatively on whole generations of Chinese revolutionaries, some of whom are still alive and active today. Perhaps because of this common heritage of civilization and mutual influence, the enormous misunderstandings, wars, threats and depredations that have characterized Sino-Japanese relations for a century have tended to take on the ferocity of a family or civil feud. Even though well-educated Chinese and Japanese can learn each other's language rather easily, it is doubtful whether any two peoples in the twentieth century have approached each other with more profoundly misleading stereotypes.

Three specific historical occurrences continue to mold Chinese and Japanese attitudes toward each other, in addition to the broader pressures on the two nations of different ideologies and national interests. First, China and Japan reacted to the influence of Western imperialism in the nineteenth century in almost diametrically opposite ways: within a few decades after the Western intrusion Japan had accommodated herself to and incorporated modern technology, whereas China disintegrated as a social system and required a century before she could begin her own modernization under conditions of national unity. Second, prior to the First World War Japan served as an exemplar and model for many Chinese modernizers, a role that the Soviet Union took over after the Bolshevik Revolution; and just as in the case of the Sino-Soviet conflict, this earlier relationship has tended to color later antagonisms with feelings of ingratitude on the one hand and betrayal on the other. Third, Japan's ultimate

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betrayal, in the eyes of Chinese revolutionaries, was her military intervention in China between 1937 and 1945 in order to suppress by force the Chinese anti-imperialist nationalist movement —a savage crucible in which the Chinese Communist Party obtained a mass following as a result of its championing resistance to Japan.

Of these three elements, perhaps the first is of the greatest long-term significance. Pre-modern China and pre-modern Japan were sociologically quite different societies, and Western imperialist pressure impinged upon each of them in different ways. None the less both were similar enough—common Sinitic civilization, closed to foreign intercourse since the seventeenth century, and forced open by the West in the 1840s and 1850s—to cause members of each society to make invidious comparisons about the performance of the other in the face of common challenges. The Chinese, supremely confident of the superiority of their own culture, reacted with various anti-foreign movements until the end of the century, while the Japanese, after a brief experiment with anti-foreignism, gave it up as a lost cause and quickly modernized along Western lines.

Among the humiliations suffered by the Chinese, none was more galling than the defeat in 1895 of the "Celestial Empire" (China) by the "Wa dwarfs" (Japanese, as seen by the Chinese), a defeat that resulted in the annexation of Taiwan into the Japanese Empire. The initial Chinese reaction to this defeat, which brought the first true Chinese revolutionary movements into being, was to blame their own inept government; and after 1895, thousands of Chinese students flocked to Japan to learn about the modern world. Over time and in light of Japan's subsequent development as an imperialist power in her own right, Chinese admiration of the Japanese modernization effort changed to a hatred of Japan, the quintessential imperialist villain who kept China weak in order to suck her dry.

China and Japan offer two of the clearest archetypes in the so-called third world of alternative responses to Western imperialism. Japan adopted the reformist strategy, grafting Western institutions onto her essentially feudal social structure, changing in subtle ways but at the same time maintaining a distinctive national identity and continuity with the past. China rejected reform, since it seemed to imply an unacceptable accommodation of Confucian culture with barbarian (uncivilized) mores, and

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was ultimately forced by implacable imperialist pressure to revolution—a revolution in which the traditional culture was to be totally dismantled and replaced with a new culture that could prevent the incessant foreign "humiliations" and restore a sense of national dignity. Reform and revolution remain the two broad alternatives open to the so-called "modernizing" nations; and Japan and China, the one perhaps the most reformist nation in modern history and the other the most revolutionary, exemplify the strengths and weaknesses of each strategy to other nations around the world and to each other.

The attitudes that grew up along with these divergent histories persist to the present time and will have an important influence on any future process of Sino-Japanese reconciliation. To the Chinese the Japanese "economic miracle" is not only a threat; it is also an insult. Today the Chinese trade more with Japan than with any other nation, but they do not praise Japan for her economic success, nor do they appear willing to put Sino-Japanese economic coöperation on a stable long-term footing. For that matter, the Chinese do not display much in the way of understanding as to why Japan's economy continues to grow as fast as it does. Premier Chou En-lai argues that Japan's economic power is an inevitable precursor of remilitarization and imperialism, and the Chinese have not thus far shown the slightest willingness to adjust to the fact that Japan's GNP is infinitely greater than China's and will continue to be so for the indefinite future. By hammering away at the inevitability of "revived Japanese militarism" the Chinese may be setting up a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The Japanese, on the other hand, seem to be befogged by an equally long-standing inability to take the Chinese seriously. It is perhaps not too far-fetched to describe Japanese attitudes toward their continental neighbors as somewhat comparable to the English or German industrialist's attitude toward an Italian or Spanish aristocrat recently gone into commerce. He admires, and is slightly intimidated by, the ancient cultural achievements to which his modern counterpart is heir, but he finds it almost impossible in the company board room to suggest seriously that the new boy might become a competitor or a threat. Japan today is interested in doing business with China but her interest in the China business is only a slight fraction of her interest in business generally, and Japanese commercial representatives seem quite

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willing to sign humiliating Chinese communiqués or other anti-Japanese pronouncements drafted by Peking in order to get what trade there is—presumably because Japanese do not take these Chinese pronouncements very seriously. The Japanese are much more concerned about the possibility that another nation might get ahead of them in the China trade than that the Chinese might compete with them successfully in the rest of Asia.

Even Chinese nuclear weapons do not appear to have caused the Japanese to see China as a potential threat, even though the Japanese dislike atomic testing by anybody. One sign of this Japanese self-confidence vis-à-vis China is the underdeveloped state of Japanese research and training about the Chinese Revolution in the postwar era. Japan's academic and governmental specialists on Chinese communist developments are among the most knowledgeable in the world, but all of them complain of the relatively slight interest in scholarship on China among students and the Japanese public. Even when Chinese events reach the headlines, they are likely to be regarded as mere "news," and not as developments that might vitally affect Japan as a nation.

None of this is to suggest that the major sources of tension between China and Japan are attitudinal and that there are no real problems. It is rather to point out that the Chinese tend to regard Japan, for good historical reasons, with the utmost suspicion, remembering how quickly the old samurai of the nineteenth century armed themselves with Western weapons and turned these against China. China's stereotypes of Japan seem to preclude a realistic Chinese assessment of how Japan has changed and of the ways in which she may change in the future, always coming back to the undertone of suspicion that Japan's achievements are likely to be at China's expense. Conversely, the Japanese regard the Chinese as still struggling with their interminable revolutions and are inclined to take the Chinese deadly seriously only when it looks as if the Chinese are about to form an alliance with a non-Asian power, say the Soviet Union or the United States, for that might greatly restrict Japan's freedom of access and maneuver in international commerce.

The other two main historical influences affecting Sino-Japanese relations—Japan's erstwhile role as model and leader of an "Asian renaissance," and the second Sino-Japanese war—reinforce and provide sustenance for the deeper suspicions arising out of the two nations' differing responses to the West. From ap-

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proximately 1895 down to the Treaty of Versailles, and persisting in an attenuated form until Japan's seizure of Manchuria in 1931, Chinese and Asian nationalists of many different political hues traveled to Tokyo to learn modern scientific culture and modern political ideas. During this period, Japan herself was wrestling with the problem of what kind of foreign policy she might appropriately pursue in the world. Should she use her newly acquired power to lead the rest of Asia toward independence and modernity? Or should she, having achieved the industrial underpinnings of great-power status, join the imperialists? Despite what one may think with the benefit of hindsight, the answer was not a foregone conclusion.

Prior to the First World War (and Japan's discovery of how easy it was to step into the enclaves vacated by the then-distracted European imperialists), some Japanese gave considerable aid and assistance to Chinese revolutionaries such as Sun Yat-sen. Equally important, Japan herself provided the climate for political discussion and ideological exploration that was so essential to the education of revolutionary leaders. In fact, much of the contemporary Chinese vocabulary of politics—terms like anarchism, socialism, communism, nationalism, and so forth—entered the Chinese language from Japanese renderings of these European words. Even when the Japanese began to lean toward an imperialist rather than an Asian role, many Chinese tried to continue to work with them.

Japan's progressive development from the Twenty-one Demands on China in 1915 to the seizure of Manchuria in 1931 ultimately filled all Chinese nationalists with enmity against Japan, a sentiment bolstered by fury against Japan's parvenu imperialism and betrayal of her fellow Asians. When, in the 1930s, the Japanese militarists tried to revive an anti-Western Asian nationalism led by Japan, they were too late. In Chinese eyes Japan was no longer Asian; it was imperialist, pure and simple.

The Sino-Japanese War itself bred further animosities and hatreds that continue to influence perceptions today, but it would be wrong to interpret the war's influence solely in terms of its brutalities. The war's more lasting contribution was its cognitive or ideological structure. Virtually all adult Japanese acknowledge and wish to atone for Japan's military actions on the continent, but many fewer will agree that Japan was fighting for a totally worthless national cause. They recall that in the depres-

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sion era of "economic nationalism" every area of East Asia from India to the Philippines, with the exception of China and Thailand, was a European or American colony and that Japan was threatened with being frozen out in each of these territories. When China, the last country open to Japanese economic activity, began to develop a powerful, quasi-Marxist, anti-imperialist, anti-Japanese social movement—one enjoying the sympathy and sometimes the encouragement of the United States—Japan reacted with panic. Fears of international isolation and of alliances that work against Japan's needs as a resource-poor, overpopulated, insular, industrial economy lay very close to the surface of the Japanese mind, as they still do today. It is one reason why the mentality of "Japan, Inc." and protectionism remain so powerful despite Japan's present global economic outreach.

On the Chinese side, World War II tended irresistibly to recommend Marxist and especially Leninist modes of thought to Chinese nationalists, since the progress of Japan from feudalism to capitalism to imperialism seemed to be a compelling confirmation of Marxist-Leninist ideology. Even today, with the decline of ideological rigidity in the communist world and the Sino-Soviet schism, China continues to believe that there is something economically inevitable about Japan's being a menace to China, regardless of what Japanese (or representatives of other economically advanced nations) profess. Needless to say, Japan's postwar alliance with the United States and America's own deep postwar antagonism to the Chinese Communists did nothing to lessen the hold of this ideological cast of mind.

Chinese communist ideology is a complex subject, and no suggestion is intended that Chinese ideology is unchanged or that it is the sole or primary influence on Chinese behavior in the world. Instead, I wish to stress that the heritage of World War II in Sino-Japanese relations has an ideological dimension—in addition to the legacy of war and killing—and that such set patterns of thinking may be more important in future contacts between China and Japan than other wartime memories. For example, Japan today has a vested interest in international stability, this being a prerequisite for the global commerce on which Japan depends and thrives. In order to secure this stability Japan is increasingly making available foreign aid to the established governments of such countries as Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand; and is opposed to revolutionary movements. How does China

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interpret these Japanese activities—say, economic aid to South Korea or to Thailand? Inevitably, the Chinese explain Japan's posture in ideological terms, as a reflection of the "capitalist-imperalist-reactionary syndrome." China does not and probably will not soon accept the legitimacy of Japan's close commercial and aid ties with the other nations of Asia.

On the other hand, China's efforts to promote revolution throughout the third world strike Japanese as evidence of China's continuing communist-based hostility to nations such as Japan. China is not—yet—a stability-promoting force in the world, and this stance of China's directly conflicts with a basic Japanese national interest. The Japanese recall what happened to their important prewar China market under revolutionary conditions, and they are not the least bit reassured by the continued virulence of communist ideology on the mainland. In short, both China and Japan have good reasons to fear a recurrence of international conditions similar to those that existed in the 1930s; both nations' perceptions of such a possible recurrence are, however, colored by their respective ideological explanations of why such conditions ever came about in the first place.

II

China and Japan have been interacting with each other and misunderstanding each other for a century, during which both underwent the most dramatic changes. There is little evidence today that either country "understands" the other any better than it did in the past. For example, China has been trying for the past two decades to conduct "people-to-people" diplomacy in Japan and to influence Japanese elections. However, despite large expenditures of money and propaganda efforts, the Chinese have never had the kind of sensitivity or insight into Japanese society that might have helped some of their subversive activities to succeed. Instead, Tokyo reporters quip that Peking's heavy-handed propaganda must be a secret weapon of the conservative party, since every time China meddles in a Japanese election its net effect is to increase the conservatives' margin of victory.

A peculiar aspect of China's inability to win large numbers of friends in Japan is that, at least on the surface, it would appear so easy for China to do so. The Japanese press is filled with protestations of friendship for China, and every major political leader has said that he is in favor of improving Sino-Japanese

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relations. There seem to be two reasons why nothing very much has happened. The first relates to the covert reality of the Japanese political process and the second to the fact that China does not want Japanese friendship unless the Japanese adopt virtually a neutralist foreign policy.

What Japanese politicians say on the substantive issues of politics must always be leavened with an appreciation of the role that issues play in relations between factions of the dominant Liberal Democratic Party. Positions on issues are often developed first and foremost with an eye to distinguishing an aspiring faction leader from the current administration, perhaps thereby enhancing his future prospects to enter or form a government, or in order to embarrass the ruling faction and to make it harder for it to capitalize politically on its current—and in all likelihood widely supported—policies. Thus, opposition faction leaders were quick to cry that Prime Minister Sato had been irretrievably disgraced and weakened when President Nixon launched his new China policy without consulting Sato in advance. Sato may have been weakened—many of his opponents hoped so—but this did not mean that, aside from wanting to replace him in office, his critics necessarily wanted to change his policies on China. The clearest example of this covert political infighting occurred during the 1960 crisis over the Japanese-American security treaty. A casual observer might have thought that the Japanese were deeply opposed to continuing friendly relations with the United States. What they were really opposed to was the way Prime Minister Kishi had handled the treaty in the Diet and the fact that he was likely to get enormous political credit for having renegotiated it. Once Kishi had been forced from office, none of his inner-party opponents said anything more about changing the treaty.

The second problem standing in the way of improved Chinese-Japanese relations is that China is not likely to accept a "normalization" of relations until Japan has met China's political requirements. In the terms of the Sino-American communiqué of February 28, 1972, the Chinese People's Republic "firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people's desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan." Japanese deeply resent this particular choice of words by the Chinese because, since they themselves criticize any signs of a "revival and

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outward expansion of Japanese militarism," they understand Chinese propaganda on this theme to mean that China opposes Japan's regaining control over Okinawa and objects to Japan's close economic ties with the rimland states of East Asia.

The Chinese demand that Japan cut her economic ties with South Korea and Taiwan, end her alliance with the United States, renegotiate a new peace treaty with China, and adhere strictly to the disarmament provisions of the present Japanese Constitution. And even if Japan did all of these things, the Chinese would still claim the right to specify which Japanese political leaders they would or would not deal with. What Japan would obtain from China in return is never made clear. Japan is unlikely to acquiesce fully to China's terms for state-to-state relations (they are the harshest terms China has asked from any nation, including the United States) unless China's tactics of playing off the United States against Japan force the Japanese to agree. Under those circumstances a Sino-Japanese rapprochement is likely to be extremely fragile and short-lived.

The question thus becomes whether the American démarche on China policy, combined with the presidential visit to China, has enhanced or damaged the possibilities of improved Sino-Japanese relations. Even though Japanese pride was somewhat wounded by the way in which the Chinese and Americans got together, and despite the fact that Tokyo is disappointed to see its long-envisioned role as intermediary between China and America go up in smoke, virtually all Japanese political leaders hope that Chinese friendliness toward the Americans applies to them too. The Japanese are prepared to make concessions to China in order to find out. Japan has already abrogated the so-called "Yoshida Letter," which pledged to Chiang Kai-shek that Japan would not provide long-term credits for Chinese communist purchases in Japan, and has made Export-Import Bank financing available to China. Many of Japan's largest firms have also accepted Chou En-lai's "four principles" of April 19, 1970, for trade with China—*i.e.* that firms trading with China must not: (1) carry on trade with South Korea or Taiwan, (2) invest in South Korea or Taiwan, (3) export weapons for American use in Indochina, or (4) affiliate as joint ventures or subsidiaries of American firms in Japan.

Nevertheless, many of the best-informed Japanese doubt that Japan can ever concede enough to win Chinese approval. Jap-

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anese leaders have hunches—the Japanese Ambassador to the United States publicly expressed his—that at least part of the Chinese motivation in inviting the American President to China was to damage the friendly relations that exist between Japan and the United States. The Japanese think that China warmed up to the United States only partly because of the growing threat posed to China by the Soviet Union and China's consequent need to complicate Soviet decision-making by ending her international isolation. Another Chinese fear, they argue, is the possibility that Japan may fill the vacuum created in East Asia as the United States scales down its presence in accordance with the Nixon Doctrine. One way to prevent the latter from happening would be for China to try to isolate Japan and to pressure her into a quick accommodation with China on Chinese terms.

In addition to the heritage of hostilities and misperceptions between the two countries, there are two other obstacles to a speedy rapprochement between China and Japan: Taiwan and Japan's defense requirements. Taiwan poses a major dilemma for Japanese policy. Despite the fact that Japanese trade with Taiwan during 1970 was worth $127 million more than Japanese trade with the mainland, the Japanese appear willing to compromise on Taiwan—but only if it produces a genuine improvement in relations with Peking. The Japanese have large investments on the island, and they are aware that a majority of the Taiwanese would prefer independence to being ruled by either the present group of mainlanders that sits in Taipei (the Kuomintang exiles) or by a new group of mainlanders. The Japanese also know that Taiwanese sentiment for independence has been muted in the past because the Taiwanese believed that time was working in their favor: the Kuomintang leaders who arrived between 1945 and 1949 are old and must pass from the scene before long. Ironically, the American acknowledgment in the communiqué of February 1972 that "Taiwan is a part of China" may finally bring a Taiwanese independence movement into being, since time is no longer on the side of the indigenous population.

The Japanese regard Taiwan as "independent" economically right now, and they have strong historical, cultural and economic interests in seeing it become independent politically. However, for them to support Taiwanese independence would eliminate any possibility of friendly relations with the present government on the mainland. Therefore, they see no other course than to

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follow the American lead and acknowledge Peking's sovereignty over the island. On the other hand, if relations with the mainland are likely to remain unchanged or to worsen in the future, then the Japanese think that it would be foolish to liquidate their Taiwanese holdings for nothing.

One reason why Sino-Japanese relations might worsen is because of Japan's security problems. Japan may be the world's third-ranking economy in terms of industrial production, but China is the world's fifth nuclear power. Japan is dependent upon, and committed to, maintaining her defense against China's growing nuclear strength via the American "nuclear umbrella." However, to the extent that the Japanese-American security treaty becomes less credible in Japanese eyes, the Japanese government will be forced to find some other way to provide for the security of a non-nuclear nation in a nuclear world. One way would be for the Japanese themselves to become a nuclear power. The Japanese do not want this; they know that to do so would alarm many of their trading partners and would ruin their chances for a détente with China. But it is something that Japanese planners must consider particularly in light of the "unravelling" of the Japanese-American relationship that has become evident over the past year.

For the time being the Japanese are seeking to display their independence of the United States in the hope that this posture will make the Chinese more willing to negotiate with them over outstanding issues. During early 1972, for example, the Japanese sent a Foreign Ministry mission to Hanoi, recognized Bangladesh and the Mongolian People's Republic, made overtures to Pyongyang, and accepted Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's overtures for improved relations and for joint Soviet-Japanese ventures in the development of Siberia. These disparate moves were not so much signs of a new Japanese policy as evidence that one did not yet exist. If China will coexist with Japan only on Chinese terms, then the Japanese position is once again likely to stiffen and tensions between the two countries will grow. If China is prepared to compromise her differences with Japan through government-to-government negotiations, then the Japanese will surely make major concessions in order to see that the negotiations succeed. But even if negotiations can remove the immediate obstacles to improved relations, the long-standing rivalries between the two nations are likely to persist.

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THE UNITED STATES AND CASTRO: BREAKING THE DEADLOCK

By Edward Gonzalez

THIRTEEN years after Fidel Castro's rise to power, Washington and Havana remain locked in mutually uncompromising positions. The continuing climate of recriminations and reprisals in U.S.-Cuban relations now stands in sharp contrast with the dramatic and sudden thaw in U.S.-Chinese relations that began in April 1971. In fact, both Washington and Havana seemed to have seized upon the Chinese development to reaffirm their postures of mutual intransigence.

On April 16, 1971, President Nixon stated that Havana's policies precluded the type of initiatives then under way toward China. The President pointedly noted that Castro was "still exporting revolution" and that "until Cuba changes their [sic] policy toward us we are not going to change our policy toward Cuba." Three days later, Castro responded by vehemently reaffirming Cuba's "solidarity" with the Latin American revolutionary movement, adding that Cuba could in fact afford to "scorn relations . . . with the imperialist government of an empire on the decline and defeated on every front." It would thus seem that the relevance of the Chinese precedent has been dismissed by both sides and that neither desires a break in the current deadlock short of a unilateral capitulation by the other party.

From the U.S. vantage point, of course, Cuba is not mainland China with its vast population, developing nuclear capability, and potential for influencing developments in Southeast Asia if not in the Vietnam War itself. Equally important, communist China has emerged as a major threat to the Soviet Union, which remains the chief strategic adversary of the United States. Most of the American political community has thus supported President Nixon's gambit toward China as furthering the vital interests of the United States.

The same kind of potential trade-offs do not appear to exist with regard to Cuba. Cuba's revolutionary thrust into the Hemisphere has already been largely contained. Castro's economic reversals in recent years have made the Cuban example less appealing for Latin America, while serving as a drain on Soviet

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resources. The Soviet ideological, military and economic stake in communist Cuba in turn provides the United States with a potential "hostage" for countering Moscow's moves elsewhere in the world. The Cuban leadership has fully aligned itself with Moscow as against Peking, and does not appear disposed toward an accommodation with Washington. As a result, U.S. officials evidently perceive few openings on the Cuban front—other than volleyball—that would allow for the type of initiatives undertaken toward Peking. Even if such openings existed, established OAS sanctions would have to be overcome in any new dealings with Cuba. Finally, a more conciliatory posture toward Havana would involve domestic political risks for the administration during an election year, stemming from the presence of the Cuban exile community and the anti-Castro sentiment among liberal as well as conservative elements of the electorate.

Notwithstanding these arguments, the United States may now need to reëxamine its own vital interests in the light of recent Cuban developments. Indeed, both the United States and Cuba may be developing limited common interests that could be exploited by a more flexible U.S. policy. For the present, however, the policies of the two countries seem based in large part on antagonistic stances having their origins in the past, and which may no longer serve to advance their respective national interests. In any event, neither the President nor the Cuban Premier appears willing to make the first move. Since this standoff has transfixed U.S.-Cuban relations for over a decade, it may be useful to reexamine the initial causes and processes making for the breakdown in U.S.-Cuban relations.

II. CONFRONTATION AND RECOIL, 1959–1961

The conflict between Havana and Washington was virtually certain after January 1959. Fresh from his stunning triumph over the Batista dictatorship, Castro was bound and determined to reduce, if not totally eliminate, the long-standing American economic, political and cultural presence in Cuba. Furthermore, he sought not only to detach Cuba from the U.S. embrace, but also to distinguish his new régime from the discredited image of past client governments. Thus committed, his nationalist and social revolution was from the very outset contrary to the established interests of the United States in Cuba and Latin America.

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The conservative style and outlook of the Eisenhower administration made the conflict all the more likely. A staunch defender of private enterprise and an implacable foe of communism, the administration had earlier backed Batista as the dutiful, reliable ally of the United States in the Caribbean. Notwithstanding Castro's seizure of power, the White House could still look to the successful Guatemalan precedent where the United States had stage-managed the overthrow of the leftist Arbenz régime in 1954. Indeed, as former Ambassador Philip Bonsal has now confirmed, Washington's policy calculations were to be greatly affected by the belief that Castro could not long survive or that if need be he could be ousted from power through indirect U.S. intervention.[1]

The stakes were also considerably higher in Cuba by the end of the 1950s than they had been in Guatemala or elsewhere in Latin America where U.S. interests had been previously threatened. The book value of American enterprises in Cuba alone was over $1 billion and encompassed wide-ranging economic interests. Cuba and the Guantanamo Naval Base were considered of pivotal strategic importance in guarding the approaches to the Caribbean and the American mainland. Sensitivity to the strategic question, in turn, had been heightened by the recent growth in Soviet strategic capabilities. Under the more venturesome leadership of Khrushchev, moreover, the Soviets appeared intent on expanding their political, economic and military influence on a global scale. High stakes and the entire gamut of U.S. interests thus appear to have been caught up with the Cuban question.

In regard to the Soviets, Castro gave cause for Washington's growing alarm by violating the "rules of the game" that heretofore had been observed—save for Arbenz in Guatemala, who had obtained Soviet-bloc arms in 1954 and, though less so, Péron in Argentina—by the member-states of the inter-American community. Beginning in early 1959, the Cuban leader openly refused to disown communist support at home, while additionally endorsing violent revolution abroad. He further advocated Cuba's neutralist position in the East-West conflict as early as March 1959, and after October he indicated his readiness to reach out to the Soviets as a means of safeguarding his revolution. Overall, then, the divergent paths of revolutionary Havana and

[1] Philip W. Bonsal, "Cuba, Castro and the United States." Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1971.

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conservative Washington made for increasingly strained relations.

While perhaps unavoidable, it does not follow that the U.S.-Cuban conflict was unmanageable. Whether a conflict is contained or enlarged may depend on how the actors identify their own interests and perceive their antagonist's intentions as well as on the interests at stake. Hence, Havana and Washington became caught up in a "self-fulfilling prophecy" whereby each side anticipated the worst possible behavior on the part of the other and began to act accordingly. Castro appears to have concluded by mid-1959 that the United States would not accept his revolution and that ultimately he would have to turn to the Soviet camp for support. Similarly, Eisenhower became convinced by early 1959 that the Cuban leader was already going communist and his administration began "to examine measures . . . [for] restraining Castro if he should develop into a menace."[2] In short, neither side was disposed toward taking initiatives or responding to the possible conciliatory signals from the other side. On the contrary, the respective postures and rhetoric of each were perceived exclusively as evidence of hostile intentions.

To be sure, Castro exercised no restraint as he mobilized popular support by giving vent to Cuba's historical grievances against the "Colossus of the North." As early as January 1959, he condemned the United States on every aspect of its relationship with Cuba—its intervention in 1898 in Cuba's War of Independence, its imposition of the Platt Amendment, its thwarting of the 1933 Revolution and its support of Batista during the 1950s. Additionally, he launched verbal attacks against "imperialism," "oligarchic régimes," "vested foreign interests," "capitalist exploitation" and "Yankee aggression." In point of fact, he exhibited little of the self-restraint shown by President Cárdenas in 1938, or at present by President Salvador Allende in attempting to maintain Chilean-U.S. relations on a manageable plane.

Castro's confrontation tactics, however, should be placed in their immediate political context. As Cuba's liberator and Latin America's most illustrious revolutionary, he necessarily had to play to nationalistic and anti-imperialistic audiences at home and abroad. Furthermore, he had to demonstrate to his followers that he would not become another practitioner of *entreguismo* (na-

[2] Dwight D. Eisenhower, "The White House Years: Waging Peace 1956–1960." Garden City: Doubleday, 1965, p. 521, 524.

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tional sellout) as had much of Cuba's old political class during the first half of the twentieth century. Imbued with his generation's mission of national redemption, therefore, he vowed on January 13, 1959, that:

> The Platt Amendment is finished. . . . No longer is there a military régime in our country, no longer are there military officers who can betray the revolution by seizing power as occurred in '33, and *for the first time there are meritorious men at the head of the country who neither sell themselves, nor falter nor become intimidated by any threat.*

Nevertheless, the young Cuban leader remained under pressure from ultranationalist and communist quarters. Witness the following editorial comment by a leading Communist regarding Castro's visit to Washington in April 1959: "Fidel does not go to beg, but to negotiate; he does not go to humiliate himself, but to discuss. . . . What Cuba wants and expects, what she hopes Fidel Castro will accomplish in his trip, is to continue pursuing Martí's course in his policy. . . . A Cubanist policy. . . ."[3]

Acutely sensitized to such nationalist demands, Castro consequently sought to avoid compromising himself in any way with the U.S. government. A former member of his régime thus recalls Fidel's uneasiness over his decision to address the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington in mid-April 1959:

> I heard him expressing fears of being invited to the White House and of being photographed with the President of the United States as one more Latin American leader "sold out" to imperialism. In addition there were problems when Mr. Nixon [then Vice President] changed his invitation from his home to his office in the Senate because that could be interpreted as an official visit.[4]

Despite his earlier statements that he would take up the question of loans for Cuba, therefore, Castro publicly denied upon his arrival in Washington that he had come for economic "handouts." Additionally, he privately instructed his economic advisers to avoid discussing U.S. loan overtures with State Department officials.

None the less, Fidel did seem to leave the door slightly ajar for a possible modus vivendi with Washington. While on this visit he publicly espoused a "humanist" revolution and went so far

[3] Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, "Un esclarecimiento necessario," *Hoy*, April 15, 1959.

[4] Letter from Felipe Pazos, March 22, 1963. Pazos served as President of the National Bank of Cuba until November 1959, and in that capacity accompanied Castro to Washington the previous April.

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as to condemn the repressive nature of the communist political system. Shortly thereafter he flew to Buenos Aires where he proposed to the OAS "Committee of 21" that the United States fund a $30-billion development program for all of Latin America in which, of course, Cuba would share. If only indirectly, therefore, Castro may have been signaling the United States to resume the courtship that had tentatively begun with the State Department's loan overtures to Cuba, but in a manner that would fully confirm his régime's independence and his own nationalist integrity.

These gestures were in the end eclipsed by Castro's ultranationalist and defiant postures. The attention of Washington and the public tended to focus on his symbolic and ideological deviations, rather than on the more moderate course that he in fact was still pursuing during the first half of 1959. The abrasive *fidelista* style of politics, as well as the leftist drift of developments within Cuba, left the Eisenhower administration little disposed to test Castro's readiness to come to terms. At the very least, such an approach would have entailed considerably more than loan overtures because these in themselves indicated no revision of the traditional U.S.-Cuban client relationship. Only in a last-minute effort to head off Cuba's turn to Moscow did Washington attempt this policy shift. Just before the arrival of First Deputy Premier Mikoyan in Havana, President Eisenhower publicly announced on January 26, 1960, that the United States would observe a policy of nonintervention, refrain from reprisals and respect Cuba's right to undertake a social revolution. But the die had already been cast.

For its part, the United States had fed Havana's apprehension by its indiscriminate as well as mounting attacks on the Cuban Revolution after early 1959. The public outcry in the U.S. press and Congress against the *fidelista* régime ranged all the way from attacks on the latter's "revolutionary justice," "communist infiltration" and "threat to the Hemisphere," to its rejection of democratic elections, its general economic policies and its Agrarian Reform Law of May 1959. From the viewpoint of the Castro régime, these growing criticisms must have appeared as a wholesale indictment of the Cuban Revolution by influential American circles which could be won over only by seriously compromising the revolutionary process. Nor were there clear signals to the contrary from the White House: both President Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon remained steadfast in

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their personal opposition.[5] Hence, Castro and his closest followers could only conclude from these public attacks that the "Colossus of the North" would eventually turn against the revolution as had occurred previously in Cuba in 1933 and only four years earlier in Guatemala.

Not to be outdone, Castro in the end spurned the United States by abruptly radicalizing the Cuban Revolution. Beginning in October 1959, he violently attacked Washington's alleged complicity with counterrevolutionary elements, aligned himself with the Cuban Communists at home, and openly bid for Soviet support the following month. He subsequently succeeded in opting into the communist camp with the Soviet-Cuban trade and aid agreement signed at the conclusion of Mikoyan's visit in February 1960. Relations between Havana and Washington rapidly deteriorated thereafter. In March 1960, President Eisenhower gave the go-ahead for the planning of an exile invasion; in May, diplomatic relations were established between Havana and Moscow; in June, Castro seized American (and British) oil refineries; in July, Eisenhower responded by cutting the Cuban sugar quota; and in late summer and early fall Castro retaliated by ordering the wholesale nationalization of American and Cuban enterprises. Soon afterwards, the two 1960 presidential candidates were vowing to eliminate the communist "beachhead" in Cuba. Relations were then broken by the United States in January 1961, and both sides began to prepare themselves for the final showdown that would come at the Bay of Pigs the following April.

In the final analysis, the absence of mutual self-restraint in the 1959–1960 period reflected the failure by both sides to discriminate among their respective national interests and to identify which of these was most essential to preserve. As a result, the conflict could not be contained within the most narrowly defined parameters of the respective vital interests at stake, but rather was rapidly escalated and widened to include lesser interests that in turn further fueled the fires of mutual antagonisms. Equally critical, without a clear identification of its vital interests neither

[5] Having become "deeply disgusted at his murderous persecution of his former opponents," President Eisenhower refused to meet Castro during his April 1959 visit. See Eisenhower, *op. cit.*, p. 532. Following his conference with Castro, Vice President Nixon concluded that he was "either incredibly naïve about Communism or under Communist discipline," and recommended that the United States "deal with him accordingly." See Richard M. Nixon, "Six Crises" (Garden City: Doubleday, 1962), p. 351–352.

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side could signal to the other which issues were negotiable and which were not.

As pointed out, for example, Castro was obsessed with his revolutionary stance at home and abroad. But such a posture confused revolutionary style with substance, tending thereby to obscure what were the vital interests of the Cuban Revolution. Consequently, not only was he prevented from making direct overtures to Washington, but he was also left with virtually no bargaining room for trade-offs—a no-compromise condition that was perceived equally by his ardent supporters and by the Eisenhower administration. This might not have been the case, however, had the *líder máximo* explicitly singled out Cuba's right to self-determination and to a social revolution as the real issues under dispute, rather than confusing these objectives with Havana's self-proclaimed mission of revolutionizing the Hemisphere or breaking with the pattern of anticommunist and anti-Soviet alliances.

The United States appears to have been equally indiscriminate in weighing the interests at stake in Castro's Cuba. These interests fell into four categories:

(1) Ideological—the rejection of "the American way of life" by Cuba and her adoption of a "socialist" or "communist" system;

(2) Economic—the threat posed to U.S. business interests on the island and additionally in Latin America if the Castro example were imitated elsewhere;

(3) Hemispheric stability—the disruptive impact of *fidelismo* on inter-American harmony and the threat posed to Latin American governments by *fidelista* revolutionaries;

(4) National security—the conversion of Cuba into a "Soviet beachhead" in the Western Hemisphere, establishing a Soviet political, economic, military and strategic (as in 1962) presence in the Caribbean.

To be sure, all four interests were to be endangered by Castro, especially after 1960. But of the four, only the issues of hemispheric stability and national security truly affected U.S. vital interests. The ideological and economic stakes were essentially secondary issues which affected, respectively, the internal values and the private sector of American society. But in the 1959–1960 period the United States tended to confuse private with national interests, and ideological with strategic interests. The net effect

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was that Washington's flexibility, like Castro's, was greatly restricted. Consequently, the White House could not communicate publicly and unambiguously to Havana its priorities: (a) the vital issues on which the United States would not yield (hemispheric subversion and a Soviet presence in Cuba); (b) the secondary issues that could be negotiated (the amount and method of compensation for nationalized American properties); or (c) the other secondary issues that fell under Cuba's right of self-determination (her choice of political and economic systems). Ultimately, Castro carried out a radicalized revolution that in fact hit hard at every American interest—from the confiscation of American properties and the adoption of a radical form of communism to the "export of revolution" and the consolidation of Cuba's ties with the Soviet Union.

III. PRESENT IMPASSE AND POSSIBLE CONVERGENCE

Throughout the 1960s U.S.-Cuban relations remained in a state of permanent tension. The United States pursued a policy of "denial" toward Castro, aiming at his diplomatic, political and economic isolation within the Hemisphere through its own economic embargo and OAS sanctions, while being accused of supporting occasional clandestine operations against Cuba. Until the late 1960s, the Castro régime struck back through efforts to promote the continental revolution, while moving toward even closer ties with the Soviet Union, especially after 1968.

None the less, U.S. policy had undergone some changes by the end of the decade. Today, Washington concedes that the Castro régime seems entrenched, and it no longer insists—as originally formulated in 1964—that Cuba break her "military, economic and political dependence" on Moscow. But two "preconditions" must still be met before the United States would consider altering its "denial" policy. These are the termination of Cuba's "military ties" with the Soviets, and the cessation of her attempts to "export revolution" abroad. Hence, as President Nixon himself has noted, the current U.S. position is not based on the internal policies and ideology of the *fidelista* régime. Rather, it is directed to Cuba's external policies, which have threatened the hemispheric and national security interests of the United States, particularly during the 1960s. However, if the operative assumption in U.S. policy is that of the permanency of the régime, are the two "preconditions" conducive to altering Cuba's objection-

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able behavior? And are they of equal relevance in advancing U.S. vital interests in light of recent developments in Cuba and Latin America?

First of all, the two "preconditions" are not likely to be met by the Castro régime. Current U.S. policy offers little inducement for Havana to abandon its Soviet ties and revolutionary activities. Before Fidel could limit his relationship with Moscow, thus far essential to the survival of his régime, or compromise his revolutionary and anti-imperialist stance, Washington would have to pay a price which it evidently would consider too high.

Second, Havana's revolutionary subversion of the Hemisphere may no longer be as threatening as in the 1960s. With the aid of U.S. security assistance, most Latin American régimes have succeeded in containing, if not eliminating, the *fidelista* guerrilla movements. For his part, Castro himself has backed off from his previous unqualified endorsement of violent revolution. He has moved instead toward closer ties with the current Peruvian military régime—the very same military that crushed the guerrilla movement in 1965—as well as with the Chilean socialist government. Consequently, it appears that the Cuban revolutionary threat no longer affects the vital interests of the United States to the same extent as in the past.

Last, and most importantly, Soviet penetration into Cuba now appears to be taking on new dimensions which could lead to her virtual satellization. In the past, Castro was able to exercise considerable independence in pursuing his own foreign and domestic policies, and on occasion challenged Moscow whenever it was in his interest and capacity to do so—to the extent even of purging the pro-Soviet "microfaction" in early 1968. But since then he has not possessed effective bargaining counters.[6] Owing to repeated economic setbacks over the last few years—and most critically to the failure to produce the ten-million-ton sugar harvest in 1970—his régime has been forced into a position of growing dependence on, and subordination to, the Soviets. The signing of new Soviet-Cuban economic agreements in late 1970 and early 1971, the growing influx of Soviet technicians, the rising influence of pro-Soviet elements within the Castro régime—and

[6] Castro's return to the Soviet fold was signaled by his qualified endorsement of the Warsaw Pact occupation of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. For a fuller discussion of Cuban-Soviet developments through 1970, see the author's "Relationship with the Soviet Union," in Carmelo Mesa-Lago (ed.), "Revolutionary Change in Cuba" (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971).

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the Soviet submarine servicing facility in Cienfuegos all attest to Moscow's increased hold on Cuba and Fidel's lessened capacity to limit Soviet encroachment. Indeed, Cuba now holds the dubious distinction in Latin America of having both Soviet and U.S. naval facilities on its island. Accordingly, it is not Castro himself, but the increased Soviet penetration of Cuba—which in turn could facilitate the development of even greater Soviet strategic capabilities in the Caribbean—that now most endangers U.S. vital interests.

Paradoxically, then, it would now appear in the U.S. interest to offer inducements to the Castro régime to stem further Soviet penetration of a strategic-military nature. Similarly, it would seem to the advantage of the Cubans—if not Fidel himself—to begin to work toward an eventual modus vivendi with the United States in order to reduce Cuba's dependence upon and subservience to Moscow. The public posture of both parties has thus far provided few openings, however, as each side appears to adhere to fixed positions.

For Castro, permanent defiance of the "imperialist government" of the United States remains very much the essence of his revolution. On August 23, 1968, he adamantly ruled out the possibility of Cuba's seeking an accommodation with the United States because that "would be the moment at which the Revolution would have ceased to exist." On April 19, 1971, replying to the aforementioned statements by President Nixon, he warned that:

> The imperialists, of course, want Cuba to calm and behave herself, they want to neutralize us. They shouldn't even dream about this! . . . [because] firm principles and revolutionary intransigence are also a part of the traditions of our people. . . . This Revolution could only have relations with the imperialists at the expense of surrender. And this Revolution will never surrender!

On August 27, 1971, he repeated that Cuba had "nothing to negotiate" with Washington, especially on the issue of compensation for nationalized U.S. properties. But once U.S. leaders decide "to lift their blockade against Cuba and stop all their measures against Cuba they must do so unconditionally and without discussing one single thing with us." It would thus seem that the Cuban leader was claiming exclusive title to unyielding anti-imperialist leadership following Peking's turnabout. Nevertheless, his very protestations and conditions concerning future rela-

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tions with the United States also suggest that Havana's position might not be as inflexible as it first appears.

Castro's forward position of maximum "revolutionary intransigence" could in fact mask contradictory tendencies within his régime—and possibly himself—concerning the potential significance for Cuba of the U.S. policy shift on Peking. His régime includes an older generation of civilian leaders from the defunct July 26th Movement who constitute a less radicalized element than most of the *fidelista* leaders drawn from the Sierra Maestra guerrilla campaign. In the post-1959 period, moreover, a new generation of technical and military élites has emerged who simply may not share the older *fidelistas'* intense antipathy toward the "Colossus of the North" and who may now be attracted by the Chinese precedent. For these older and younger elements of the Cuban leadership, therefore, some form of limited accommodation with the United States may offer the only prospect of improving Cuba's economic situation, lessening her dependence on Moscow and undercutting the further rise of pro-Soviet elements within the régime.

Such a "Titoist" solution for Cuba has been flatly rejected by Castro in the past—perhaps precisely because he views it both as a "surrender" to the United States and as his last remaining option for recovering his independence from Moscow. In the meantime, the preservation of Cuba's revolutionary ethic requires some level of external tension with the United States. Indeed, his regimen of stark austerity to force the pace of economic development, and his commitment to creating a "new communist man," have been facilitated over the years by Cuba's insularity from her affluent, highly developed neighbor to the north. One of the supreme ironies of the present Cuban situation, then, is that an accommodative rather than an aggressive U.S. posture could present difficult choices for Castro, and might indeed pose the more threatening situation. Fidel's defiant posturing thus serves a twofold preëmptive purpose: it deters moderate elements within his régime from pressing for some form of rapprochement with the United States, while it discourages Washington from pursuing a more conciliatory course toward Cuba.

The Cuban Premier may well have succeeded in programing the U.S. response in this respect. Notwithstanding the changing context of the Cuban and Latin American situation, U.S. officials continue to insist publicly that Havana has not fulfilled the two

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"preconditions" necessary for the United States to reconsider its position. Hence, State Department spokesmen were quick to point out that in his speech of April 22, 1970, Castro had vowed that Cuba had not given up and would not give up her support for the Latin American revolutionary movement. They disregarded his amending statement in which he added that such support "does not necessarily have to be expressed in favor of guerrilla movements" but could be extended to any nationalist government "no matter by what path that government has reached power"—a proviso that has since included the Peruvian military régime as well as Chile's democratically elected socialist government.

In his remarks of April 16, 1971, President Nixon also focused on Castro's antagonistic postures:

> As far as Castro is concerned, he has already drawn the line. He is exporting revolution all over the hemisphere, still exporting it. His line is against the United States. . . . As long as Castro is adopting an antagonistic, anti-American line, we are certainly not going to normalize our relations toward Castro. As soon as he changes his line toward us, we might consider it. But it is his move.

By thus challenging Castro, the President enabled the *líder máximo* to convert his own defiant stance in his April 19 reply into a question of national honor. In turn, Castro's ringing reaffirmations of support for the Latin American revolution tend to feed U.S. perceptions. Hence, on January 2, 1972, the President again insisted that there has been "no indication whatever that Castro will recede one inch from his determination of exporting Castro-type revolution all over the Hemisphere." Consequently, he went on, "our policy isn't going to change."

The President's position, moreover, conceals a fundamental contradiction in U.S. policy. While decrying Havana's "export of revolution," the United States has been equally adamant in opposing normalization of diplomatic and trade relations between Latin America and Cuba. Hence, by insisting on Cuba's continued hemispheric isolation, the United States has contributed to a situation whereby Havana in effect is being encouraged to pursue revolutionary rather than diplomatic interests in Latin America. Equally important, the President's remarks have contained no signal for the Cubans that it is the issue of increased Soviet military-political penetration and not the issue of "exporting revolution"—whether symbolic or actually implemented—

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that has now become the most objectionable factor in the Cuban situation.

Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 16, 1971, however, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Hurwitch did dwell on Cuba's military ties with the Soviets. He charged that only the year before, the Castro government had "permitted" the establishment of a Soviet submarine facility in Cienfuegos. But his testimony overlooked the question as to whether current U.S. policy provides an inducement—let alone the leverage—for Cuba to resist the Soviet incursion.

To be sure, Castro remains repugnant to much of the American political community. Any change in U.S. policy could be interpreted as a concession to communism, and as bailing out a hostile government that is laboring under economic difficulties. But such an ideological and emotional reaction to Castro fails to come to grips with the crux of the Cuban problem. It only postpones the reassessment of U.S.-Cuban policy that must surely come, given the apparent permanency of the Castro régime, and the need to redefine U.S. vital interests in light of recent Cuban and hemispheric developments.

Further delay could prove costly to the United States on at least two counts. First, in addition to Chile and Peru, a number of Latin American states have already begun to press for Cuba's reintegration within the Latin American community in one form or another. The Cuban question is thus likely to become a highly divisive issue for the inter-American community in the future, and perhaps could even lead to Washington's virtual isolation within much of the Hemisphere. Second, and most importantly, the longer Washington delays in reconsidering its policy toward Cuba, the less likely it is that Castro will retain sufficient leverage to deter further Soviet penetration. Ultimately, therefore, the United States will probably deal with either a *fidelista* or a more Sovietized régime. Although the former appears preferable, we will probably be confronted with the latter unless we are willing to pay some price in the near future to bolster rather than weaken Castro's position vis-à-vis the Soviets.

IV. TESTING THE CUBAN LEADERSHIP

Such a maneuver by the United States is not without precedent and in fact is entirely consistent with the long-standing policy of Soviet containment. Washington turned the Jugoslav situation to

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U.S. advantage by extending aid to Tito following his break with Stalin in 1948. And today, the Nixon administration not only seeks to develop ties with communist China, but also to prevent a breakdown in relations with socialist Chile which could lead to further Soviet penetration of the Western Hemisphere.

Whether Castro himself can be prevailed upon to shift his position toward the United States of course remains an open question. It may depend upon whether he can still assert his independence given Moscow's increased hold over the island. But the point is that the United States has offered neither Fidel nor less intractable elements within his régime much leeway in terms of exploring new options for Cuba. Instead, the U.S. stance has tended to confirm the *fidelista* position that Cuba must either capitulate to the Colossus or align herself fully with the Soviet Union. By attempting to deprive Cuba of the alternative markets and sources of supply, and by seeking to prevent the normalization of relations between Cuba and individual Latin American states it has also served to reinforce Castro's behavior along objectionable, if not self-defeating, lines.

A more flexible policy toward Cuba, therefore, would need to clarify the alternatives available to the Castro régime and the intentions of the United States toward the Cuban Revolution. In this regard, the U.S.-Cuban relationship need no longer be conceived by either party as a zero-sum game whereby one side can gain only at the expense of the other. To be sure, many Cuban leaders still share Castro's assumption that any lessening of Cuban-Soviet ties not only would constitute an unacceptable "reversal of alliances," but also would leave Havana extremely vulnerable to renewed U.S. efforts to eliminate the present régime.

Such an assumption may now be invalid, however. Havana's alternatives are not mutually exclusive ones in which Cuba must either become a satellite of the Soviet Union or revert back as a client of the United States. Both Cuba and the United States can gain from a situation whereby Havana retains its political, economic and military "lifeline" with the Soviet bloc, but recovers some measure of independence from Soviet control—for example, by broadening Cuba's ties with Western Europe and Japan, the noncommunist third world, and Latin America. And even if an adversary relationship were to remain under such conditions, it nevertheless would be a less damaging one than at present.

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In the final analysis, much may depend on how the United States signals its readiness to work toward a limited accommodation that minimizes the costs to both sides. Washington could begin on the symbolic plane much as the Nixon administration confirmed its position publicly to Peking by its usage of the term "People's Republic of China." In changing its public stance, the United States might eventually succeed in indicating to the Cuban leadership that the "Colossus of the North" does not seek Cuba's return to her former client status, but only her escape from an ever-increasing Soviet influence. Most critically, such a posture would need to convey a commitment that the United States would refrain from attempting to depose a more vulnerable Cuban régime that seeks to limit—let alone to break—its protective association with Moscow.

Simultaneously, the United States would need to verify its intentions, and to provide Havana with the incentives for modifying Cuban policy. To this end, Washington might begin wholly or in part by easing up on the U.S. trade embargo, lifting the U.S. ban on travel to Cuba, permitting official Cuban participation in specialized conferences and sporting events held in the United States, removing U.S. objections to West European trade with Cuba and relaxing U.S. opposition to the normalization of relations between Latin America and Cuba. At a minimum, such a policy shift would serve as a means for testing Castro's readiness to lessen Cuba's revolutionary objectives in the Hemisphere, and to resolve such issues as the hijacking of commercial airplanes. At a maximum, it might provide additional inducements and needed leverage for Cuba to resist further Soviet military and political penetration. Havana's response to the U.S. initiative could then provide a basis for determining whether further attempts to improve relations are in order.

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CHINA AFLOAT

By John R. Dewenter

A GREAT deal of information has been published about the military strategy and forces of the People's Republic of China, some through official Chinese publications, much more through the writings of Western analysts. Most of this information concerns China's massive ground forces, with a respectable amount of coverage given to her air arm and even to her nascent nuclear missile forces. What about China's navy? "Didn't know they had one," is the derisive response one is most likely to receive.

There are several reasons why China's naval forces have received so little attention. The Chinese Navy has been dwarfed by the massive Chinese Army. The air force and navy combined comprise at most about 20 percent of China's military manpower. Secondly, the navy is just now beginning to get its "head of steam." Furthermore, it has heretofore maintained a low visibility, operating in waters close to its own shores from bases seldom if ever visited by foreigners, shunning traditional show-the-flag foreign port visits. It has been almost totally ignored in official Chinese press releases. Under this shroud of secrecy, information is simply unobtainable even by the increasing numbers of Western visitors to China.

Even granted ready access to military information, should one reasonably expect to find significant naval development in China today? The competition for scarce resources alone—for her developing economy and for the other military services with which her land-oriented "Long March" leadership certainly must feel more at home—would seem to indicate no. And then there is our traditional concept of China as a continental power.

In the short historical consciousness of the average American, pre-communist China is pictured as an awkward, continental giant. When we think of the old China we seldom think of the great Middle Kingdom, which had an historical continuity reaching back over 4,000 years and periods when its national power and culture—unparalleled in other areas of the world—reached out well beyond its own borders. Instead, the popular image of China is that of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, since her exposure to the modern Western world—weak, wracked

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by internal turmoil and corrupt government, ineffectively struggling both to modernize and yet resist the effect of modernization on her anachronistic social and political institutions, an amorphous mass of humanity tied to the ancestral soil of mother China. Even the "awakened" China of today, with unlimited manpower, the largest ground forces in the world and a growing nuclear arsenal is still seen essentially in her limited continental role as a purely land power.

The continental orientation of China is attributed by some Western scholars to a lack of affinity for the sea, which is thought to be more or less a fundamental national characteristic. Thus, Chinese history is reported by noted Sinologist John K. Fairbank to have had "no counterpart to the Elizabethan or medieval Japanese institutions of maritime adventure and piracy whereby the country waxed strong on its overseas takings." Manchu efforts at naval reform in the late nineteenth century are considered to have failed partly, at least, because a navy was, in Fairbank's words, "so foreign to Chinese ways." That ill-fated Manchu navy, under the command of a former army general, segmented and tied to the provincial land forces for coastal defense, met ignominious defeat in 1895 at the hands of a fledgling Japanese navy.

A look at the Chinese Navy of today might seem to confirm this historical judgment. Once again it is led by former army generals—guerrilla soldiers from the days of the Long March and Yenan caves. And as a subordinate element of the People's Liberation Army it is once again segmented into three geographic fleets and oriented toward coastal defense, having shown little inclination for "blue-water" operations.

Not all historians, however, would agree that the Chinese "have no vocation for the sea." Joseph Needham, in introducing the nautics portion of his monumental work on Chinese science, admitted that, "More than once we had a presentiment that something was wrong with the idea often entertained that the Chinese were never a sea-going people."[1] Raymond Dawson said it more forcefully:

> All too unjustly have Chinese been dubbed a non-maritime people. Their ingenuity manifested itself in nautical matters just as much as elsewhere, the number of their vessels on the inland waters was found by medieval and

[1] J. Needham, "Science and Civilization in China," Vol. VI, Part 3: "Civil Engineering and Nautics." Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971, p. 379.

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Renaissance Western merchants and missionaries almost beyond belief, and their sea-going navy was assuredly the greatest in the world between 1100 and 1450.[2]

Moreover, with more than 40 submarines China today possesses the third largest submarine fleet in the world.[3] One need only recall that Nazi Germany started the Second World War with a submarine fleet not much larger than China's today to appreciate its potential threat to the shipping lanes of the Pacific Ocean, which serve to transport virtually all of Japan's crude oil requirements.

In weighing these conflicting views of China as a sea power we must consider whether her history, in fact, is so deficient in maritime adventure as to support contentions that the Chinese are psychologically ill-adapted for the seafaring life; whether China's geographical setting has fostered a traditional inward, continental orientation or has in reality favored a maritime outlook; and finally, whether China has the wherewithal to build a formidable modern navy.

II

The power base of the Chinese People's Republic does not lie in her interior heartland as might be expected of a continental power. China's massive population, agricultural resources and industrial centers are all crowded along what Peking describes as "14,000 km. of coastline with harbors facing in various directions."

China may be acutely conscious of her history of repeated barbarian invasions across her inner Asian frontiers; but these frontiers consist mainly of great deserts, rugged mountains and dense tropical jungles. These were natural barriers to communication and trade with the world outside the Middle Kingdom. In contrast, the sea has traditionally offered China ready contact with the outside world, lucrative commerce, easy migration routes, avenues for extension of power and influence, and, in

[2] R. Dawson, ed., "The Legacy of China." Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964, p. 293–294.

[3] "Janes Fighting Ships 1971–72," R. V. B. Blackman, ed. (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co. Ltd.), p. 62. "The Military Balance 1971–1972" (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971), p. 15, 42. *The Washington Post,* March 21, 1972, p. A3. "Janes" credits both China and United Kingdom with 35 submarines each as of December 1970. "Military Balance," as of July 1971, indicates 36 for Britain, inclusive of those in reserve or undergoing refit, conversion or construction, as compared with approximately 45 for China, including ten older, training vessels. In any case, China's increasing momentum in submarine construction seems accurately reflected in the more current *Washington Post* estimate of "more than 40 diesel-powered attack submarines."

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more recent times, grave threats to her very existence. For it was nineteenth-century European gunboat diplomacy along China's coasts and inland waters that led to foreign invasions, progressive dismemberment, unequal treaties—a century of national shame.

Some Sinologists point to this recent period as an ebb in the "dynastic cycle," a theory of somewhat questionable validity. It is nevertheless of interest to note that considerable Chinese maritime activity has ebbed and flowed with the dynastic cycle.

Over 2,000 years ago, in roughly the same period that Athens was enjoying naval supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean, the state of Yueh, one of China's "Warring Kingdoms," is reported to have transported its army by ship to invade the state of Wu. After the first dynastic unification of China under Emperor Shih Huang-ti in 221 BC, an imperial expedition was launched to explore the islands of the Pacific; and in the first century AD Ma Yuan, known as the "Pacifier of the Waves," achieved considerable renown for his voyages along the Annam coast.

Beginning in the year 589 under the strong but short-lived dynasty of Sui and during the following three centuries under the T'ang Emperors, Chinese fleets conducted amphibious operations from Korea south through the Ryukyu Islands to Annam, vanquishing the naval forces of Japan and Korea in the process. Spurred by the introduction of the mariner's compass, Chinese shipping during the Sung Dynasty was able to wrest the lead in maritime commerce from the Arabs and build a great commercial empire. Trade extended to Indonesia, India, Africa and the Middle East. Even the Mongol conquerors of China attempted to extend their empire across the barriers of the sea, but the great warriors of the steppes were unfamiliar with the sea and unable to rely on their Chinese sailors, who served them only under compulsion. In 1281 Kublai Khan's invasion armada was destroyed by a typhoon enroute to Japan.

The golden age of Chinese sea power came with the zenith of the Ming Dynasty in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, climaxed by the amazing expeditions under Cheng Ho, said to have begun in 1405 with a fleet of 62 ships carrying more than 37,000 men. These expeditions, clearly an attempt to extend Chinese hegemony over the rulers of littoral kingdoms, eventually navigated the Persian Gulf and the coasts of Arabia and

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Africa before ending with the seventh expedition in 1433. Although Chinese ships had been frequenting these waters for a thousand years, for the first time they came as an organized naval force with great 1,500-ton, five-masted junks carrying a thousand men or more. Chinese shipbuilding was clearly far ahead of Europe; the treasure ships of Cheng Ho's Grand Fleet would have dwarfed the 300-ton vessels of Vasco da Gama had they met on their voyages along the African coast, which they very nearly did. In 1644 the declining Mings were replaced by the foreign Manchu invaders and with the departure of the Mings the last era of significant Chinese sea power passed into history.

The recent impact of the West fell upon China almost entirely by sea, and resulted in a prolonged effort throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century to develop a modern navy. Though never fully supported, this navy was to become one of China's first modern achievements—until it came to an abrupt end at the hands of the Japanese in 1895, its history "all but lost to view in the confusion attending the collapse of the imperial order."[4]

At the start of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 the Chinese Navy enjoyed overwhelming numerical superiority. Its Manchu leadership, however, had no naval strategy except for the linkage of ships with guns ashore. Its warships remained compartmentalized into four provincial fleets spread along the coast, not coördinated with any single authority within the Manchu government. The Chinese position was further exacerbated by Japanese superiority in equipment, leadership and training. The infamous final straw in this episode came with the misappropriation of the naval budget by the Empress Dowager for her personal use. After 1889 at least 90 percent of the special naval defense fund, instead of continuing to build a modern navy, was used to refurbish the Summer Palace. Ironically, the only lasting image of the Manchu navy was to be the Empress Dowager's Marble Boat, a two-story structure built atop a marble junk's hull firmly resting on a lake bottom.

The lack of affinity for the sea which Western historians have attributed to the Chinese would, therefore, more appropriately apply only to the foreign dynasties, Manchu and Mongol, which were singularly unable to capitalize on China's rich seafaring tradition. It now remains to be seen whether the new, indigenous "people's" dynasty can foster a contemporary Chinese maritime regeneration.

[4] J. L. Rawlinson, "China's Struggle for Naval Development 1839–1895." Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967, p. vii.

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III

At first glance the Chinese Navy of today seems a ludicrous hodgepodge of the old and the new. There are ex-U.S., Japanese, British, Canadian, Australian and Chinese Nationalist ships. Several of these are genuine antiques, built over 50 years ago, and one former Japanese coastal defense vessel of 1905 is still on active inventory. But there are also more recent Soviet designs, some built in China; and, most significantly, there are increasing numbers of modern vessels of Chinese design.[5] The Chinese have apparently obtained excellent mileage from their vintage collection while carrying out a steadily accelerating modernization and expansion program.

The Chinese Navy has an overall personnel strength of more than 150,000 officers and men, including over 16,000 in the naval air force and 28,000 marines. The number of naval personnel has nearly tripled since 1960. This spectacular growth rate clearly emphasizes the importance now placed on sea power by the high command in Peking. Theirs is the world's third largest submarine force and third largest navy in terms of personnel assigned. It is nearly as large as those of Britain and France combined or, more significantly, as the combined naval and marine forces of Japan, Taiwan and South Korea.

Admittedly, numbers of men tell little about fighting capabilities. The quantity and quality of ships, leadership and doctrine, training and readiness for combat, and logistic support are all much more meaningful indicators. Unfortunately, many of these factors are largely subjective and, short of actual combat as the ultimate test, require evaluation based on a considerably more intimate association and observation than has heretofore been allowed by the leadership in Peking.

The Chinese have over 1,200 naval vessels which are divided into three coastal fleets.[6] About 240 vessels are assigned to the North Sea Fleet operating from the Yalu River to just south of the Shantung peninsula. Seven hundred vessels are assigned to the East Sea Fleet whose area encompasses the strategic Taiwan Strait. The South Sea Fleet with 300 vessels ranges from just north of Swatow south past Hong Kong to the Tonkin Gulf.

[5] "Janes Fighting Ships 1971–72," *op. cit.* p. 62–67. Unless otherwise indicated, "Janes" annual publications have served as the source for all naval force levels throughout this paper.

[6] "Military Balance," *op. cit.* p. 42.

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While this organization is somewhat reminiscent of the Manchu era, one must assume that the Chinese are achieving flexibility of movement between the fleets and an overall command authority which exercises that flexibility. They have at least demonstrated considerable daring and ability in limited engagements with Nationalist naval forces in the Taiwan Strait area.

Organization and overall numbers also fail to reveal the remarkable growth and modernization within selected priority areas of the Chinese Navy, particularly during the last three to five years. Despite the retention of some of the antiquated coastal defense and river gunboats in active service, the old are being inexorably weeded out and replaced with new, advanced models, many of Chinese design. This significant development would indicate a degree of sophistication which, on the surface, appears difficult to reconcile with our "Yenan cave" image of the Peking military leaders. It becomes all the more perplexing when one traces the origin of this fledgling navy, born of the Red Army.

When the Chinese communist forces stormed out of the north to become the masters of China in 1949 they suddenly acquired a seacoast to defend and the dregs of a navy left behind by the Chinese Nationalists, who obviously took many of their better ships, their senior officers and best men with them to Taiwan. The People's Liberation Army had been a land-locked guerrilla force operating from their Shensi base since the Long March in 1935. They may have accepted some help from "liberated" Nationalist naval personnel, but by and large the new navy probably started with politically more reliable Red Army officers at the helm, augmented with seamen "untainted" by past Nationalist associations, recruited from among the native seafarers of the coastal provinces. In those early days of the People's Republic, political reliability rather than seafaring experience and skill must have been the primary consideration in selecting personnel to control instruments with a built-in capability for defection.

There are few experienced naval commanders who would relish the task of building a modern navy from such an inauspicious beginning. But then, the job did not go to an experienced naval officer because there was none. Hsiao Ching-kuang[7] was transplanted from the army and appointed admiral and naval com-

[7] "Who's Who in Communist China," Vol. II (Kowloon, Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1969), p. 805, and *China News Summary*, No. 324, June 18, 1970.

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mander-in-chief when the navy headquarters was established under the People's Liberation Army in 1950. Prior to that he had been a field general, with a distinguished career dating back through the Long March to his entry into the Chinese Communist Party in the early 1920s while attending Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow. Hsiao has commanded the navy for more than 20 years and certainly must be given major credit for leadership, vision and influence over the naval development program. His amazing survivability, even through the recent Lin Piao crisis, can only add to the influence he has wielded as Vice Minister of National Defense since 1954 and member of the Party's Central Committee. In his late sixties, he was nevertheless recently called by one analyst a "rising military star" in the depleted ranks of Peking's political and military élite, possibly portending an interservice position of growing strength for his navy.

During the first decade of its existence Soviet assistance put the Chinese Navy on its feet. Although the 30-year Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union was signed in 1950, the naval assistance program apparently did not get under way until after the Korean armistice. The Chinese began constructing the first of at least 21 Soviet "W" class submarines in 1956. These are medium-sized, streamlined, medium-to-long-range diesel submarines which were assembled in Chinese yards from Soviet components. Several older and smaller Soviet submarines were given to the Chinese in 1954–55, but some of these have since been retired from service. The Chinese also received four Soviet "Gordy" class destroyers, and in 1956 they launched from a Chinese shipyard the first of four destroyer escorts modeled after the Soviet "Riga" class. Six "Kronstadt" submarine chasers were received from the Soviets in 1956–57 and 18 more were subsequently built by the Chinese. Two Soviet "T-43" minesweepers acquired in 1954–55 were followed by 18 more built in Chinese shipyards. This same pattern followed, on a somewhat larger scale, in motor-torpedo boat construction.

The Sino-Soviet quarrel came to the surface in the late 1950s and by the second decade of its life the Chinese Navy was on its own. From this point on China's naval development became even more remarkable because it was accomplished substantially without outside assistance and despite the economic setback of the early sixties and the chaos of the Cultural Revolution period.

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By 1964 the Chinese naval shipbuilding program appeared to be getting underway again with the completion of an advanced diesel-powered ballistic missile submarine patterned on the Soviet "G" class, apparently with the aid of plans obtained before the rift. (As yet, however, no compatible Chinese missiles are known to exist for this submarine.) And since the mid-sixties, naval expansion has continued with ever-increasing momentum —new "R" class diesel attack submarines; new destroyer escorts of Chinese design, larger, faster and more heavily armed than their Soviet "Riga" class predecessors; massive numbers of fast missile, torpedo and gun boats. But the most significant development of all may be in the nuclear field. For some time now there have been persistent rumors that the Chinese are probably working on a nuclear-powered submarine. "Janes" reports that the first such vessel was begun in 1969 and there may be as many as three nuclear-powered submarines in various stages of construction. These subs are reportedly designed for a displacement of 3,000 tons and an armament of missiles and torpedoes. Should this be true the Chinese Navy may be on the threshold of an entirely new dimension.

IV

The Chinese, including even the most parochial of their naval commanders, certainly harbor no dreams of "catching up" with and matching the full spectrum of global maritime power of the United States or the Soviet Union. The mere suggestion of the Chinese joining in a sort of three-cornered naval arms race with the two superpowers seems preposterous. But this does not mean that China cannot mold her naval arm into a formidable instrument for national defense vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, the United States, or any lesser power, or fashion her total maritime power into a useful and effective tool in support of her foreign policy. It is clearly toward these ends that Peking embarked in the early sixties upon her maritime expansion program.

From the outset the Chinese Communists have considered coastal defense their first priority, a preoccupation resulting from the presence of hostile Nationalist and American naval vessels in the waters off their long and exposed coastline. Most recently, the Soviet containment policy toward China has furnished fresh stimulus for her to "build a powerful navy . . . and turn China's coastline into a great wall of iron," as the leadership

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view with anxiety the expansion of Soviet naval activities into East Asian waters as an extension of Soviet revisionism's "ring of encirclement against China."[8]

Inherent in coastal defense is the policing of territorial waters, a mission of growing importance with the increasing international pressure for exploitation of the as yet untapped offshore mineral resources on the continental shelf of East Asia. Even now there are ominous signs of a growing controversy between China and Japan over the Tiaoyu (Senkaku) Islands off Taiwan's northern coast. Disputed ownership of those islands with their rich offshore oil deposits could prove to be a major stumbling block in future Sino-Japanese relations, and the eventual stimulus to a much prophesied Japanese remilitarization.

It is not surprising, then, that the Chinese have made their most significant naval strides in the development of their coastal defense forces, which appear to be organized under a well-conceived and coördinated plan. The outer ring of this system would be their growing fleet of torpedo, anti-ship-missile, and minelaying diesel attack submarines backed up by about 100 Il-28 torpedo-carrying light bombers, part of the more than 450 shore-based combat aircraft of the Chinese naval air force.[9] Close-in defense would be provided by great numbers of fast missile, torpedo and gun boats, as well as patrol and minecraft under an umbrella of naval fighter aircraft.

All of China's MIG-15 and MIG-17 navy fighters are fully integrated into her air defense system and have apparently given good accounts of themselves in aerial engagements—credited in Peking news releases with the downing of intruding Nationalist and U. S. aircraft over southern China. But if one is also to believe the occasional human interest story emanating from Peking regarding, for example, the plight of sailors keeping the night target beacons lighted through all kinds of weather for naval aerial maneuvers, it is obvious that their naval aircraft are also practicing day and night, and possibly in all weather, air-to-ground weapons delivery for support of the surface defense forces.

Under this coastal defense concept, naval expansion has focused on constructing a large fleet of more than 400 fast missile, torpedo and gunboats. This fleet has nearly tripled since the ter-

[8] *China News Summary, op. cit.* p. A1.
[9] "Military Balance," *op. cit.*, p. 42.

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mination of Soviet assistance in 1960. It has more than doubled during the last five years, which have seen the introduction of 90 or more modern hydrofoil torpedo boats of Chinese design and more than 15 surface-to-surface missile boats. In this category the Chinese fleet may soon surpass that of the Soviet Union to become the world's largest.

China's expanding submarine fleet is, of course, capable of ranging considerably further afield in conventional attack operations than its coastal defense mission would require. The Chinese thus far, however, have shown little inclination to extend operations with deployments much beyond home waters. But this picture seems destined to change with the building of China's own nuclear submarines. At least one submarine currently under construction appears to be nuclear and designed for an attack role.[10] "Its deployment," as Australian Harry G. Gelber has noted, "promises not only to give China's naval defenses additional depth but also to provide experience on which the subsequent construction and deployment of a more complex missile/submarine system could be based. Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that by 1980 or so China will have the option of deploying her ICBMs on land or at sea, or in some mix or both."[11]

The ultimate functions and effectiveness of a Chinese nuclear submarine, its potential role in China's strategic nuclear deterrent forces, its broader political usefulness as an instrument of foreign policy—if only as a sort of status symbol, having "made it," so to speak, as a full-fledged member of the great-power club —all remain to be seen. In its most limited role, however, the nuclear submarine will constitute a quantum jump toward attaining China's highest naval priority—the "great wall of iron" along her coastline—a formidable coastal defense force capable of deterring or defeating, if necessary, any foreign intrusion by sea.

In sharp contrast to the dynamic growth of China's defensive forces has been the relatively static condition for more than a decade of her amphibious and marine forces which still, however, afford a limited offensive capability. Maintaining about 60 ex-U.S. World War II amphibious ships and craft, China could transport her 28,000 marines to a not-too-distant coast and presumably land them on a not-too-hostile shore. Although Peking

[10] *The New York Times*, Feb. 1, 1972, p. 6.

[11] H. G. Gelber, "Nuclear Weapons in Chinese Strategy," *Problems of Communism*, November–December 1971, p. 39.

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has shown no interest in expanding this capability through additional shipbuilding programs, one cannot ignore the literally thousands of motorized junks which are available and could be employed in "short-haul," follow-on waves carrying tens of thousands of army troops behind a marine amphibious assault. Such an assemblage of vessels, however, would certainly telegraph the intended punch. If it were to be employed against determined air and sea opposition it would probably stand about as much chance of success as Kublai Khan's ill-fated attempts against Japan in the thirteenth century.

On the other hand, a massive junk armada could be a decisive factor in a hypothetical scenario isolating Taiwan, unassisted by outside friendly forces, in a struggle with the People's Republic. Peking's massive numerical air superiority and submarine interdiction could overwhelm and eliminate Taiwan's air and naval defenses before an amphibious operation need be launched from the mainland. Even more vulnerable are the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. The amphibious threat is, at the very least, a potent politico-military instrument with which Peking could bring great psychological pressure to bear against Taiwan.

In China's quest for sea power she has not neglected her merchant fleet and domestic shipbuilding industry. At one time Peking relied heavily on a charter fleet—about 150 ships in 1966—but has since shed that policy as a "slavish comprador philosophy" advocated by that font of all evil, Liu Shao-ch'i. Concentrating on a dual program of acquiring new ships abroad while at the same time expanding her own shipbuilding resources, China recently contracted for four 15,000-ton freighters from the Jugoslavs and additional ships from Poland. West European yards have also supplied China with 10,000 and 15,000-ton passenger and cargo ships.

China's own shipbuilding industry has progressed from the construction of 10,000-ton ships in 1969, to 15,000 tons in 1970, to 20,000 and 25,000 tons in 1971. "Janes" indicates that, overall, China's registered shipping increased by 37 ships during the past year and her merchant fleet is rapidly approaching one million gross tons. Like the Soviet merchant marine, the newness of China's merchant fleet will constitute an important advantage; and one need only recall how the centrally planned expansion of the Soviet merchant fleet raised it from a nonentity to a position among the world's leaders in one decade. China's new merchant

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fleet will indeed constitute a valuable political adjunct to her growing naval power—a "sea-borne railway" that will give her direct and increasing access, for whatever purpose she may desire, to most of the countries of the third world.

V

Seapower, traditionally as much a political as a military instrument of national power, seems ideally suited to China's new international role as well as to her Maoist strategic doctrine where "politics" remain in command. It can give her access as well as varying degrees of visibility and presence throughout the world, all carefully controlled and manipulated at will according to her political objectives—from clandestine support of an insurgency movement to openly "showing the flag."

China's recognition of this is becoming more and more apparent in her increasing interest in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. She is suspected of building a naval base in the disputed Paracel Islands between the Philippines and Vietnam. Her aid missions are well established around the Indian Ocean littoral where she also supports various rebel movements such as the Dhofar People's Liberation Army in Muscat and Oman; and she has shown an unusual sensitivity to superpower maritime competition in the area, accusing the Soviets, for example, of "gunboat diplomacy" and regarding the Indian Ocean as a "Soviet lake."

The Chinese may, however, already be a step or two ahead of the Soviets with respect to establishing their own chain of strategic "coaling stations" along the Indian Ocean littoral. China concluded an agreement several years ago for naval visits to Ceylonese ports. She is reportedly building naval facilities in competition with Soviet aid missions in southern Yemen. It is doubtful that Pakistan would object to a Chinese presence in the port of Karachi. She is providing naval advisers to Tanzania and constructing naval facilities at Dar-es-Salaam in conjunction with the 1,000-mile long Tanzania-Zambia railway. It is notable, in this regard, that the headquarters of various African liberation movements directed against South Africa, Rhodesia and Portuguese-ruled Mozambique and Angola are reputedly located in Zambia and Tanzania; and the Tanzanian naval facility is conveniently located on the western extremity of a potential Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile range over the Indian Ocean.

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Although the Chinese Navy still lacks a significant "blue-water" surface capability, it is already the world's third largest on two other counts—submarines and personnel. Furthermore, China's massive fleet of fast missile, gun and torpedo boats may soon surpass the Soviet Union's to become the world's largest. Chinese shipyards are building more and larger ships; and China's mercantile fleet, while not comparable to those of the world's maritime leaders, is nevertheless rapidly becoming a significant factor in East Asian shipping circles. All of these areas are in a state of dynamic growth, with nuclear-powered submarines and, possibly, a seaborne nuclear deterrent just around the corner. While there are still too many unknowns in China to confidently project developmental trends, nevertheless, barring a breakdown in leadership or domestic chaos it seems highly probable that for the first time since the Ming Dynasty voyages of Cheng Ho over 500 years ago, the sea power of China will once again exert an important influence on international affairs well beyond the borders of the Middle Kingdom.

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RECONSIDERATIONS

THE SPIRIT OF LOCARNO: ILLUSIONS OF PACTOMANIA

By J. B. Duroselle

FOR five years between 1925 and 1929, a certain portion of mankind, like those parched travelers in the desert who think they have glimpsed the oasis which will save them, believed the gate to lasting peace was at hand. This, as we now know, was only a mirage. But such a mirage had never before existed. People had never believed so fervently in the blessings of peace, or hoped so passionately that peace would be perpetual. Optimism rose to new heights. "Away with cannon and machineguns: instead, conciliation, arbitration, and peace!" At the meeting of the League of Nations on September 10, 1926, when Germany, recently defeated, was received as a member, the French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand touched a new intensity of emotion with these celebrated words.

We have not yet reached the fiftieth anniversary of that ephemeral period of hope. The last of its principal actors, the French statesman Joseph Paul-Boncour died in March 1972 at the age of 99 years; but the period might well belong to another century, or another planet. International historiography has long since taken possession of the subject. The release of the German, British and American archives, the approaching release of the French and the Italian, and the release of the archives of the League of Nations (which we owe in particular to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), in addition to hundreds of memoirs and personal accounts, offer an inexhaustible source of material which constellations of young historians are currently attacking. However, the essential outline of the whole is clear. The reader will, I hope, allow me to aim at a general view of the period, pointing out its essential characteristics: noble illusions and grave errors.

II

The year 1924 marks a turning point in international relations. Up to that time, the French and British governments, the most directly affected, had very little faith in the League of Nations. Each year, in September, they dispatched delegations to the League that were characterized more by brilliance than effectiveness. France sent René Viviani, a sonorous orator, and Léon Bourgeois, the Pope of radicalism, who in 1910 had written a book, "Toward a Society of Nations," which had made him the French expert on the subject, although he was in the main a solemn but lazy man. In 1924, after the election of a Chamber of Deputies "of the Left," Aristide Briand, Edouard Herriot and Joseph Paul-Boncour made their first appearances at Geneva. The first Labour government in England also decided to take the Geneva organization seriously. It seemed as if the sour and brutal policies of the immediate postwar period had come to an end: the policies personified by Poincaré, a believer in the pitiless "execution" of treaties, the man who, to be sure of German reparations payments, seized the productive Ruhr basin.

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Henceforth, the atmosphere evolved from "execution" to conciliation in an agreeably steady manner. Negotiation replaced force. To be sure, collective security had not become automatic. The Geneva Protocol of 1924 would have been able to achieve this by making arbitration obligatory and making it possible to identify an aggressor. Edouard Herriot's formula, "Arbitration, security, disarmament," was the logical conclusion to this process. Disarmament, in the French view, could be undertaken once security was assured. However, in the eyes of the British, it was through disarmament that security would be reached. In the end, this contradiction was responsible for the failure of the protocol. When the Conservatives returned to power, with Austen Chamberlain in the Foreign Office, they refused to ratify the protocol, under pressure from the dominions, as well as opposition from United States, which viewed it as a kind of "Holy Alliance" which might undermine the Monroe Doctrine.

But at the time this failure seemed unimportant, simply a matter of postponement. Other fruitful agreements were signed. In the summer of 1924, the agreements of London permitted the adoption of the Dawes Plan, which had been prepared by experts to facilitate the payment of reparations. Germany, in effect, accepted without any pressure a provisional plan of five years to start paying reduced reparations. A flood of private American capital would provide the necessary funds. To be sure, the Germans were not particularly pleased with this agreement. But Gustav Stresemann, who was in charge at the Wilhelmstrasse from December 1923 until his death on October 3, 1929, was, like the later Walter Rathenau, a partisan of the policy of fulfillment. The cancellation of the unjust clauses of the *Diktat* of Versailles would not be achieved by opposition to the French, but rather by demonstrating German loyalty in the execution of those very clauses. And, in fact, by adopting the Dawes Plan, the Germans obtained the evacuation of the Ruhr.

At this point, the most likely way for Germany to improve its position was to enter the League—a proposition which required many months of public discussion, for German opinion demanded concessions. Principally, this meant the cancellation of Article 231 of the Versailles Treaty, which seemed to affirm Germany's war guilt. That was a question which haunted all Germans and supplied the ultranationalists with fuel to maintain the fires of hate. However, Stresemann was a realist: economic prosperity, progress toward "Gleichberechtigung" (equal rights) were well worth a lessening of insistence on Article 231. Before Germany's entrance into the League an intermediate stage was reached. In October 1923 the famous treaties of Locarno were signed. Germany freely admitted that it would not invade the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland. Thus, there would never again be an August 1914, or, inversely, an invasion of the Ruhr. The United Kingdom and Italy stood as guarantors. If the treaty were violated, the Council of the League of Nations would immediately take up the matter; further, if the violation were "flagrant," the victim of the aggression and the guarantors were empowered to undertake military operations without waiting for the opinion of the Council.

Did this not mean that peace was assured? The French felt that it would be even more secure if there were also an "Eastern Locarno," if Germany

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would also guarantee its borders with Czechoslovakia and Poland. But Stresemann did not wish this at any price. He had implicitly agreed to the renunciation of Alsace-Lorraine, but the Polish Corridor, Danzig and Upper Silesia were another matter. And the British, certain that they would never go to war over Danzig, discreetly supported Stresemann in his resistance.

From that point, one can pass from the regional to the universal. Eleven months of negotiation, illuminated by the "spirit of Locarno," resulted in the admission of Germany to the League of Nations. Committed to Locarno and to the League Covenant, Germany had taken a decisive turn toward pacifism. It capitalized on this by requesting the expected evacuation of the occupied zones and the re-annexation of the Saar without waiting for the plebiscite of 1935. These two points had been under negotiation since the famous interview at Thoiry between Briand and Stresemann in September 1926. On the first point, the anticipated evacuation, Stresemann triumphed at the Conference of The Hague, a few weeks before his death. In exchange for the adoption of a new reparations plan, the Young Plan, drawn up not for five years (as the Dawes Plan had been) but for 58 years, the last of the occupied zones, the areas surrounding Coblenz and Mainz, would be evacuated in 1930—a remarkable and admirable evidence of faith in treaties!

This success can be largely explained by an earlier event—the signing of the Pact of Paris (the Briand-Kellogg Pact) on August 27, 1928. The history of this incredible episode is well known. As the French parliament had refused to ratify the Mellon-Berenger accords of April 1926, on the payment of French war debts to the United States, Briand was trying to pacify American public opinion by some spectacular gesture. Advised by Professor James Shotwell of Columbia, he proposed, in April 1927, on the tenth anniversary of American entry into the war, that the United States and France mutually renounce war—an undertaking which, given the state of U.S.-French relations, meant nothing in practical terms. But, as a consequence of the influence of a pacifist radical, Salmon O. Levinson, on Senator Borah, and Senator Borah's influence on Secretary of State Kellogg, the American response was a proposal to extend the treaty to all nations of the world. Briand accepted, in a spirit of resignation rather than enthusiasm, and war was duly outlawed, except for military sanctions undertaken by the League. Stresemann lost no time in taking advantage of this situation. As soon as the pact was signed, with the current (and future) peaceful character of Germany as the basis of his position, he called for the departure of those whom he had referred to in a private letter to the German Crown Prince as "our stranglers."

Thus, within a five-year period, a network of treaties and accords was established. In September 1929, opposite Stresemann, for whom this was to be the last Geneva session, Briand launched a new initiative. Speaking to the 27 European members of the League (nearly half the total membership of 61 states), he proposed that they establish among themselves "some sort of federal link."

However, all of this was to break down like a house of cards. "Black Thursday," October 24, 1929, precipitated the stock market crash on Wall Street, which was the prelude to the most serious economic crisis capitalism

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had yet faced. In 1930, Europe was only indirectly affected. Nevertheless, within three years the entire political effort and attitude symbolized by Locarno was to crumble. On September 14, 1930, 104 Nazi deputies were elected to the Reichstag, as opposed to the 14 in 1928. Hitler would have 13 million supporters by the spring of 1932, and 230 deputies in the elections of July 31. On January 30, 1933, the aged President, Field Marshal Hindenburg, badly advised by Franz von Papen, would name Hitler Chancellor of the Reich. After 1930, Briand's proposal for a European union would founder in the face of British and Italian opposition. Despite the Briand-Kellogg Pact, Japan invaded Manchuria in September 1931. In the same month, England was to devalue the pound sterling, also putting an end to 80 years of free exchange.

Powerless against Japan, the League of Nations was equally unable to bring the conference on disarmament to a successful conclusion in the face of Hitler's will to rearm. In October 1933, Germany withdrew from the disarmament conference and from the League. In the same year, Mussolini began to think of taking Ethiopia by force as a colony in which to settle an Italian population. Since the end of 1932, there had been no more reparations payments and no more repayments of European war debts to America. Roosevelt, who assumed power during the tragic month of March 1933, planned to resolve the American crisis at the national level, and, despite the opposition of the U.S. Secretary of State Cordull Hull, extinguished the last hope of a stabilized international economy by torpedoing the London Economic Conference. The débâcle was total. "It will be His Majesty the Cannon who speaks," prophesied Mussolini.

III

We must not in our sad hindsight lightly dismiss the system symbolized by the word "Locarno," but, rather, try to get to the core of the principles on which Locarno was built.

The year 1924—the year in which British and French leaders finally became interested in the League and began to put some hopes in it—was the year in which the deaths occurred, within a week of one another, of the two men who had done most to demolish the system of a European equilibrium: Lenin and Woodrow Wilson. Let us leave aside Lenin and the avatars of an isolated Soviet Union in which Stalin was building "Socialism in a single country." For the West, Wilson's destiny had been to plant a seed which would bear fruit only after him. Before Wilson, the Great Powers assigned themselves special rights. They managed the affairs of smaller countries. And among themselves, if conciliation and negotiation did not produce desired results, there was always recourse to the other solution: the force of arms. Since, after the French defeat of 1871, Europe had been divided into two groups of opposing alliances, the shock of a military clash, if it came, would have, as the German memorandum of July 24, 1914 foresaw, "incalculable consequences." The deaths of millions of young men had just demonstrated the ultimate result of the "balance of power."

What Wilson had longed for with all his heart was, on the one hand, the equality of small and great nations, and on the other, through the League, a

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means of avoiding final confrontations. During the opening years of the twenties, he had failed, not only in the American Senate but in Europe as well, where Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Bonar Law, Millerand, Poincaré and Mussolini saw little of value in his principles. But by 1924 the situation had changed. Macdonald, Briand, Herriot, Paul-Boncour, Beneš, Politis, Titulescu and legions of other influential statesmen were saturated with Wilson's ideas. Stresemann, more nationalist than Wilsonian, repudiated, out of sincerity or expediency, the idea of revenge by force. This new generation—squeezed between the traditionalists who regretted diplomacy in the style of Bismarck or Delcassé and the audacious cynics who were to produce fascism—sincerely tried to build a Wilsonian Europe, and for a while even thought it was being successful. And in the United States itself, if the Republicans in power were "nationalists," Wilsonian "internationalists" also influenced a sizable portion of public opinion.

These men, of whom Briand is probably the best example, had based their conception of security on optimism, taking the League as a framework of action. "The League," wrote Paul-Boncour, "was a massive attempt at international democracy." He goes on to say: "Briand was marvellously skilled in manipulating this institution . . . he played on his voice as if it were a violoncello. Anyone who has not heard him winding up a debate at his place in the Council, yielding only on secondary points, but maintaining all the essentials, does not know the best of Briand's talent."

It was really a question of an entirely new diplomacy, replacing the traditional secret negotiations conducted by expert and cynical career ambassadors. This new diplomacy was open and slow, embellished by long speeches but offering statesmen periodic personal encounters and a means of becoming acquainted, which sometimes produced genuine friendships transcending national boundaries. Specifically, if the earliest efforts of the League were far from promising (the affairs of Vilna, Memel and Corfu), it enjoyed an obvious success in the settlement of the bloody Greco-Bulgarian incidents of October 1925, and it governed the Saar efficiently. Its top bureaucrats played an inconspicuous but effective role in securing the protection of minorities, working to overcome social disasters and securing safeguards for labor. What was, in fact, the system at its apogee could be seen, for a time, as a promising beginning.

Neither the League nor the diplomacy of Locarno can be considered responsible for the prosperity of 1925 to 1929. However, there was a kind of prefiguration of the future Bretton Woods system in the sense that the League contributed to the financial restoration of certain countries whose economies had been dislocated by the war. Prepared by Jean Monnet, the Assistant Secretary-General, the Brussels economic conference (September 24 to October 8, 1920) had tried to regulate monetary disturbances. These efforts produced the "Economic Committee," and the "Financial Committee," composed of well-known experts, whose common secretary was Sir Arthur Salter. Many countries benefited from his advice. In a recent book, "Banker's Diplomacy," B. H. Meyer demonstrates that if the central banks played the decisive role, the monetary restoration of Poland, Jugoslavia and Rumania owed a certain amount to the "Economic Committee" of the

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League. Austria, too, received help which permitted her to restore her economy. The Italian delegate, Tittoni, proposed at Geneva that the natural riches of the entire universe be held in common, under the absolute control of the League. An economic conference was held in 1927, a favorable year, for currencies were stable again and budgetary stability was the rule rather than the exception. This conference denounced economic nationalism and fixed as its objectives "the return to free international trade, the primordial condition of prosperity." Was it not possible to believe that such a philosophy might gradually alter the general attitude? Even in strongly protectionist countries like the United States of that time, a liberal philosophy deriving from President Wilson's Point Three had been adopted by influential persons, in particular by Cordell Hull.

But optimism, faith in human nature, hopes of progress and peace manifested themselves, above all, in a multiplicity of formal agreements. We have mentioned the most celebrated of these, Locarno and the Briand-Kellogg Pact. Faith in contracts had never been stronger. Treaties of peace, of commerce, of alliance, public and secret, had certainly existed in large numbers during the three preceding centuries. But what appeared now, and seemed to be developing, was something different: treaties limiting armaments (Washington, 1921; London, 1930); pacts of nonaggression; pacts of arbitration; treaties of recognition of governments (particularly regarding the Soviet Union).

The so-called *Diktats* of 1919–1920 were succeeded by treaties that often were freely negotiated and then signed by equals. Italy, for example, although Fascist, participated in this "pactomania," sometimes of course with tongue in cheek. To consider only those treaties reached by Italy between 1924 and 1929: in October 1925, the Locarno agreements; on December 6, 1926, an agreement with the United Kingdom ceding Djaraboub to Libya; the exchange of Anglo-Italian letters between December 16 and 20, 1926, on the subject of Ethiopia; in September 1926, a treaty of friendship and technical assistance with Yemen; on September 16, 1926, a treaty of friendship with Rumania; on November 27, 1926, a pact of friendship and security with Albania; on April 4, 1927, an Italian-Hungarian treaty of friendship; on November 22, 1927, a treaty of defensive alliance with Albania; on May 30, 1928, a treaty of friendship with Turkey; on August 2, 1928, an agreement of conciliation and arbitration with Ethiopia; on September 23, an Italo-Greek treaty of friendship.

The Soviet Union signed treaties still more systematically: January 20, 1925, an agreement with Japan; December 17, a Russo-Turkish treaty of neutrality; April 24, 1926, with Germany, the celebrated Berlin treaty of friendship, neutrality and nonaggression; August 31, 1926, a Russo-Afghani agreement; September 28, 1926, a treaty of friendship and neutrality with Lithuania; March 9, 1927, a treaty (which was not ratified) with Latvia; October 1, 1927, a treaty with Persia; February 9, 1929, the Moscow agreement on the Litvinov protocol, the adhesion of the Soviet Union, Poland, Rumania and Latvia as well as Turkey, Lithuania and Estonia to the Briand-Kellogg Pact.

These lists, though incomplete, demonstrate how widely European treaties

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were multiplying—from the most insignificant and often self-serving to the most exacting. It was as if the universe were following the example of William Jennings Bryan, the great Commoner, for whom the signing of agreements, no matter how fragile, was a mania.

The impulse of pactomania was to survive through the 1930s, even as the system on which it was based was breaking up. Hitler, who had no concern for sworn agreements or the sanctity of treaties, exploited the fondess of his future adversaries for pacts. He rarely violated a treaty without the simultaneous offer of some grandiose nonagression pact which was to cover the next 25 years. Everyone fell victim to this maneuver, from Poland in 1934 to Russia in 1939, with the lamentable treaties of nonaggression signed by Great Britain (September 30, 1938), and France (December 6, 1938). For the Führer, all this was a smokescreen.

Consider a traditional democracy like France: despite her links with Czechoslovakia and Poland, in 1938 she violated her word and abandoned her ally Czechoslovakia, and in 1939 entered the war unready for the undertaking, theoretically to help her ally, Poland, but knowing full well that with an army organized entirely for defense, she could not, in fact, deliver any help.

Signing numerous treaties is a manifestation of faith in the word of others. It is also a presumption that one will oneself have the courage and strength to keep a sworn obligation. At the time of Locarno, there was a readiness to believe in fundamental human goodness. "Locarno," Austen Chamberlain wrote toward 1935, "remains a curtain of safety for Europe. To cast any doubt on its validity would be to encourage hopes and ambitions which could be realized only by war." Alas, does the suppression of doubt as to another's good faith guarantee that good faith? Stresemann considers the same question in one of his last speeches in September 1929: "International understanding is often a labor of Sisyphus. The rock which one thought one had pushed to the summit rolls to the bottom once more, and one feels close to despair. It is, therefore, essential to have faith."

In its totality, the spirit of Locarno was less a spirit of "world public opinion," than it was a reflection of the common attitudes of a group of influential men for whom Geneva was the center: ministers, ambassadors, high international civil servants, journalists, writers, a few academics, members of numerous national and international associations which supported the League, certain religious groups and so on. Their aim was to avoid war, to consolidate peace. Their means were open discussion, generous proposals and the signing of pacts, using over and over again the words "peace," "security," "reconciliation," "rapprochement," "accord," "understanding," "hope," "progress," "future," "humanity," "union." They believed, as Stresemann expressed it in the speech already cited, that "Anyone who looks back with his mind's eye at these recent years, and who is not deliberately blind, must agree that international understanding has progressed. This progress must continue."

IV

To understand the collapse of the Locarno world order, three themes must

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be touched upon: the narrowness of the political base, the persistence of nationalism, and the errors of economic policy.

The world of the League, as distinct from that of the United Nations following the "package deal" of 1955, was narrow. The Soviet Union thought of the Geneva organization as an association of its adversaries which was planning to encircle and destroy it. To be sure, the illness of Foreign Commissar Chicherin in 1928, and the growing influence of Litvinov, would lead Soviet Russia to modify its policies and to join the League in 1934. But it was already too late. The Soviet Union was of no great concern to the men at Geneva, except to the Germans, who used it to strengthen the Soviet resistance to the West. In France, Briand was always indifferent to Russia, and the first steps toward a Franco-Russian rapprochement could not be undertaken until after his death. As for the United States, there was never a majority of Senators in favor of adhering to the Geneva organization. The exclusion of the two potentially most powerful countries in the world sharply limited the effectiveness of the system, even if the two great countries were associated with certain of its undertakings: the Briand-Kellogg Pact and the conference on disarmament.

There was, also, an immense universe of silence comprising the innumerable peoples subject to empires. All of Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia, with few exceptions, followed destinies imposed on them by distant European leaders. Today, the genuine reactions of these people, or at least of their élites during the colonial period, are studied with passion. Actually, there can be no doubt that the success or failure of the League in Corfu, Bulgaria, the Saar, or Chaco interested these élites very little. Their aspirations to equality, either through assimilation (*e.g.* the "Jeune Algérie" movement) or by gaining independence, were unknown to the public at large as well as in Geneva. Political Europe was unaware that a world was preparing to be born.

But—and this is equally important even in countries which were members of the League—large segments of the public showed skepticism and even hostility toward it. In addition to communist sympathizers who emphasized the "bourgeois" and "capitalist" character of the League, there were the nationalists who were more preoccupied with power and prestige than with peace, and the traditionalists, who wished to return to the old principles of European equilibrium based on a concert of great powers and bilateral alliances. Thus, it can be said that only a minority of public opinion, recruited from the moderate Left, supported the policies of Locarno.

In a curious book entitled "Locarno without Dreams" which the French political writer Alfred Fabre-Luce, known as an adversary of Poincaré and a partisan of the League, published in 1927, he enumerates its basic weaknesses and contradictions: "Opposition between the principles of the League and its geographical extent;" "Opposition between its general organization and the regional agreements it authorized;" "Opposition between Justice and Treaties;" "Opposition between the League as executor for the victors and the League as an organ of reconciliation;" "Opposition between the absolute prohibition of war and the incomplete organization for the peaceful settlement of conflicts;" "Opposition between the Spirit of the League and some

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of its methods of action." It was an effective summary of the narrowness of the international organization's political base.

In Germany, nationalism appeared in a virulent form. But Fabre-Luce was not correct in referring to the League as the executor for the "victors." Was not maintenance of the status quo as produced by the treaties of 1919–1920 the easiest way of maintaining the peace? But all Germans thought these treaties unjust and they believed that, by acting as though the treaties were just, the French practiced a pernicious nationalism also. Briand had made concessions, but as a compromise, "*en zig-zag*," as Fabre-Luce remarks.

Let us cite Pascal, and we shall understand the dilemma of the League vis-à-vis the nationalists: "Unable to force obedience to justice, it has been made just to obey strength; unable to strengthen justice, strength has been justified, so that justice and strength are one, and peace exists, which is the sovereign good."

A world in which all international dealings would be regulated by contracts, and in which contracts would be faithfully observed, could be an intellectual paradise for jurists and something less than that for great masses of humanity. For the origin of contracts is sometimes more important than their appointed value. And in international society, a contract is almost always a transaction based on force. The victor imposes his will on the vanquished. A world in which victory invariably reflects the will of God would be a fortunate world indeed. We know, alas, that this is never the case. A peace treaty, therefore, usually implies advantages for the victor, founded principally on the maxim "Vae victis!" The victor may adopt a variety of attitudes: he may spare the vanquished, as Bismarck spared Austria in 1866, to avoid pushing it into dangerous alliances; or he may satisfy a desire which he feels is perfectly just, but which the vanquished may feel with equal sincerity is perfectly unjust. (An example is Bismarck's annexation of Alsace and Lorraine because their German dialects seemed to him to make them part of Germany. The French could accept this *Diktat* only with indignation because the will of the Alsatians and Lorrainers to remain French seemed to them a higher criterion of nationality than language.) Or the victor can go even further and satisfy his own interests without any concern for justice (for example, the partition of Poland, simply because it was weak, by Hitler and Stalin in 1939).

In any case, a treaty can arouse in the vanquished a passionate discontent, and a more or less violent desire for revenge. A treaty may be not only unjust in itself, but also a cause of war and of violence. And it is no use saying that time will settle everything. In certain cases, as we have seen in Ireland, violence can flare up again at the very moment that certain essentials seem to have been settled.

To a believer in totalitarian government, ready to subordinate all other values to his doctrine, sworn agreements count for nothing; when the balance of power changes, he will eagerly seek to profit from the change. This is true of both the confirmed nationalist and the confirmed racist. Bismarck, whom one may certainly call, if not a nationalist, at least a confirmed Prussian, made the following remark to an Austrian diplomat: "Austria and Prussia are both states too large and important to be linked by the text of a treaty. They can

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be guided only by their own interests and by their own convenience. If a treaty blocks the way to realizing these interests and these conveniences, the treaty must be broken." This would also do very well for a Marxist-Leninist, who expresses relations between powers in terms of the class struggle. Stalin observed the treaties negotiated in 1920 and 1921 between Bolshevik Russia and its neighbors to the West only in so far as it seemed to him impossible to break them. When the possibility arose, in the summer of 1939, he did not hesitate in accomplishing a great maneuver, skillfully, he imagined; he relied on a confirmed enemy, detested by all mankind, to recover the Russian territories lost at Brest-Litovsk.

For the Western democracies, respect for a treaty is a far more certain value than for a totalitarian state. If a Western democratic statesman follows the consequences of this idea to its logical conclusion, as President Wilson wanted to do, he tries to make sure that the contract is fair, so that the vanquished will adopt it and abandon the idea of revenge. The difficulty is that there is as yet no objective criterion as to what is fair. One can sometimes achieve success by trial and error, or perhaps because one has some help from geography and history. Certainly the Treaty of the Pyrénées of 1659 between France and Spain was a good one because, apart from the exceptional crises of the Revolution and the Empire, the frontier has remained stable for over three centuries. In that case, too, there was a winner and a loser.

In the case of Wilson, it was incomparably more difficult. To be sure, the principles involved were sound, establishing as they did the equal rights of large and small nations, setting frontiers along "clearly recognizable" lines of nationality, not to speak of creating the League. Unfortunately, in many areas the lines of nationality were not at all "clearly recognizable." In many parts of the world, two peoples can equally passionately lay claim to the same district as an integral part of their nation. Certain American historians have a tendency to believe that the peace of Versailles would have been more just if Wilson had not been obliged to struggle with Clemenceau. But, in fact, on every point of disagreement between the two men—the Saar, the political separation of the Rhineland—Clemenceau yielded, holding fast only for the temporary occupation of the Rhineland. And this, too, was to be evacuated in advance, by 1930, three years before the advent of Hitler. What seemed unacceptable to every German, and sustained a sense of exasperation which favored the Nazi rise to power, were two points on which Wilson and Clemenceau were always in agreement: Article 231, which seemed to affirm German guilt, and the famous Polish Corridor, which derived directly from Wilson's Point Thirteen, according to which a reconstituted Poland should have access to the sea.

If, therefore, it is very difficult to arrive at "fair" contracts, one of the preoccupations of democratic societies must be to find a way of ameliorating contracts which are unsatisfactory. Treaties are not eternal, unless, as Mussolini put it, one wishes to say that the world is dead. Even for a democrat, treaties are not eternal. Democratic jurists have introduced the notion "Rebus sic stantibus" (if conditions remain the same). And, of course, conditions never remain the same forever.

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It was easy to see, between the two wars, that the Treaty of Versailles was not perfect. But the two principal democracies responsible for it, France and England, had adopted contradictory attitudes toward it. For a long time France clung to the notion of a full "execution" of the treaty. Then she made concessions—but "too little and too late." England was converted to the idea of concessions by the spring of 1919, and undoubtedly this attitude, shared by the French Left, and later by Briand, was the wiser. But the English sank into incoherence in their desire to maintain and even systematize their policy of concessions after Hitler took power. This was "appeasement." Nothing is more significant than the reaction of Anthony Eden, head of the British Foreign Office, to Hitler's reoccupation of the demilitarized zone in the Rhineland, in March 1936. This, he observed, was "a heavy blow to the sancity of treaties." But, he added immediately, "Fortunately, there are grounds for hope that this will not lead to war."

Some of Eden's successors came to think that any blow struck by Hitler against the Versailles treaty, or for the annexation of German-speaking populations, was, in the end, justified. It was only Hitler's method which was to be condemned. Therefore, the original contract having been broken, the dictator must be persuaded to sign a new one. Hitler understood this attitude so well that he coupled his acts of international violence, as we have seen, with spectacular proposals; for example, treaties of nonaggression for the next 25 years. Thus, on one side, Hitler tried to pacify the democracies by offering them treaties which he was prepared to violate as soon as the balance of forces shifted. On the other, the English felt they could persuade Hitler that his methods were bad, and so offered him treaties designed to convert him to an attitude more respectful of treaties. Of course, the results were the opposite of what had been hoped, and, ultimately, Secretary of State Stimson's approach of not recognizing the fruits of aggression was the more rational.

V

The greatest weakness of the system we have described is also the least well known. It is the mediocrity of economic policy, or, to put it more precisely, the failure of policy to reflect economic reality.

The decade of the twenties had been, for the West, and particularly for the United States, a decade of unbridled capitalism. For Hoover, who was largely responsible for this situation, first as Secretary of Commerce, and then as President, optimism was the rule. "American individualism" implied the possibility of each citizen's making a fortune. For capitalists, it also implied the possibility of acting without constraints imposed by the state, and even with the protection of the state in the form of low taxes and high import duties.

On the international level, contrary to the ideas of Wilson, and later of Cordell Hull, there was disorganized competition and protectionist egoism. In Europe, more or less the same methods were followed, although here and there the international cartels were able to impose some sort of order. The International Agreement on Steel, adopted on September 30, 1926, fixed the production quotas of Germany, France, Belgium, Luxemburg and the Saar. But that was an exceptional instance. On the whole, nothing was available

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to control production, overproduction and credit, except a sanctimonious faith in the excellence of economic laws.

This faith had another consequence. It was considered essential that debtors repay their war debts. To encourage repayment, the Hoover administration established a principle according to which countries which had not settled their debts, or the citizens of those countries, were not eligible for American loans. These stipulations, between 1925 and 1930, oriented available American capital toward Germany, thus enabling it to pay reparations during the five years of the Dawes Plan. But when the crisis came, and American funds were withdrawn, Germany was no longer able to pay reparations. The ex-victor countries could no longer pay their debts. This situation arose in 1932, and we know how much these difficulties helped poison relations between Europe and the United States.

Monetary errors were added to protectionist egoism. Drawn after the war into a world of inflation until then unknown, European leaders committed almost every possible error. By retying the pound sterling to gold at its 1914 parity, Winston Churchill, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, condemned England to an indefinite period of a million unemployed. By counting on reparations to make up her budget deficits, France lived until 1926 in a state of permanent monetary crisis. As for Germany, the destruction of the mark in 1923 certainly enriched a few powerful businessmen, but impoverished the salaried class, wiped out all small savings and created conditions of misery ideal for Nazi recruitment. The relative wisdom of the years 1925 to 1929 (balanced budgets and more or less stable currencies) was accompanied by a total absence of control of production and of credit, as if the state, having become wise for a time, was allowing producers the right to go mad.

When the crisis of overproduction developed no one was prepared to deal with it. In monetary matters, the world, instead of engaging in mutual assistance, split into three groups, the countries which had devalued (principally the United Kingdom and the United States); the countries of the "Gold Bloc" (principally France), stupidly clinging to monetary parity and trying to lower their prices by a deflation productive of discontent; and countries with total currency control (principally Germany). This absence of international solidarity was almost as catastrophic for the world as the advent of Adolf Hitler.

One might summarize these "economic errors," of which only a very incomplete list is given here, by saying that the politicians, either through ignorance or illusion, were unaware of the invasion of politics by economic considerations. The Great War had formidably heightened the economic responsibilities of governments, but these had recoiled before the new reality. They managed their budgets as they had before 1914, leaving to private interests, notably to banks, the particulars of running their economies. The French, English and German banks, all-powerful before 1914, investing all over the world, had drawn back into themselves. A French law of 1918, which was operative for ten years, even forbade investments in foreign funds, an extraordinary contrast to the proud economic imperialism of France at the beginning of the century.

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The banks did not know how to fill the void left by governmental economic incompetence. And the central banks—the Bank of England of Sir Montagu Norman, the Reichsbank of Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, the Banque de France of Robineau and then Moreau, instead of considering themselves instruments in the service of the common good, sought above all to preserve their private character and their independence vis-à-vis the state. The fabulous economic and financial ignorance of Aristide Briand, a typical statesman of the "Locarno generation," should not blind us to the fact that his partners, Austen Chamberlain, Frank B. Kellogg and even Gustav Stresemann were hardly more competent than he.

Thus, in a world where the state was becoming responsible for the economy, the politicians did not try to adapt to their new responsibilities and the banks did not help them. The economic conjuncture looked good, and once again, an excess of optimism led to the belief that it would remain good indefinitely.

VI

The spirit of Locarno was a beautiful dream—a dream of reconciliation and peace based on fidelity to sworn engagements. From that pleasant but somewhat absurd dream came the plunge into the abyss of horror. And, of course, between the spirit of Locarno and the spirit of *Lebensraum,* the choice is not difficult. At least let us share with the men of Locarno, already belonging to such a distant day, a faith in the progress of humanity. It is simply that after 50 more years of experience, our faith is less naïve and more anxious.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Edited by Jean Gunther. Editors of sections: Henry L. Roberts, General, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union; William Diebold, Jr., Economic and Social; Gaddis Smith, United States; Robert D. Crassweller, Western Hemisphere; Fritz Stern, Western Europe; John C. Campbell, Middle East and North Africa; Lewis C. Austin, Asia and the Pacific; Jennifer Seymour Whitaker, Africa.

General: Political and Legal

IMPERIALISM. By George Lichtheim. New York: Praeger, 1971, 183 p. $7.50 (Paper, $2.45).

An excellent essay on a much-debated theme, handled with Mr. Lichtheim's customary intellectual finesse.

THE CONVENTIONS OF CRISIS. By Coral Bell. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1971, 131 p. $3.75 (Paper).

An illuminating study of the recently developing techniques in "managing" diplomatic crises, especially those between adversaries.

CRISIS ESCALATION WAR. By Ole R. Holsti. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972, 290 p. $11.00.

Using as case studies the crisis of 1914, which led to war, and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, which did not, the author seeks to cast some light on decision-making in moments of mounting tension.

CRISES AND SEQUENCES IN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT. By Leonard Binder and others. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971, 326 p. $8.00.

This volume in the series "Studies in Political Development" centers on five crises—labeled as identity, legitimacy, participation, penetration and distribution —which appear to have arisen historically in the process of political development and state building, and which may fall into significant sequential patterns.

FACES OF NATIONALISM: NEW REALITIES AND OLD MYTHS. By Boyd C. Shafer. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972, 535 p. $12.95.

Long a student of nationalism, the author, for many years editor of *The American Historical Review,* here traces the evolution of that protean and myth-ridden phenomenon from the late Middle Ages to the present.

DEMOCRACY. By Dorothy Pickles. New York: Basic Books, 1971, 200 p. $5.95.

A broad discussion of the meaning, historical forces and problems of democracy, by a leading British political scientist.

NOTE—By special arrangement with UNA-USA World Affairs Book Center, readers of Foreign Affairs may obtain any book published in the United States (except paperbacks) at the publisher's regular list price. Prepaid orders over $10.00 postage free; under $10.00, add 25¢ for U.S.A., 75¢ outside U.S.A. Send orders, with check or money order, to World Affairs Book Center, 345 East 46th Street, New York, New York 10017.

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COMMONWEALTH: A HISTORY OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS. By H. Duncan Hall. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1971, 1,015 p. $29.95.

This massive work carries the story of the Commonwealth from the beginning of the century to the 1950s. Centering on the development of the association rather than upon the individual members, it makes extensive use of the minutes of the Prime Ministers' meetings.

BETWEEN NOTHINGNESS AND PARADISE. By Gerhart Niemeyer. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1971, 226 p. $8.95.

In this extended essay Professor Niemeyer analyzes the tradition of "total critique of society" and consequent totalitarian activism, and then outlines the criteria and limits of nondestructive social critique.

THE HUMAN BASIS OF THE POLITY: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF POLITICAL MEN. By Jeanne N. Knutson. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1972, 360 p. $12.95.

Proceeding from an analysis of Abraham Maslow's motivation theory, the author moves to a general consideration of the efforts to provide the "psychic dimensions of political man." Valuable as a critical review of the literature and as an original contribution.

PEACEFUL CHANGE IN MODERN SOCIETY. Edited by E. Berkeley Tompkins. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971, 158 p. $6.50 (Paper, $3.95).

Essays commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the Hoover Institution. Contributors include Anthony Eden, Sidney Hook and Bertrand de Jouvenel.

COERCION. Edited by J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1972, 328 p. $8.95.

Fifteen papers dealing with the role and meaning of coercion in human affairs, including international relations.

BUILDING THE CITY OF MAN. By W. Warren Wagar. New York: Grossman, 1971, 180 p. $3.95 (Paper).

"Our goal," says the author, "must be, quite simply, a new organic world civilization," and he prescribes the wholesale revolutionary measures needed to create it. An enthusiastically total critique of the existing state of affairs.

MODERN REVOLUTIONS. By John Dunn. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1972, 346 p. $14.50 (Paper, $4.95).

A quite penetrating analysis, through historical case studies, of modern revolution and revolutionary ideology.

ANARCHY AND ORDER: ESSAYS IN POLITICS. By Herbert Read. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971, 235 p. $7.50 (Paper, $2.95).

Herbert Read, who died in 1968, is best known for his writings on art. He was also a philosophical anarchist. This book, which first appeared in England in 1954, assembles his various essays on the theme of anarchism.

ANARCHISM TODAY. Edited by David E. Apter and James Joll. Garden City: Doubleday, 1972, 274 p. $5.95 (Paper, $1.95).

Essays providing a world tour of present-day anarchist movements and moods.

COMPARATIVE POLITICAL CORRUPTION. By James C. Scott. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1972, 166 p. $6.95 (Paper, $2.50).

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Seeing corruption as a prevalent, perhaps necessary, lubricant for a society, the author compares such diverse cases as Stuart England, Thailand and urban America.

PEACE IN PARTS: INTEGRATION AND CONFLICT IN REGIONAL ORGANIZATION. By J. S. Nye. Boston: Little, Brown, 1971, 210 p. $3.95 (Paper).

An effort to assess the past and future role of international regional organizations in promoting world peace. (Written under the auspices of Harvard's Center for International Affairs.)

THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER. VOLUME III: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT. Edited by Cyril E. Black and Richard A. Falk. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971, 413 p. $12.50.

The 11 contributors to this third volume deal with various aspects of the role of law in the control of international conflict.

THE LEGAL REGIME OF HYDROSPACE. By E. D. Brown. London: Stevens (for the London Institute of World Affairs), 1971, 236 p. £4.50; New York: Harper and Row, 1972, $14.50.

An analysis of some of the important current problems relating to the international law of the sea, the seabed and its subsoil, the delimitation of the continental shelf, deep-sea mining, and oil and nuclear pollution.

THE USE AND ABUSE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE. Edited by Irving Louis Horowitz. New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1971, 350 p. $8.95 (Paper, $3.95).

Critical essays on the involvement of social scientists in national policy-making.

LE SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL DES NATIONS UNIES. By Marie-Claude Smouts. Paris: Colin, 1971, 298 p. Fr. 55.

A dissertation on the role played by the Secretaries-General of the United Nations in resolving international conflicts.

General: Military, Technical and Scientific

DIPLOMACY FOR VICTORY: FDR AND UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER. By Raymond G. O'Connor. New York: Norton, 1971, 143 p. $6.50.

In contrast to many historians, Mr. O'Connor regards Roosevelt's "unconditional surrender" policy in a positive light, as providing flexibility and permitting the Allies to maintain their tenuous relationship until victory.

FORCE AND FOLLY. By Hans Speier. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1969, 342 p. $12.50.

Occasional essays on war, international affairs and intellectual history, by a member of the Research Council of the RAND Corporation.

LOW INTENSITY OPERATIONS: SUBVERSION, INSURGENCY, PEACE-KEEPING. By Frank Kitson. Harrisburg: Stackpole, 1971, 208 p. $9.95.

Drawing on his experiences in Kenya, Malaya, Cyprus and Northern Ireland, Brigadier Kitson seeks to outline "the steps which should be taken now in order to make the army ready to deal with subversion, insurrection, and peacekeeping operations during the second half of the 1970's."

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THE SCIENCE OF WAR AND PEACE. By Robin Clarke. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972, 335 p. $10.00.

After a review, largely familiar but still chilling, of the disasters that threaten to overtake humanity, the author turns to the various intellectual efforts that are being made to find a way to avert catastrophe.

PARADOXES OF RATIONALITY: THEORY OF METAGAMES AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR. By Nigel Howard. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1971, 248 p. $12.95.

A quite technical work, presupposing familiarity with game theory, but indicating some interesting approaches to problem-solving in the "real world."

CIVIL WARS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. Edited by Robin Higham. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1972, 260 p. $9.00.

A collection of essays covering the civil wars in Russia, China, Vietnam, Spain, Ireland and Nigeria.

THE ARMS TRADE WITH THE THIRD WORLD. New York: Humanities Press, 1971, 910 p. $15.00. (Stockholm: Almqvist, Swedish Kr. 60.)

A massive compilation of information on the arms trade from industrialized to underdeveloped countries since 1945. (Issued by SIPRI, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.)

GLOBAL POLITICS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY. By Mason Willrich. New York: Praeger, 1971, 204 p. $15.00.

An inquiry into the implications for the world community of the advances in nuclear energy and technology for nonmilitary purposes in the 1970s.

THE PRIVATE NUCLEAR STRATEGISTS. By Roy E. Licklider. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1972, 213 p. $11.00.

A study of the makeup of that significant group of individuals, not employed by the government, who have been professionally concerned with nuclear strategy and disarmament.

General: Economic and Social

THE THREE WORLDS OF ECONOMICS. By Lloyd G. Reynolds. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971, 344 p. $12.50 (Paper, $3.45).

Professor Reynolds of Yale compares the economic structures of the rich countries, the poor countries and the socialist countries and then their economic policies and problems. He asks how much of "Western" economics—analytical tools and theories, both—can usefully be applied to the other parts of the world. He concludes with a thoughtful consideration of some basic questions about the nature and scope of economics. To put this tour d'horizon in a modest-sized book is a tour de force made possible by clear, succinct prose. A remarkable book that deals with fundamentals.

AMERICAN AID FOR DEVELOPMENT. By Paul G. Clark. New York: Praeger (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1972, 231 p. $8.50.

Contrary to widespread impressions, many poor countries made marked economic progress in the 1960s. They and others could make good use of increased foreign aid to grow further in the 1970s. These well-reasoned conclusions by the head of the Center of Development Economics at Williams College (and a

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former AID official) lead to concrete recommendations for the reshaping of American aid policies.

AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF AN ECONOMIST. By Lord Robbins. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972, 301 p. $10.00.
MONEY, TRADE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. By Lord Robbins. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971, 282 p. $10.95.

In a remarkable retrospect, one of England's leading economists reassesses his own major works. The fact that he does not find all of them good, plus his comments on people, events and especially the atmosphere of certain times and places, make the autobiography an attractive contribution to the intellectual history of our time. By regrouping earlier essays and providing a new commentary on them, the other volume gives us an up-to-date statement of the author's judicious views.

THE LIMITS TO GROWTH. By Donella H. Meadows and others. New York: Universe Books, 1972, 205 p. $6.50 (Paper, $2.75).

The Club of Rome's little doomsday book. The controversy about it will enter a second stage when the data underlying its dramatic conclusions are released, and a third stage when global generalizations are brought closer to the levels of regions and nations.

WORLD DYNAMICS. By Jay W. Forrester. Cambridge: Wright-Allen Press, 1971, 142 p. $9.75.

The predecessor of the Meadows study (above); more detailed in some respects but less refined in others.

THE SICK SOCIETY: AN ECONOMIC EXAMINATION. By Michael Tanzer. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971, 260 p. $5.95.

A well-written statement of a familiar case: American society is dominated by profit-seeking corporations owned by a "tiny upper-income elite." It follows that the ills of the United States are rooted in what corporations do or do not do. The remedy? Some kind of socialism especially concerned with people.

PERSISTENT POVERTY. By George L. Beckford. New York: Oxford University Press, 1972, 303 p. $7.50 (Paper, $2.95).

"The persistence of underdevelopment in plantation economies derives basically from the nature of the plantation system itself." The case for this conclusion is well argued in this interesting book by a Jamaican economist who succeeds in his aim "to present a genuinely Third World perspective" on some old but still contemporary institutions.

FOREIGN AID TO NEWLY INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES. AIDE EXTÉRIEURE AUX PAYS RÉCEMMENT INDÉPENDANTS. Edited by Ester Boserup and Ignacy Sachs. The Hague: Mouton, 1971, 184 p. (New York: Humanities Press, 1972, $7.00.)
DEVELOPING THE THIRD WORLD: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE NINETEEN-SIXTIES. Edited by Ronald Robinson. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971, 289 p. $13.50.
STUDIES IN DEVELOPMENT PLANNING. Edited by Hollis B. Chenery with others. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (for the Center for International Affairs), 1971, 422 p. $13.50.

Our understanding of economic development increases more slowly than the literature about it, but each of these three collections has something special to

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offer. Boserup (a Dane) and Sachs (a Pole) coördinated studies by a number of scholars from Eastern and Western Europe that throw light on the ability of poor countries to absorb aid. Robinson brought practitioners and scholars together some years ago since "there is little hope of success if economists can talk only to economists and administrators will talk only with God." The third book reflects the important work done by the Project for Quantitative Research in Economic Development at Harvard.

A HARMADIK ÉVEZRED FELÉ. By Mihály Simai. Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1971, 375 p. Ft. 65.

Basing his analysis on a study of the world economy since the end of the war, Professor Simai of the Karl Marx University in Budapest discerns the patterns and trends that will dominate the rest of the century.

FROM PEASANT TO FARMER: A REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY FOR DEVELOPMENT. By Raanan Weitz. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971, 292 p. $10.00.

An Israeli specialist stresses people, organization, community-building and coöperation as elements in making agriculture a key to development.

ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM. Edited by Kenneth E. Boulding and Tapan Mukerjee. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1972, 338 p. $10.00 (Paper, $3.95).

Some classicists, some critics, some historians and some quantifiers provide a stimulating interchange on an old subject that has come alive again.

ECONOMIC REGULATION OF THE WORLD'S AIRLINES: A POLITICAL ANALYSIS. By William E. O'Connor. New York: Praeger, 1971, 189 p. $15.00.

An official of the Civil Aeronautics Board sifts many proposals to find the most efficient and economic method of regulating international airlines. Not surprisingly, it seems unacceptable to governments; so he proposes some alternatives that may improve on the present state of affairs.

EUROPE'S FREE TRADE AREA EXPERIMENT. Edited by Hugh Corbet and David Robertson. Elmsford (N.Y.): Pergamon Press, 1970, 258 p. $8.75.

Mostly by close observers, the papers about EFTA experience are naturally of more lasting value than those on its prospects as seen several years ago.

WETTBEWERBSTHEORIE—WETTBEWERBSPOLITIK. By Adriaan Willemsen. Bern: Stämpfli, 1971, 313 p. Swiss Fr. 56.

A comparison of theory, policy and law on competition in the European Community and EFTA that emphasizes the different purposes of the two bodies.

BANKING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: SOME LESSONS OF HISTORY. Edited by Rondo Cameron. New York: Oxford University Press, 1972, 267 p. $8.95.

The experiences of seven countries in the nineteenth century analyzed in the hope of throwing light on present problems.

THE POLITICS OF DECONTROL OF INDUSTRY: BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES. By Susan Armitage. London: Weidenfeld (for the London School of Economics and Political Science), 1969, 213 p. (New York: Humanities Press, distributor, 1970, $8.50).

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Interesting comparisons of experience at the end of the First World War based partly on new material.

The United States

SWORDS AND PLOWSHARES. By General Maxwell D. Taylor. New York: Norton, 1972, 434 p. $10.00.

This didactic essay, in autobiographical form, on the use and misuse of power ends on a pessimistic note. Most of the book deals with the years of the author's eminence at the heights of the military profession. No startling revelations.

THE ADMINISTRATION OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY. By Richard A. Johnson. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971, 415 p. $10.00.

The author, a former State Department career administrator and diplomatist, believes the United States has "held the line and prevented the great catastrophe for a quarter of a century" but that future security depends in part on abandoning the "luxury of conducting its overseas affairs as a projection of domestic bureaucratic rivalries."

ROOTS OF WAR. By Richard J. Barnet. New York: Atheneum, 1972, 350 p. $10.00.

A revisionist synthesis which emphasizes the personalities and motivations of the "national security managers." Barnet argues that American business interests influence but do not dictate foreign policy. He is more persuasive than rigid economic determinists like Joyce and Gabriel Kolko.

COLD WAR AND COUNTERREVOLUTION: THE FOREIGN POLICY OF JOHN F. KENNEDY. By Richard J. Walton. New York: Viking, 1972, 250 p. $7.95.

A heavy-handed and oversimplified rebuttal of the rather worshipful accounts by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. and Theodore Sorensen (both 1965). The author accuses Kennedy of being a product of his times, *i.e.* a vigorous cold warrior.

AMERICAN BUSINESS AND FOREIGN POLICY, 1920–1933. By Joan Hoff Wilson. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1971, 339 p. $9.95.

A well-documented history which demonstrates the complexity of business views and influences and corrects the still-prevalent tendency of historians to make the 1920s a scapegoat decade.

THE RADICAL LEFT AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. By Robert W. Tucker. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press (for the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University), 1971, 156 p. $7.50 (Paper, $2.75).

The author concludes that radical-left criticism, as distinguished from conventional liberal criticism, assumes that foreign policy flows inexorably from the structure of society; only by radical change in society can foreign policy be changed. The comments are sometimes trenchant, although the number of critics discussed is very small.

THE LONDON JOURNAL OF GENERAL RAYMOND E. LEE 1940–1941. Edited by James Leutze. Boston: Little, Brown, 1971, 489 p. $12.50.

Voluminous, well-edited journals of the American military attaché in London during the 18 months from Dunkirk to Pearl Harbor. A portrait of an interventionist and an important source for the history of the time.

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SELECTED PAPERS OF WILL CLAYTON. Edited by Fredrick J. Dobney. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971, 298 p. $8.50.

Carefully chosen excerpts from speeches and sparse but revealing unpublished papers of an architect of foreign policy in the Truman years. Clayton's efforts to create an environment favorable to American capitalism are displayed.

CHRISTIAN A. HERTER. By G. Bernard Noble. New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1970, 333 p. $7.95.

The gentle, patrician Christian Herter was Secretary of State for the last 21 months of the Eisenhower administration, succeeding the fatally ill John Foster Dulles. This contribution to the "American Secretaries of State" series is graceful, respectful and—like its subject's tenure as Secretary—undramatic.

IN THE MIDST OF WARS: AN AMERICAN'S MISSION TO SOUTHEAST ASIA. By Major General Edward Geary Lansdale. New York: Harper and Row, 1972, 386 p. $12.50.

Euphemistic, somewhat evasive memoirs by a "legendary" American practitioner of counterinsurgency and covert operations in the Philippines and Vietnam. The author does not mention his important role in shaping policy toward Vietnam in the 1960s and limits his account to the 1950s.

COVER-UP. By Seymour M. Hersh. New York: Random House, 1972, 305 p. $6.95.

A devastating exposé of the Army's concealment of the My Lai atrocity, based largely on the 25,000-page Peers investigation materials which have not been officially released but which somehow came into the author's possession.

THE BEGINNING OF AMERICAN AID TO SOUTHEAST ASIA. Edited by Samuel P. Hayes. Lexington (Mass.): Heath Lexington, 1971, 336 p. $15.00.

This historically valuable volume contains the reports of the Griffin Mission (1950), declassified in 1967 and now published for the first time, and retrospective comment by French, Vietnamese and Burmese officials and by the author/editor who was deputy chief of the mission. The documents prescribe economic tools for the creation of political stability.

THE MEGASTATES OF AMERICA: PEOPLE, POLITICS, AND POWER IN THE TEN GREAT STATES. By Neal R. Peirce. New York: Norton, 1972, 745 p. $12.95.

The author pays tribute to and emulates John Gunther's "Inside U.S.A." Excellent reading in its entirety or for the detailed portraits of any of the states: New York, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan, Florida, Texas and California.

AMERICAN COMMUNISM IN CRISIS, 1943–1957. By Joseph R. Starobin. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972, 331 p. $12.95.

An informed analysis of the internal factionalism, stultifying concepts and rigidities which, in Starobin's opinion, did more damage to the Communist Party U.S.A. than did the hostile American political climate and repression under the Smith Act. The author was foreign editor of *The Daily Worker* and now teaches political science in Canada.

DECLARATION OF CONSCIENCE. By Margaret Chase Smith; edited by William C. Lewis, Jr. Garden City: Doubleday, 1972, 512 p. $8.95.

A collection of speeches, a few letters and memoranda and brief comments by

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Senator Smith on her experiences. This volume does not qualify as a full memoir, but it is a welcome addition since there are so few senatorial memoirs of any sort.

SENATOR ARTHUR H. VANDENBERG: THE EVOLUTION OF A MODERN REPUBLICAN, 1884–1945. By C. David Tompkins. Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1970, 312 p. $9.00.

A solid political biography providing perspective and information not available in "The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg" (1952). The author contemplates a second volume on Vandenberg and foreign policy, 1945–51.

WHITE KNIGHT: THE RISE OF SPIRO AGNEW. By Jules Witcover. New York: Random House, 1972, 465 p. $10.00.

The best of a spate of books on the controversial Vice President, based primarily on interviews with 120 of his friends, enemies and associates. More than half the book deals with the years before 1969. The author, a veteran Washington journalist, maintains an objective stance.

THE IMPUDENT SNOBS. By John R. Coyne, Jr. New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1972, 524 p. $8.95.

The complete text of the Vice President's speeches preceded by an admiring analysis and elaboration of Mr. Agnew's attack on the press and television. The author, a conservative journalist, once served on the Vice President's staff.

THE MAKING OF THE TEST BAN TREATY. By Ronald J. Terchek. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1970, 211 p. Gldrs. 29.70.

An analysis of the roles played in the United States by the various political participants in the ratification of the treaty.

STRATEGIC POWER AND NATIONAL SECURITY. By J. I. Coffey. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971, 214 p. $9.50.

The author argues that current and projected levels of U.S. nuclear capability far exceed rational requirements and therefore are detrimental to national security. The evidence is presented in a form comprehensible to laymen.

The Western Hemisphere

A BIAS FOR HOPE. By Albert O. Hirschman. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971, 374 p. $12.50 (Paper, $3.45).

The distinguished Harvard authority on Latin American development has gathered here a harvest of his shorter writings, published over a period of almost two decades. A new "Introduction: Political Economics and Possibilism" serves as a focus and unifying element.

LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND U.S. POLICY. By Joseph Grunwald and others. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1972, 216 p. $6.95.

A useful overview of the various economic integration schemes, and the relationship to them of U.S. policy, buttressed by extensive text and appendix tables.

THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY. By Robert D. Crassweller. New York: Praeger (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1972, 470 p. $13.50.

A policy study, whose author urges the development of a "Caribbean Community" characterized by greatly increased regional coördination and joint action over a wide range of economic and social activities.

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HUERTA: A POLITICAL PORTRAIT. By Michael C. Meyer. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1972, 272 p. $9.50.

A scholarly biography—the first—of an important figure in Mexican history. Political elements are stressed over personal material, a necessary consequence of the nature of the surviving sources.

MODERN BRAZIL: NEW PATTERNS AND DEVELOPMENT. Edited by John Saunders. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1971, 350 p. $12.50.

Brazil's progress on the road to great-power status is considered in 13 studies by competent professionals. The fields covered include economics, agriculture, sociology, culture, education and politics.

REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE IN CUBA. Edited by Carmelo Mesa-Lago. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971, 544 p. $14.95.

A well-balanced and perceptive final chapter summarizing the Cuban present and future caps this volume of essays on political, social and economic aspects. A rewarding volume.

CRISIS IN COSTA RICA: THE 1948 REVOLUTION. By John Patrick Bell. Austin: University of Texas Press (for the Institute of Latin American Studies), 1971, 192 p. $7.00.

The most thorough account yet available concerning the origins and role of the National Liberation Movement in Costa Rica and the rise of José Figueres to political preëminence.

HAITI: ITS STAGNANT SOCIETY AND SHACKLED ECONOMY. By O. Ernest Moore. New York: Exposition Press, 1972, 281 p. $8.00.

Authoritative but less massively detailed than the recent Rotberg study, this volume will be a useful introduction for students of the many-sided Haitian dilemma. An index is lacking.

LATIN AMERICAN UNIVERSITY STUDENTS: A SIX NATION STUDY. By Arthur Liebman and others. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (for the Center for International Affairs), 1972, 296 p. $11.75.

A comparative study of student movements and attitudes in six countries selected for their diverse political and university systems: Colombia, Panama, Paraguay, Puerto Rico, Uruguay and Mexico.

CANADIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS. By Aloysius Balawyder. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972, 248 p. $12.50.

A good contribution, based on archival research, to the slowly growing literature on the history of Canada's external relations. The author demonstrates that Canada lacked a coherent policy toward Russia, except for measures calculated to avoid discord at home.

TRUDEAU IN POWER. By Walter Stewart. New York: Outerbridge and Dienstfrey, 1972, 240 p. $6.95.

A savage critique of the Canadian Prime Minister's performance since election in 1968. The author argues that Trudeau is an autocrat who has evaded or mismanaged the nation's most serious problems and undermined parliamentary democracy in the process. (Published in Canada as "Shrug: Trudeau in Power," Toronto: New Press, 1971, $7.95.)

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Western Europe

FELLED OAKS: CONVERSATION WITH DE GAULLE. By André Malraux. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972, 128 p. $6.95.

An American translation of a work reviewed here in January 1972 of which it was said: The "epitome of a close association of two self-consciously great men." An important source.

THE DUEL: DE GAULLE AND POMPIDOU. By Philippe Alexandre. Boston: Houghton, 1972, 360 p. $7.95.

The complicated relations between de Gaulle and his successor, a fascinating story told rather chattily.

UNE POLITIQUE ÉTRANGÈRE 1958–1969. By Maurice Couve de Murville. Paris: Plon, 1971, 499 p. Fr. 33.60.

The reflections of de Gaulle's Foreign Minister, whose tenure at the Quai d' Orsay was the longest since the French Revolution. Offers interesting perspectives on traditional French outlook on diplomacy and on de Gaulle's ideas and practices.

THE FRENCH COMMUNISTS: PROFILE OF A PEOPLE. By Annie Kriegel. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972, 408 p. $12.50.

A splendid work on the character and history of the party, by a well-known scholar who fuses analytical insights with her personal experiences in the party. (Originally published in France in 1968.)

THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY VERSUS THE STUDENTS: REVOLUTIONARY POLITICS IN MAY–JUNE 1968. By Richard Johnson. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972, 215 p. $8.00 (Paper, $1.95).

Johnson was still a Yale undergraduate when the battles here depicted took place. He analyzes the conflicts between "proletarian apparatchik" and left-wing students filled with anarchist ideas and yearnings with subtlety and some detachment. An intriguing book on an important and timely subject.

PEACE FOR OUR TIME: MUNICH TO DUNKIRK—THE INSIDE STORY. By Roger Parkinson. New York: McKay, 1972, 411 p. $7.95.

A familiar, if still gripping, story of futility, put together with the help of some new evidence.

THE DIARIES OF SIR ALEXANDER CADOGAN, O.M., 1938–1945. Edited by David Dilks. New York: Putnam, 1972, 881 p. $15.00.

As Permanent Undersecretary of the Foreign Office during the last war, Cadogan was ideally placed for first-hand observation of men and events. The diaries, here reproduced in abbreviated form, suggest that his rather conventional prejudices and personal likes and dislikes narrowed his outlook.

THE ART OF THE POSSIBLE: THE MEMOIRS OF LORD BUTLER. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1971, 274 p. £3.75.

Recollections of a leading Conservative that tell us little about his many experiences and important involvements.

IN MY WAY: THE POLITICAL MEMOIRS OF LORD GEORGE-BROWN. By George Brown. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972, 299 p. $8.95.

The spirited memoirs of Britain's famously volatile former Foreign Secretary. Candid and often uncomplimentary vignettes of Britain's politics and politicians.

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LONDON WAR NOTES: 1939–1945. By Mollie Panter-Downes; edited by William Shawn. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1971, 378 p. $10.00.

Week after week, the empathetic London correspondent of *The New Yorker* wrote about London life and morale during the war. This collection of her pieces constitutes a readable, informative record.

THE SECRET ARMY: THE IRA 1916–1970. By J. Bowyer Bell. New York: Day, 1971, 404 p. $8.95.

The story of a revolutionary movement, based largely on extensive interviews with its members. The reader is left with the impression of the futility of so much suffering: "Irish Republicans have largely misinterpreted the past, selected the inappropriate tactics, and applied a useless strategy."

DAS DEUTSCHE DILEMMA. By Karl Dietrich Bracher. Munich: Piper, 1971, 470 p. DM. 32.

A collection of essays on the character of the Federal Republic and on its political antecedents, by a foremost political scientist and a forthright defender of democracy.

KONRAD ADENAUER 1876–1967. By Terence Prittie. Chicago: Cowles Book Co., 1972, 334 p. $10.00.

A well-known British journalist, with decades of experience in Germany, presents a straightforward portrait, based in part on interviews with Adenauer's contemporaries.

HONECKER: PORTRÄT EINES NACHFOLGERS. By Heinz Lippmann. Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1971, 271 p. DM. 20.

An informative biography of Ulbricht's successor, by someone who once worked with him in the Communist Youth Movement. Fifty years in German communism prepared Honecker for his present responsibilities but did not encourage personal initiative or even an original style of thought and action.

THE BERLIN CRISIS 1958–1962. By Jack M. Schick. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971, 266 p. $9.50.

A rather narrow, conventional study of an acute phase of the Berlin struggle.

QUISLING: THE CAREER AND POLITICAL IDEAS OF VIDKUN QUISLING 1887–1945. By Paul M. Hayes. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972, 368 p. $12.95.

A scholarly and judicious biography of a complicated traitor, based on some new evidence.

MUSSOLINI AND FASCISM: THE VIEW FROM AMERICA. By John P. Diggins. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972, 524 p. $16.50.

An important study of America's far from uniformly hostile attitude to Italian Fascism—a sobering work that enhances our understanding of the appeals of fascism and of the nature of American society, by a young scholar.

THE END OF AN ALLIANCE: ROME'S DEFECTION FROM THE AXIS IN 1943. By Friedrich-Karl von Plehwe. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971, 161 p. $7.25.

A member of the German military mission in Rome reconstructs the aftermath of Mussolini's ouster in July 1943, emphasizing particularly Hitler's brutal reaction to Italian developments. A useful commentary on a hitherto obscure aspect of World War II. (A translation of a 1967 German book.)

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Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

ZHUKOV. By Otto Preston Chaney, Jr. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1971, 512 p. $9.95.
THE MEMOIRS OF MARSHAL ZHUKOV. New York: Delacorte Press, 1971, 703 p. $15.00.

The substantial biography by Chaney is considerably more extensive in coverage and scope than the translation of Zhukov's own rather flat memoirs, which suffer from some evident political editing along the way.

ALEKSANDR SOLZHENITSYN. By Abraham Rothberg. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971, 215 p. $7.50.

An extended essay, political rather than literary, on the major novels of Solzhenitsyn.

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY IN THE SOVIET UNION. By Loren R. Graham. New York: Knopf, 1972, 584 p. $15.00.

This impressive study investigates the complex interplay between some of the leading themes of twentieth-century science and the principles of Marxist philosophy. Ranging from quantum mechanics to cybernetics and from relativity theory to genetics, Mr. Graham is far less concerned with such scandals as the Lysenko affair than with the serious intellectual endeavors of the best Soviet scientific minds.

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY SINCE THE DEATH OF STALIN. By H. Hanak. Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972, 340 p. $10.00.

A useful selection of documents, with introductions, to illustrate the movement of Soviet foreign policy since 1953.

DIE SOWJETISCHE DEUTSCHLAND-POLITIK IM JAHRE 1952. By Gerd Meyer. Tübingen: Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Osteuropaforschung; Cologne: Böhlau, 1970, 181 p. DM. 26.

A close examination and appraisal of the Soviet initiatives in 1952 regarding the reunification of Germany.

THE USES OF TERROR: THE SOVIET SECRET POLICE 1917–1970. By Boris Levytsky. New York: Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, 1972, 349 p. $7.95.

This English translation of a serious history of the Soviet political police carries the story down to mid-1970.

THE KREMLIN AND THE COSMOS. By Nicholas Daniloff. New York: Knopf, 1972, 258 p. $6.95.

Daniloff gives a journalist's account of the development of the Russian space program.

DEVIANCE IN SOVIET SOCIETY. By Walter D. Connor. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972, 327 p. $12.50.

A sociological study of juvenile delinquency, alcoholism and crime, and efforts at their prevention or control.

LITHUANIA IN CRISIS: NATIONALISM TO COMMUNISM, 1939–1940. By Leonas Sabaliūnas. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972, 293 p. $11.50.

A well-written, meticulously documented review of Lithuanian domestic and

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foreign affairs in the interwar period, the social and economic conditions in the last years of independence, and the crises leading to the loss of sovereignty.

DIE DEUTSCHE BALTIKUMPOLITIK ZWISCHEN BREST-LITOVSK UND COMPIÈGNE. By Hans-Erich Volkmann. Cologne: Böhlau, 1970, 283 p. DM. 68.

A detailed and well-documented study of German policies toward Latvia and Estonia in the period between the signing of the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Compiègne. The author disagrees with the well-known thesis of Fritz Fischer that German policy toward the Baltic region was completely annexationist.

THE BAKU COMMUNE, 1917–1918. By Ronald Grigor Suny. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972, 412 p. $15.00.

An able monograph on the revolution in a provincial capital that was also an oil center and a focus of national antagonisms.

SINISTÄ JA MUSTAA. SUOMEN 1920–JA 1930—LUKUJEN OIKEISTO-RADIKALISMIN KARTOISTUSTA. By Lauri Hyvämäki. Helsinki: Otava, 1971, 270 p. Fmk. 16.

An engrossing account by a well-known historian of the right-wing political currents in Finland during the 1920s and 1930s.

MIEHITYKSEN VARALTA– PÄÄMAJAN TIEDUSTELUA 1943–1945. By U. A. Käkönen. Helsinki: Otava, 1971, 250 p. Fmk. 14.

A high-ranking intelligence officer offers a valuable description of Finnish operations during 1943–1945.

LE C.A.E.M. By Jean Caillot. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1971, 413 p. Fr. 58.

A juridical examination of the structure and extent of integration of Comecon.

WARTEN AUF GERECHTIGKEIT. By Karl Wilhelm Fricke. Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1971, 256 p. DM. 24.

A documentary history of communist purges and rehabilitations, with particular attention to the SED in East Germany.

The Middle East and North Africa

LA VRAIE BATAILLE D'ALGER. By Jacques Massu. Paris: Plon, 1971, 391 p. Fr. 33.60.

France's outspoken "chef des paras" gives his version of the "battle" of 1957 in Algiers, made famous in print and on the screen, in the form of answers to 22 questions you always wanted to ask.

THE BRITISH IN EGYPT. By Peter Mansfield. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972, 351 p. $8.95.

Not a systematic history, but an urbane and perceptive account of Britain's 74-year moment (1882–1956) on the Nile.

ISRAEL AND THE ARAB WORLD. By Aharon Cohen. New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1970, 576 p. $15.00.

A book notable for its comprehensive coverage and independent judgment. The viewpoint is generally that of Mapam, concerned over Israel's independence but seeking rapprochement with the Arabs and critical of Western and official Israeli policies.

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ARAB ATTITUDES TO ISRAEL. By Yehoshafat Harkabi. New York: Hart, 1972, 527 p. $10.00.

An Israeli general, who is a veteran "Arabist," has gone through mountains of Arab writings to produce this discouragingly accurate composite.

THE FOREIGN POLICY SYSTEM OF ISRAEL: SETTING, IMAGES, PROCESS. By Michael Brecher. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972, 693 p. $17.50.

A disquisition on personalities, institutions and modes of thought, with an admixture of tables and computations on decision-making. Much of it makes fascinating reading.

WEST GERMAN REPARATIONS TO ISRAEL. By Nicholas Balabkins. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1971, 384 p. $12.50.

The documented story of the 1952 Luxembourg Treaty and its fulfillment, stressing the effects on the Israeli economy.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND POPULATION GROWTH IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Edited by Charles A. Cooper and Sidney S. Alexander. New York: American Elsevier, 1972, 620 p. $19.95.

A volume in a series covering a wide spectrum of the area's problems. The conclusions are cautious, but they stress the potential for vigorous economic growth. On population, the analysis suggests a non-Malthusian interpretation even though present Arab birth rates are high.

THE CYPRUS QUESTION. By Leontios Ierodiakonou. Stockholm: Almqvist, 1971, 311 p. Swedish Kr. 30.

A generally reliable account, detailed up to 1959 and sketchy thereafter. The author is critical of British policy in the 1950s for injecting the question of partition and for denying self-determination to the people of Cyprus.

AKEL: THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CYPRUS. By T. W. Adams. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971, 284 p. $6.00.

The most complete and enlightening book on this subject. Adams shows how AKEL, like all others involved in the affairs of Cyprus, is caught on the horns of several dilemmas.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN IRAN 1900–1970. By Julian Bharier. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971, 314 p. $12.00.

This comprehensive study, rich in statistics, foresees a somewhat slower rate of economic growth over the coming decade than the remarkable progress of the recent past.

South and Southeast Asia

HO CHI MINH AND HIS VIETNAM. By Jean Sainteny. Chicago: Cowles Book Co., 1972, 193 p. $6.95.

A French diplomat who knew Ho Chi Minh for 24 years offers a graceful and perceptive account of the personality and politics of a man not easily fathomed. (A translation of "Face à Ho Chi Minh," Paris: Seghers, 1970, 210 p. Fr. 17.30.)

INDOCHINA IN CONFLICT: A POLITICAL ASSESSMENT. Edited by Joseph J. Zasloff and Allan E. Goodman. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1972, 227 p. $10.00.

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These generally solid papers, products of a Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group (SEADAG) seminar held in May 1971, deal with an underlying question phrased apocryphally by a military man: "Why are their gooks always better than our gooks?" The answer emergent in this volume: theirs are true nationalists, ours not.

NORTH VIETNAM'S STRATEGY FOR SURVIVAL. By Jon M. Van Dyke. Palo Alto: Pacific Books, 1972, 336 p. $10.95.

Between 1965 and 1968 the United States dropped more than a million tons of bombs on North Vietnam. This book, originally written for the then Professor Kissinger's Harvard seminar, is a sober but devastating critique of a tragically flawed policy.

WAR COMES TO LONG AN. By Jeffrey Race. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972, 299 p. $11.95.

The author, U.S. Army adviser to a Vietnamese district chief in 1967 and now a graduate student at Harvard, uses interviews and documents to explain the success of insurgent strategies and the failure of Washington and Saigon countermoves. In brief: the revolutionaries understood the situation and the people; the government and its ally were ignorant.

PAKISTAN: MILITARY RULE OR PEOPLE'S POWER. By Tariq Ali. New York: Morrow, 1970, 270 p. $7.95.

THE EAST PAKISTAN TRAGEDY. By L. F. Rusbrook Williams. New York: Drake Publishers, 1972, 142 p. $5.95.

PAKISTAN CRISIS. By David Loshak. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972, 152 p. $6.95.

These three polemics, now bypassed by events, are similarly passionate but absolutely irreconcilable. Ali, Trotskyist leader of the "Fourth International," saw mass violent revolution as—happily—inevitable; Professor Williams lamented the betrayal of Yahya Khan's good intentions by scheming Indians and Bengalis; journalist Loshak's swift-moving account of the genesis of the conflict argued that all solutions will be unhappy ones. The Bangladesh crisis made all analysis apocalyptic.

BEYOND PUNJAB: 1937–1960. By Prakash Tandon. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972, 222 p. $6.95.

Fluent narrative and a gift for the illuminating anecdote make this third autobiographical volume absorbing reading. Mr. Tandon, now chairman of India's State Trading Corporation, is the man who introduced the country of Gandhi to artificial *ghee*.

CULTURE AND POLITICS IN INDONESIA. Edited by Claire Holt with the assistance of others. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972, 348 p. $15.00.

This collection of essays, a fascinating exercise in the study of political culture, attempts to link traditional values and meanings to contemporary political behavior. Clifford Geertz, the grand master of cultural anthropology and Indonesian studies, contributes a singularly perceptive afterword.

East Asia and the Pacific

CHINA RETURNS. By Klaus Mehnert. New York: Dutton, 1972, 322 p. $10.00.

Mehnert toured China in 1971 at the invitation of Cambodia's Prince-in-exile,

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Sihanouk. He used his time to good advantage and his copious notes are not outdated by later travelers' reports on the Chinese enigma. (German original, "China nach dem Sturm," Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1971, 348 p. DM. 25.)

THE LONG MARCH 1935: THE EPIC OF CHINESE COMMUNISM'S SURVIVAL. By Dick Wilson. New York: Viking, 1972, 331 p. $8.95.

A distinguished journalist and long-time Asian expert combines painstaking research and vivid style to present a picture both sympathetic and skeptical of the mythic-historic key point in the communist Chinese Revolution.

LA LONGUE MARCHE. Presented by Claude Hudelot. Paris: Julliard, 1971, 365 p. Fr. 9.

This well-organized collection of primary and secondary source material, with intelligent commentary and narrative, constitutes a useful introduction to an exciting and crucial period of modern Chinese communist history. Its value is reduced by the exclusion of unsympathetic material.

THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS. By Helen Foster Snow (Nym Wales). Westport (Conn.): Greenwood, 1972, 398 p. $15.00.

Edgar Snow's ex-wife, an accomplished journalist herself, updates her 1937 "Red Dust" interviews with expanded biographical material on the individuals who were to become China's new élite.

SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1949–71. Documented and Introduced by Roderick MacFarquhar. New York: Praeger (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1972, 267 p. $8.00 (Paper, $2.95).

Rushed to the press, this volume contains a useful compendium of documents on the postwar course of Sino-American relations as well as essays by Morton Halperin, A.M. Halpern and Donald W. Klein which attempt to assess the consequences of this course.

THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION IN CHINA. Edited by Thomas W. Robinson. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971, 509 p. $13.50.

Writing for the RAND Corporation, five Sinologue scholars attack the problems of making sense of the Cultural Revolution. Richard Baum looks at the struggle in the countryside, Melvin Gurtov at the Foreign Ministry. William F. Dorrill examines the crucial role of ideology in the conflict and Harry Harding, Jr. analyzes its organizational precepts. Thomas W. Robinson looks at Chou's "political style." Interesting analyses, in part outmoded by events.

THE REVENGE OF HEAVEN: JOURNAL OF A YOUNG CHINESE. By Ken Ling. New York: Putnam, 1972, 413 p. $8.95.

The pseudonymous author, a student leader in the Cultural Revolution who fled China when the military reasserted control, depicts a world of cruel and unpredictable factional conflict.

CHINA'S CHANGING MAP: NATIONAL AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1949–71. By Theodore Shabad. New York: Praeger, 1972, 370 p. $15.00 (Paper, $5.95).

The author, at present in *The New York Times'* Moscow bureau, updates an admirable earlier work which should be an indispensable geographical and economic reference tool for the student of Chinese affairs.

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VICTORS' JUSTICE: THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL. By Richard H. Minear. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971, 229 p. $7.95.

Professor Minear argues that the Tokyo trials of 1946–48 were politically motivated, arbitrarily conducted and legally invalid. The evidence he adduces, most of which has long been available but remarkably unpublicized, leaves very little doubt that these conclusions are correct. His moral: waging aggressive war and overlooking war crimes were not and are not acts for which policy-makers can be held *legally* responsible.

CONSPIRACY AT MATSUKAWA. By Chalmers Johnson. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972, 460 p. $10.95.

In the summer of 1949 a passenger train was derailed in Japan after the tracks were sabotaged by persons unknown; three crewmen died in the wreck. Twenty years later the legal reverberations of the case still echoed in Japanese courtrooms. Professor Johnson uses this still unsolved mystery as a thread to guide the reader through a labyrinth of speculation about democracy, the law, political culture and social change in postwar Japan. It is a fascinating and disconcerting study.

THE STRUCTURE AND OPERATION OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY. By K. Bieda. New York: Wiley, 1970, 292 p. $9.00 (Paper, $6.95).

Analytic clarity, a sardonic originality and a profusion of relevant and statistical data make Bieda's book the best study of the overall functioning of the modern Japanese economy yet to appear.

Africa

GUERRILLA STRUGGLE IN AFRICA: AN ANALYSIS AND PREVIEW. By Kenneth W. Grundy. New York: Grossman, 1971, 204 p. $12.50 (Paper, $4.95).

This study, a theoretical treatise on the potential for antirégime violence in Africa generally, concentrates particularly on the colonial and white-settler régimes and advocates as well as predicts their downfall.

FRANCE AND BRITAIN IN AFRICA: IMPERIAL RIVALRY AND COLONIAL RULE. Edited by Prosser Gifford and Wm. Roger Louis. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971, 989 p. $30.00.

This collection of historical essays is valuable chiefly for the section devoted to comparative analysis of the British and French colonial administrations—in sum, they indicate that the differences were not as important as has been commonly thought.

CRISIS AND CONFLICT IN NIGERIA: A DOCUMENTARY SOURCEBOOK 1966–1970. By A. H. M. Kirk-Greene. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971, 2 v. ($13.75 and $17.00).

The book-length introduction to these two volumes of documents provides a lucid and closely substantiated account of the important events leading up to and spanning the civil war; the collection of primary source material is a significant tool for students of Nigeria.

NIGERIA: DILEMMA OF NATIONHOOD; AN AFRICAN ANALYSIS OF THE BIAFRAN CONFLICT. Edited by Joseph Okpaku. New York: The Third Press; Westport (Conn.): Greenwood, 1972, 426 p. $14.00.

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An uneven and occasionally abstruse collection of essays on Nigerian institutions and the civil war, by eight African authors.

POPULAR GOVERNMENT IN AN AFRICAN TOWN: KITA, MALI. By Nicholas S. Hopkins. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972, 246 p. $9.50.

This very detailed delineation of both the traditional and contemporary political structure of a Malian town illustrates some of the conflicts that may arise when a new and poor nation tries to combine the goals of participatory government and economic development.

THE REVOLUTION IN ANGOLA. By Don Barnett and Roy Harvey. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972, 312 p. $7.95.

The recorded autobiographies of four Angolan MPLA guerrillas, which constitute the major part of this book, offer vivid insights into the sources of the conflict in that Portuguese colony.

LIBERALISM IN SOUTH AFRICA 1948–1963. By Janet Robertson. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971, 252 p. $7.25.

Always in the background of this history is the image of South Africa's downward spiral into apartheid. In the foreground the author depicts in dispassionate detail the struggle of white and black liberals—carried on within the official framework of parliamentary government until the dissidents were forced outside it—for traditional civil rights as well as against racial separation.

THE DISCARDED PEOPLE: AN ACCOUNT OF AFRICAN RESETTLEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA. By Cosmas Desmond, O.F.M. Baltimore: Penguin, 1971, 264 p. $1.95 (Paper).

A first-hand report of the appalling conditions of life in many of the South African "homelands," and their effect upon the South African blacks resettled there.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Donald Wasson

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C. 20402. *United Nations, International Court of Justice:* United Nations, Sales Section, New York 10017. *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org.* and *Food and Agric. Org.:* Unipub, Inc., P.O. Box 433, New York 10016. *Int. Labor Office:* 917 15th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005. *European Communities:* 2100 M St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037. *Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development:* 1750 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, and Congressional documents, unless otherwise noted, are for the 92nd Congress, 2nd Session. New York imprints are United Nations, unless otherwise noted.

Africa

Organization of African Unity: what it is, how it works, what it does. Addis Ababa, OAU Press Information, n.d. 15 p.

Asia and the Pacific Ocean

Asian Development Bank Act amendments. Report, Committee on Banking and Currency, House, to accompany S. 749, Jan. 24, 1972. 12 p. (H. Rept. 92—771.)

——. Conference report, to accompany S. 749, Feb. 10, 1972. 3 p. (S. Rept. 92–608.)

Regional economic co-operation in Asia and the Far East: report of the meeting of the Council of Ministers for Asian Economic Co-operation (4th Session, Kabul, 1970). N.Y., 1971. 54 p. (Regional Economic Co-operation Series, no. 8.) (71.II.F.21.) $1.50.

Report of Special Study Mission to Asia, by Hon. L. L. Wolff. Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., pursuant to H. Res. 143, Je. 21, 1971. Washington, 1971. 37 p. (Com. Print.)

Five-power defence arrangements. Wellington, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1971. 41 p. (Publication, 410.) N.Z. $0.30.

Recognition of Bangladesh. Report, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, to accompany S.Con.Res. 55, Mar. 15, 1972. Washington, 1972. 7 p. (S. Rept. 92—694.)

Employment and unemployment in Ceylon, by P. J. Richards. Paris, OECD, 1971. 211 p. (Development Centre Studies Employment Series, 3.) $3.50.

United States-Republic of China relations. Hearings, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., Oct. 20–26, 1971. Washington, 1971.

Okinawa reversion treaty. Hearings and Annex, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., on Ex. J. 92-1, Oct. 27–29, 1971. Washington, 1971. 2 v.

Relating to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Report, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, House, to accompany S. 860, Feb. 24, 1972. Washington, 1972. 19 p. (H. Rept. 92—852.)

Vietnam commitments, 1961. Staff study based on the Pentagon Papers, prepared for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, Mar. 20, 1972. Washington, 1972. 38 p. (Study No. 1.) (Com. Print.)

The United States and Vietnam: 1944–1947. Staff study based on the Pentagon Papers, prepared for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, Apr. 3, 1972. Washington, 1972. 44 p. (Study No. 2.) (Com. Print.)

The Human cost of communism in Vietnam. A compendium prepared for the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act . . . Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, Feb. 17, 1972. Washington, 1972. 123 p. (Com. Print.)

Atomic Power

Atomic Energy Commission: Cannikin test and nuclear power program. Hearings, Subcommittee, Committee on Appropriations, House, Nov. 15, 1971. Washington, 1971. 63 p.

Commercial Policy and Trade

The President's new economic program. Hearings, Joint Economic Committee, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., Sept. 9–23, 1971. Washington, 1971. Pts. 3–4.

The International implications of the new economic policy. Hearings, Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy. Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., Sept. 16–21, 1971. Washington, 1972. 156 p.

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